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Abstract  
As frontline clinicians, junior doctors (trainees) are being increasingly recognised as powerful agents for 
change in improving patient safety. However, routine postgraduate medical education (PGME) offers little 
opportunity for trainees to develop the requisite knowledge and skills to advance safety improvement efforts. 
This thesis aims to build on the evidence base for patient safety education by developing and evaluating 
educational interventions informed by users, the existing literature, and educational theory.  
 
Section One (Chapters 1 to 3) sets the context for the thesis, providing an introduction to patient safety, 
relevant educational theory, and the role of education and engagement in improving patient safety. 
Subsequently, Section Two reports exploratory research to inform the development of a patient safety course 
for Foundation trainees – junior doctors at the very start of their careers. A systematic review reveals how the 
UK lags behind international efforts to deliver patient safety education for trainees, and highlights the need to 
address barriers to its sustainable integration into medical curricula (Chapter 4). An analysis of Foundation 
trainees’  portfolio  entries  demonstrates  the  feasibility  of  using  patient  safety  incidents  (PSIs)  experienced  by  
trainees as the basis for learning about patient safety (Chapter 5). 
 
Drawing on these findings, Section Three reports the development and evaluation of  ‘Lessons  Learnt:  Building  
a  Safer  Foundation’. This is a novel patient safety programme designed to formalise the opportunity for all 
1000+ trainees across a Foundation School to learn from PSIs in a structured, facilitated forum. The 
development and delivery of the programme is first described (Chapter 6), followed by empirical studies to 
develop senior faculty (Chapter 7), and to evaluate the impact of the programme on trainees’  learning both 
qualitatively (Chapter 8) and quantitatively (Chapter 9).  
 
In Section Four, a different approach is taken to explore non-technical skills (NTS) training for more senior 
trainees. A tri-continental interview study of 33 surgical team members underlines the need to improve 
debriefing as a core NTS in Surgery and explores the user perspective on effective debriefing in surgical 
training (Chapter 10). These findings are used to inform the development of the  ‘SHARP  5-Step Feedback Tool 
for Surgery’  and to evaluate its impact through observation of 100 surgical cases (Chapter 11).  
 
A number of conclusions are drawn from the research. Patient safety education is well accepted by trainees 
and trainers alike, and results in improved safety competencies across knowledge, skill and behavioural 
domains. It is feasible to embed a large-scale patient safety programme into PGME and to engage senior 
doctors to support its delivery. Overall, these findings suggest that patient safety education not only improves 
‘safety  skills’  at an individual level, but may also promote the safety of the wider healthcare system through 
enhancing medical engagement in patient safety and fostering cultural change. The concluding Section 
(Chapter 12) summarises the findings in detail. Strengths and limitations of the research are discussed, and 
recommendations are drawn for accelerating the integration of patient safety education into PGME.  
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SECTION ONE: Introduction and Aims 
I begin my thesis by setting the context for my research. In Chapter 1, I provide an introduction to 
patient safety and highlight the role of the doctor in maintaining and promoting patient safety. In 
Chapter 2, I explore the role of education to enhance medical engagement in patient safety and 
examine the current state of patient safety teaching in postgraduate medical education. In Chapter 
3, I outline key educational theory and approaches of relevance to my research and discuss their 
application to developing and delivering patient safety education for trainees (junior doctors). 
Finally, at the end of this Section, I set out the aims and outline of my thesis. 
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1 Patient Safety and the Role of the Doctor 
In this Chapter, I provide an introduction to the core concepts of patient safety to cover the 
emergence of patient safety and its relationship with quality, the scale of harm in healthcare and key 
safety theory. I move on to discuss progress in patient safety and areas for further development and 
conclude with an exploration of the role of the doctor in promoting patient safety. 
1.1 The Emergence of Patient Safety 
Although medical error and patient harm have been described and studied for centuries, it is only 
over the past decade that patient safety has gained international importance as a core tenet of high-
quality  healthcare.  Defined  as  ‘the  avoidance,  prevention  and  amelioration of adverse outcomes or 
injuries  stemming  from  the  process  of  healthcare’  (Vincent 2010),  it was a series of seminal reports 
including  the  Institute  of  Medicine’s  ‘To  Err  is  Human’  in  the  USA (Kohn et al. 1999) and the 
Department  of  Health’s  ‘An  Organisation  with  a  Memory’  in  the  UK  (Department of Health 2000), 
which first highlighted patient safety as a top  priority.  Prompted  by  early  studies  and  ‘celebrated  
cases’  of  harm,  these  reports  highlighted  teamwork,  reporting  and  learning, and systems thinking as 
central considerations in the quest for safer healthcare (Kohn et al. 1999, Department of Health 
2000). Subsequently, the spiralling human and financial cost of preventable harm, and additional 
high-profile failings in care, most recently the case of Mid-Staffordshire (House of Commons 2013) 
have served to propel patient safety further up the healthcare agenda, gaining the on-going 
attention of politicians, healthcare professionals and the public. 
 
Surprisingly, patient safety did not feature explicitly in earlier frameworks of quality in healthcare 
(Donabedian 1968, Maxwell 1984). Safety as a critical dimension of quality was first captured in the 
Institute  of  Medicine’s  ‘Crossing  the  Quality  Chasm’  report  as  one  of  six others including 
effectiveness, patient-centredness, timeliness, efficiency and equity (Institute of Medicine 2001). 
More  recently  in  the  UK,  it  was  the  Department  of  Health’s  ‘High  Quality  Care  for  All:  NHS  Next  Stage  
Review’  that  cited  safety,  effectiveness  and  patient  experience  as  the  most  important  aspects  of 
quality in healthcare (Department of Health 2008). Patient safety has been unfavourably branded as 
the  ‘dark  side  of  quality’  given  its  association  with  litigation  and  blame,  however,  it  is  being  
increasingly appreciated that safety has enriched the quality movement by contributing new ideas 
and approaches and by highlighting that healthcare can be positively dangerous to patients (Vincent 
2010).   
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1.2 The Scale of Harm in Healthcare    
When considering the nature and scale of harm in healthcare,  the  ‘adverse  event’  is  most  commonly  
used  to  define  harm;  it  describes  ‘an  unintended  injury  caused  by  medical  management  rather  than  
by the disease process and which is sufficiently serious to lead to prolongation of hospitalisation or 
to temporary  permanent  impairment  or  disability  to  the  patient  at  time  of  discharge  or  both’  
(Brennan et al. 1990). Various methods can be used to measure adverse events. These include 
analysis of administrative data, case record review, direct observation of patient care and active 
clinical surveillance (Thomas et al. 2003). Of these, the case record review is a commonly employed 
method and involves the retrospective review of medical records by trained clerical and clinical staff 
to assess the nature, incidence and economic impact of adverse events (Vincent 2010).   
 
The pioneering study of this kind was the Harvard Medical Practice Study in 1991, which found that 
adverse events occurred in 3.7% of acute care hospitalisations and 27.6% were due to negligence 
(Brennan et al. 1991). Extrapolating this data suggested that approximately 100,000 deaths per year 
in the USA were associated with adverse events and that 69.6% of these were potentially 
preventable (Leape et al. 1991).  Indeed a systematic review of eight studies employing retrospective 
record review found that in countries with well-developed healthcare systems, between 8% and 12% 
of hospitalised patients suffer from an adverse event, with almost half of these regarded as 
preventable (de Vries et al. 2008). Moreover, recent studies conducted in the USA (Landrigan et al. 
2010, Classen et al. 2011) the UK (Sari et al. 2007) and The Netherlands (Baines et al. 2013) 
demonstrate continuing high rates of preventable harm in the hospital setting.   
 
Surgery is one of the riskiest aspects of healthcare, with surgical adverse events accounting for one 
half to two thirds of all adverse events identified in many studies (Brennan et al. 1991, Gawande et 
al. 1999, de Vries et al. 2008). In a recent longitudinal retrospective record review study conducted 
in The Netherlands, over 50% of all adverse events were related to Surgery and the rate of 
preventable adverse events was found to be higher in patients admitted to surgical units in 2008 
when compared to in 2004 (Baines et al. 2013). In the UK, it is estimated that at least 30-35% of 
major complications in General Surgery could be avoided (Vincent 2010b). Whilst patient risk factors 
and intra-operative errors are significant contributors to adverse events in Surgery (Wanzel et al. 
2000), the standard of peri-operative care, underpinned by effective teamwork and communication, 
is critical in ensuring successful surgical outcomes (Neale et al. 2001, Gawande et al. 2003, Christian 
et al. 2006). For example, Gawande et al interviewed American surgeons and found that 43% of 
surgical adverse events were a direct result of communication failures between two or more 
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clinicians (Gawande et al. 2003). It is findings such as these, which have led to sustained global 
efforts to improve patient safety within Surgery (discussed further in 1.4.1).  
1.2.1 Reporting and learning systems: uses and limitations  
Reporting and learning systems in healthcare were established in response to the scale of harm 
revealed by early retrospective record review studies (Vincent 2010). Indeed a key recommendation 
of the  Department  of  Health’s  follow-on  publication  ‘Building  a  Safer  NHS  for  Patients:  Implementing  
An  Organisation  with  a  Memory’  (Department of Health 2001) was the establishment of the National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). Set up in 2004, this is a voluntary national reporting system 
to collect and analyse information from adverse events from all NHS organisations, in order to 
inform safety improvement efforts. 
 
Whilst  record  review  studies  are  able  to  provide  a  ‘snap-shot’  of  the  epidemiology  of  harm,  
reporting systems such as the NRLS aim to provide information about adverse events on an on-going 
basis. However, studies reveal that such systems only detect 7-15% of adverse events (Blais et al. 
2008) and that multiple methods should be used to gain an accurate picture of the scale of harm 
(Olsen et al. 2007). Nonetheless, reporting systems can be particularly useful in identifying patterns 
of adverse events, which at local level may seem insignificant but once collated may flag a significant 
concern in healthcare practice at national level (Vincent 2010).  
 
Crucially, despite learning being the primary aim of reporting systems, significant barriers to 
reporting exist.  As well as lack of time or opportunity, the majority of barriers relate to the still-
prevalent  ‘blame  culture’  with  factors  such  as  guilt,  shame  and  fear  of  retribution  making  clinicians  
the  inadvertent  ‘second  victim’  of  adverse  events  (Wu 2000). Moreover, lack of feedback and action 
from reporting is also cited as a significant factor leading to staff disillusionment and disengagement 
with reporting systems (Benn et al. 2009). 
1.3 Understanding Error and Harm  
Whilst reporting systems have amassed a wealth of information on adverse events, understanding 
harm in healthcare requires consideration of key patient safety theory and the application of root 
cause analysis. Here I outline key models of human error and explain how adverse events may act as 
a  ‘window  on  the  system’  (Vincent 2010). 
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1.3.1 Human error and systems thinking 
‘Error’  is  a  judgement  made  in  hindsight  and  describes  an  act  which  was  (i) not desired by a set of 
rules or an external observer (ii) led the task or system outside acceptable limits and (iii) was not 
intended by the actor (Senders et al. 1991). Importantly, not all adverse events are due to error and 
many errors do not result in adverse events (Vincent 2010). 
 
Generally, there are two ways in which human error can be viewed: the person approach and the 
system approach (Reason 2000). The  traditional  ‘blame  culture’  within  healthcare  is underpinned by 
the  ‘person  approach’ to error, which attributes unsafe acts to recklessness, carelessness or 
stupidity  on  the  individual’s  part.  Associated  countermeasures  typically  involve  disciplinary  
measures,  shaming  and  retraining.  In  contrast,  the  ‘systems  approach’  to  error  accepts  human  
fallibility and calls for errors to be understood in the context within which individuals work. 
Therefore,  countermeasures  based  on  the  ‘systems  approach’  work  on  the  assumption  that  ‘though  
we cannot change the human condition, we can change the conditions under which humans work’  
(Reason 2000). Crucially, the systems approach to error seeks not to remove individual 
accountability for adverse events but to promote a just patient safety culture. 
 
Jim Reason elegantly illustrates the  ‘systems approach’ to safety in his Swiss cheese model (Reason 
2000). This model explains that in any high technology system such as healthcare, there are several 
layers of defences and safeguards. These may take a variety of forms: some may be engineered (for 
example alarms and automatic shutdowns), others may be reliant on healthcare staff, and others 
still may depend on procedures and administrative controls. Ideally, these defences would be intact. 
However, in reality they more likely resemble slices of Swiss cheese with many holes (Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1 The Swiss cheese model of accident causation 
 
Reproduced from (Reason 2000) with permission from BMJ Publishing Group Ltd. 
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These  holes  may  arise  from  ‘active  failures’  (errors  and  other  unsafe  acts  committed  by  healthcare  
staff)  or  ‘latent  conditions’  (inevitable  system  ‘pathogens’  such  as  inadequate  equipment  or  poorly  
designed policies and procedures). An adverse event results when a combination of active failures 
and latent conditions align over successive layers of defence to permit a trajectory of harm (Reason 
2000). 
1.3.2 Analysing  adverse  events:  ‘A  window  on  the  system’   
Drawing on the ‘systems approach’ to patient safety, understanding the aetiology of harm in 
healthcare requires a consideration of the breadth of individual and systems factors that contribute 
to adverse events. Root cause analysis provides structure to the retrospective analysis of incidents 
and has been successfully used in high reliability organisations such as aviation and the nuclear 
power industry to promote learning from serious incidents (Wu et al. 2008).  
 
Several models of root cause analysis have been adapted for use in healthcare. In the USA, these 
include intensive programmes developed by the Joint Commission and the Department of Veteran 
Affairs (United States Department of Veteran Affairs 2013). In the UK, the London Protocol 
developed by  Vincent  et  al  is  a  method  based  on  Reason’s  model  of  organisational  accidents  (Reason 
1997).  Described by its originators as a ‘systems analysis’ method, central to the London Protocol is 
a  framework  of  contributory  factors  influencing  clinical  practice:  ‘the  seven  levels  of  safety’  (Vincent 
et al. 1998). These factors are displayed in Table 1.1 and range from patient factors, through staff and 
team factors to organisational and wider institutional factors. 
 
Regardless of the terminology and the taxonomies used, all such methods of investigating and 
analysing adverse events aim to address three key questions: what happened, why did it happen and 
what can be done to prevent future recurrence of such incidents? Full application of root cause 
analysis methods typically involves review of case records and other documents, and interviews with 
key staff  involved  in  the  incident.  As  Vincent  describes,  adverse  events  effectively  act  as  a  ‘window’  
on the system and incident analysis, if properly applied is not a retrospective search for root causes, 
but an attempt to look to the future (Vincent 2010). 
 
However, often root cause analyses are performed incompletely or with inappropriate emphasis on 
uncovering a single root cause for the incident under investigation (Wu et al. 2008). This has 
prompted calls for more training in root cause analysis (House of Commons 2009). Moreover, such 
analyses often do not produce useable results and barriers to engagement include insufficient time 
and resources and lack of support from colleagues and management (Braithwaite et al. 2006).  
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Table 1.1 Seven levels of safety: framework of contributing factors by Vincent et al. 
Factor types Contributing factors  
Patient factors  
 
Patient’s  condition  (complexity  &  seriousness) 
Language & communication 
Personality & social factors 
Task & Technology factors 
 
Task design & clarity of structure 
Availability & use of protocols 
Availability & accuracy of test results 
Decision making aids 
Individual staff factors  
 
Knowledge & skills  
Competence  
Physical & mental health 
Team factors  
 
Verbal & written communication 
Supervision & seeking help 
Team leadership 
Work environment factors  
 
Staffing levels & skills mix 
Workload & shift patterns 
Design, availability & maintenance of equipment 
Administrative & managerial support 
Physical environment  
Organisational & Management factors  
 
Financial resources & constraints 
Organisational structure 
Policy, standards & goals 
Safety culture & priorities 
Wider institutional context factors   
 
Economic & regulatory context 
NHS Executive 
Links with external organisations 
 
1.4 Progress on Patient Safety  
An appreciation of the nature and scale of harm in healthcare and the development of safety theory 
and methodologies has meant that patient safety has rapidly emerged as a science in its own right 
(Shekelle et al. 2011).  Here I highlight key progress in patient safety and outline areas in need of 
development.  
1.4.1 Strategies for improving patient safety 
There has been substantial research activity and investment globally in patient safety with studies 
being  conducted  which  span  the  ‘research  cycle’  to  include  those  measuring  harm,  understanding  
causes, identifying solutions, evaluating impact and translating evidence into safer care (Andermann 
et al. 2011). In particular, there has been a huge proliferation of interventions aimed at improving 
patient safety. These have been directed at various levels from the patient (for example patient 
engagement in hand hygiene programmes (McGuckin et al. 2011)) to individual clinicians and teams 
(for example team training (Maynard et al. 2012)); the workplace (for example working time 
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regulations (McIntyre et al. 2010))  and  broader  healthcare  systems  (for  example  the  UK’s  NRLS). 
However, such interventions have produced mixed results (Woodward et al. 2010).  
 
Given the high rates of preventable harm in Surgery, there have been concerted international efforts 
to improve safety in this field (Vincent 2010b). Most  notably,  the  World  Health  Organisation’s  
(WHO) Surgical Safety Checklist (World Health Organisation 2008) which aims to improve team 
communication and consistency of care has now been implemented in several countries worldwide 
including in the UK, having demonstrated reductions in surgical morbidity and mortality (Haynes et 
al. 2009). Simulation-based medical education has grown in popularity as a means of developing 
surgical skills whilst protecting patients from trainees’  learning  curves  (Aggarwal et al. 2006). 
However such interventions are by no means a panacea for improving safety in Surgery (Savoldelli et 
al. 2005, Vats et al. 2010), as will be discussed further in Section Four of the thesis. 
 
Recently, a research team supported by an international panel of patient safety experts reviewed 
the evidence for 41 patient safety strategies judged to be the most important to the largest 
audience (Shekelle et al. 2013). They considered the strength and quality of evidence about the 
effectiveness of implementation for each safety strategy and concluded that based on the evidence, 
22 patient safety strategies were ready to be encouraged for adoption by healthcare providers 
(Shekelle et al. 2013).  Among  the  ‘top  10’  listed were preoperative and anaesthesia checklists to 
prevent operative and postoperative deaths (Haynes et al. 2009); bundles that include checklists to 
prevent central-line associated bloodstream infections (Pronovost et al. 2006); hand hygiene 
programmes (Kendall et al. 2012) as well as previously less publicised strategies such as 
multicomponent interventions to reduce pressure ulcers (Sullivan et al. 2013).   
1.4.2 Patient safety strategies: areas for development 
Whilst the evidence base for patient safety strategies has matured over the past 12 years since the 
publication of seminal policy reports, recent reports in the USA and UK conclude that progress in 
patient safety has been slower than hoped (House of Commons 2009, Shojania et al. 2013, Wachter 
et al. 2013). A number of reasons are cited for this (Shojania et al. 2013). Some safety strategies may 
be highly context-specific (Wachter et al. 2013), with a multiplicity of barriers preventing wider 
adoption and sustainability (Burnett et al. 2010). Moreover, evaluating the impact of safety 
interventions on patient outcomes can prove challenging (Vincent et al. 2008).  More research is 
therefore required to identify the best approaches to integrating safety strategies into clinical 
practice and to develop improved measures of harm and context (Wachter et al. 2013). 
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Crucially, it is felt that safety improvement efforts have so far paid insufficient attention to the role 
of clinicians (includes doctors, nurses and other allied health professionals) (House of Commons 
2009). In particular, there are renewed calls for medical leadership in patient safety (Pronovost et al. 
2009, Shine 2013). In a recent editorial, Shine et al lament that doctors have been notoriously 
unwilling to consider treatment protocols, checklists, and bundles of care - branding  them  as  ‘cook-
book  medicine’  (Shine 2013). They further reflect on the sad irony that often the success of a care 
bundle  is  inversely  proportionate  to  the  amount  of  effort  required  on  the  doctors’  part.  Moreover,  
engagement with incident reporting systems (Wallace et al. 2008) and compliance with hand 
hygiene (Creedon et al. 2008) is also poor amongst doctors when compared to their clinical peers. It 
is therefore essential to consider the role of the doctor in patient safety. 
1.5 The Role of the Doctor in Patient Safety  
With the paradigm shift in  safety  theory  to  the  ‘systems approach’, care needs to be taken to avoid 
inadvertent promulgation of a simplistic ‘no  blame’  culture,  removing  individual  accountability.   
Indeed, doctors have a professional duty to maintain high standards of good medical practice and to 
raise and act on concerns about patient safety (General Medical Council 2012, General Medical 
Council 2013). Key statements from the General  Medical  Council’s  (GMC)  latest  guidance  on  ‘Good  
Medical Practice’  are  displayed  in  Box 1.1 (General Medical Council 2013). Here I examine the 
qualities and attributes of the safe doctor and begin to consider how the role of doctors in patient 
safety may be enhanced through education. 
 
Box 1.1 Key statements  in  the  GMC’s  ‘Good  Medical  Practice’,  Domain  2:  Safety  and  quality   
 
You must take part in systems of quality assurance and quality improvement to promote patient safety. This 
includes: a) taking part in regular reviews and audits of  your  work…  b)  regularly  reflecting  on  your  standards  of  
practice  and  the  care  you  provide…  Paragraph 22 
  
To help keep patients safe you must: a) contribute to confidential inquiries; b) contribute to adverse event 
recognition; c) report adverse incidents involving medical devices that put or have the potential to put the 
safety  of  a  patient,  or  another  person,  at  risk…  Paragraph 23   
 
You must promote and encourage a culture that allows all staff to raise concerns openly and safely. 
Paragraph 24   
 
You must take prompt action if you think that patient safety, dignity or comfort is or may be seriously 
compromised: a) If a patient is not receiving basic care to meet their needs, you must immediately tell 
someone who is in a position to act straight away b) If patients are at risk because of inadequate premises, 
equipment or other resources, policies or systems, you should put the matter right if that is possible. You must 
raise your concern in line with   our guidance and  your  workplace  policy…  Paragraph 25 
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1.5.1 The qualities and attributes of the safe doctor 
As frontline staff within complex healthcare systems, doctors often form the last line of defence 
against harm reaching a patient, and may actively contribute to the genesis or erosion of safety 
through their actions or omissions (Taylor-Adams 2008). However, the qualities and attributes of the 
safe doctor  go  beyond  ‘simple’  technical  competence  (Yule et al. 2006). Analysis of adverse events in 
healthcare and lessons from high reliability organisations including aviation and the nuclear power 
industry, has led to widespread acceptance  of  ‘non-technical  skills’  (NTS)  as  being  key  to  ensuring  
safe clinical practice – particularly within the craft specialties of Surgery and Anaesthetics. Defined as 
‘the  cognitive,  social  and  personal  resource  skills  that  complement  technical  skills  and contribute to 
safe  and  efficient  task  performance’  (Flin et al. 2008), NTS span a broad range of skills including 
communication, teamwork and situational awareness (Yule et al. 2006) (Table 1.2). 
 
Table 1.2 Taxonomy of non-technical skills in Surgery proposed by Yule et al 
Interpersonal skills Cognitive skills 
Communication 
Leadership 
Teamwork 
Briefing/ planning/ preparation 
Resource management 
Seeking advice and feedback 
Coping with pressure/ stress/ fatigue 
Situation awareness 
Mental readiness 
Assessing risks 
Anticipating problems 
Decision making 
Adaptive strategies/ flexibility 
Workload distribution 
 
 
Recently, Long et al sought to capture a broader conceptualisation of the qualities and attributes of 
a safe doctor than that afforded by established taxonomies of NTS. The authors conducted a survey 
and focus group of patient safety experts and identified a long-list  of  73  ‘safety  skills’  (attributes of a 
safe doctor) which fell into 18 broad categories (listed in Box 1.2) (Long et al. 2011). Subsequent 
survey of 50 physicians and surgeons regarding their views on the skills identified found that the 
majority of these skills were perceived to be important to being a safe practitioner. 
 
Interestingly, the attributes of humility, honesty and empathy were uncovered as being key qualities 
of a safe doctor. Indeed, these attributes fit well with the broader qualities that patients, the public 
and regulators expect the medical profession to espouse (General Medical Council 2013). However, 
they may not have previously been accepted as being of direct importance to safe medical practice.  
33  
Box 1.2 Categories of 'safety skills' identified by Long et al 
Anticipation and preparedness   
Awareness of the patient (including empathy) 
Awareness of oneself    
Awareness of the situation   
Awareness  of  one’s  team 
Common sense 
Confidence   
Conscientiousness    
Crisis management   
Honesty    
Humility 
Leadership  
Open-mindedness   
Organisational skills and efficiency 
Responsiveness 
Team working and communication  
Technical skills    
Vigilance 
 
1.5.2 Enhancing the role of the doctor in improving patient safety  
Importantly,  survey  respondents  in  Long’s  study  also  believed  that  the  majority  of  the  ‘safety  skills’  
identified can be trained (Long et al. 2011). However, as a junior doctor (henceforth abridged to 
‘trainee’)  I  am  aware  that  routine  postgraduate medical education contains little or no formal 
opportunity to develop many of the safety skills beyond the core technical competencies of a doctor.  
Moreover, core concepts of patient safety described in the preceding sections are rarely taught and 
despite the recognised value and importance of learning from error and adverse events (and the 
recognised barriers to doing so), there is often minimal opportunity for trainees to reflect and learn 
from such events in a systematic way. If professional standards set by the GMC are to be met, as 
argued by others (Pilpel et al. 1998, Aron et al. 2002, Flin et al. 2009, Paterson-Brown 2011), I 
believe that education is necessary to not only equip us with essential technical and non-technical 
skills, but to help us to accept our fallibility; to learn from things that go wrong and engage us in 
efforts to improve the wider healthcare system. 
 
In summary, in this Chapter I have described how patient safety is a critical component of high 
quality care and an emerging science in its own right. Whilst there has been considerable progress in 
patient safety, the role of doctors in promoting safety has received inadequate attention, and 
optimising their role through education warrants further exploration. In the following Chapter, I 
continue to set the context for my thesis by describing the structure and delivery of postgraduate 
medical education and by examining the evidence for education and training as a means of 
enhancing medical engagement in patient safety.  
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2 Education and Engagement for Patient Safety  
Building on Chapter 1, in this Chapter I continue to set the context for my research. I begin by 
describing the structure, delivery and regulation of postgraduate medical education (PGME) in the 
UK. I move on to highlight how this relates to medical, and particularly trainee engagement in 
patient safety. Subsequently, I examine the evidence for educational interventions in patient safety, 
with a focus on courses teaching core concepts of patient safety and non-technical skills training. 
Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the current state of patient safety education in UK PGME and 
outline opportunities for change. 
 
Before I begin, I am aware that there is often inconsistent use of the terms ‘education’  and  ‘training’  
within the field of postgraduate medical education. The  Oxford  dictionary  defines  ‘education’  as ‘the 
process  of  receiving  or  giving  systematic  instruction’ (Oxford Dictionary 2013). This definition further 
extends  to  define  ‘education’  in  the  health  context:  ‘information  about  or  training  in  a  particular  
subject: health education’. For the purpose of my thesis, I will use the phrase ‘postgraduate medical 
education (PGME)’  to  encompass both  ‘education’  and  ‘training’ in the period following graduation 
from medical school up until the Certificate of Completion of Training (CCT).  
2.1 Postgraduate Medical Education in the UK  
Postgraduate medical education (PGME) and heath service delivery are inextricably linked (House of 
Commons 2013). A detailed analysis of PGME since the creation of the NHS is beyond the scope of 
my thesis. Instead, I will focus on recent changes from the early 1990s, before which the 
postgraduate  medical  career  structure  had  ‘remained  remarkably  similar’  over  the  previous  decades  
(Osgood et al. July 2012). I begin by outlining key policy milestones and regulatory reforms in PGME, 
before describing the current structure and delivery of PGME in the UK. 
2.1.1 Key policy milestones in PGME  
The  ‘educational  journey’  is  said  to  have  commenced in 1993 with the report by the then Chief 
Medical  Officer  (CMO),  Sir  Kenneth  Calman  ‘Hospital  Doctors:  Training  for  the  future’  (Department 
of Health 1993) and  a  subsequent  report  by  the  successive  CMO  Sir  Liam  Donaldson  ‘Unfinished  
Business’  (Donaldson August 2002).  The  result  was  a  set  of  reforms  entitled  ‘Modernising  Medical  
Careers’  (MMC)  which  aimed  for  more  streamlined  training that would ensure competency-based 
progression of doctors through training - to  work  towards  the  2000  NHS  Plan’s  vision  of  a  more  
consultant-delivered service (Department of Health 2000). However, the time-frame for the 
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proposed reforms was extremely challenging. Inadequate workforce planning, poor selection and 
the failure of the computerised Medical Training Application System (MTAS) led to major problems 
and criticism in 2007 (NHS Medical Education England 2012). Sir John Tooke was tasked to lead an 
independent inquiry into MMC and amongst his many recommendations was the creation of a new 
body  to  act  as  the  professional  interface  between  policy  development  and  implementation:  ‘Medical  
Education  England’  (MEE)  - a  concept  which  was  further  developed  in  Lord  Darzi’s  NHS  Next  Stage  
Review (Tooke 2008).  
 
Established in 2009, the role of MEE was to provide the Department of Health with independent 
expert advice on education, training and workforce planning for doctors, dentists, healthcare 
scientists and pharmacists (NHS Medical Education England 2012). MEE commissioned two recent 
major  reports:    ‘Time  for  Training’  – a review of the impact of the European Working Time 
Regulations (EWTR) on the quality and outcomes of PGME (Temple 2010) and  ‘Foundation  for  
Excellence’  – a review of the Foundation Programme (Collins 2010). Importantly, both reports have 
highlighted the need for an appropriate  balance  between  education  and  ‘delivering  the  service’  and  
have also raised concerns regarding the supervision of trainees (NHS Medical Education England 
2012).   
 
At the time of writing, a new national leadership body for education, training and development of 
the healthcare workforce  ‘Health  Education  England’  (HEE) is being developed in response to policy 
set  out  in  ‘Liberating  the  NHS:  Developing  the  Healthcare  Workforce’ (Department of Health 2010). 
HEE will be in full operation from April 2013 and will take over the work of MEE. A key objective will 
be to ensure greater responsibility and accountability for local decision-making in issues of 
healthcare education, training and workforce planning - through the development and support of 
Local Education and Training Boards (LETBs) (Department of Health 2012).  
2.1.2 Regulatory reforms in PGME  
Historically, the medical profession has been self-regulated,  relying  upon  the  public’s  trust  in  doctors  
to maintain high standards of clinical practice. However, a number of high-profile medical failings 
have accelerated the pace for regulatory reform (Tooke 2008). Before 2005, the General Medical 
Council (GMC) had responsibility for undergraduate medical education; postgraduate specialist 
medical training was the responsibility of the Royal Colleges as agents of the Specialist Training 
Authority (STA), whilst General Practice (GP) training was overseen by the Joint Committee on 
Postgraduate Training for General Practice (PMETB 2009). In 2000, the NHS Plan proposed a joint 
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regulator for both specialist and GP training and in 2001, the Bristol Inquiry called for more public 
and service involvement in all healthcare regulatory functions.  
 
Following government consultation, the Postgraduate Medical Education and Training Board 
(PMETB) was created in 2005 to oversee all postgraduate medical education and training across the 
UK (PMETB 2009). In 2006, the Shipman Inquiry galvanised additional moves towards a single 
regulator for undergraduate and postgraduate medical education and in 2008, the Tooke Inquiry 
into MMC recommended early amalgamation of the regulatory functions of PMETB and the GMC to 
achieve greater continuity and economies of scale (Tooke 2008). Since April 2010, the GMC has 
assumed statutory responsibility for setting, maintaining and promoting standards of undergraduate 
and postgraduate medical education in the UK (General Medical Council 2010).  
2.1.3 The current structure and delivery of PGME  
Following graduation from medical school, all UK graduates must complete the Foundation 
Programme, a two-year period of training which is managed locally by Foundation schools in 
association with medical schools, deaneries and healthcare providers (NHS Careers 2013). The 
Foundation Programme curriculum is set by the UK Foundation Programme Office (UKFPO), in 
collaboration with other stakeholders and in accordance to standards set by the GMC. Successful 
completion of the first year of Foundation training leads to full registration with the GMC. 
 
Following Foundation training, trainees compete to enter GP or specialist training programmes, the 
latter of which come in a variety of models depending on the chosen specialty. Some specialties 
operate  ‘run-through’  training  programmes  (where trainees are recruited for the full duration of the 
specialty programme), whilst others involve Core Training, which typically runs for two to three 
years, following which trainees apply to continue training in their chosen (sub-) specialty (NHS 
Careers 2013). Training is delivered through a range of healthcare organisations, overseen and 
supported by postgraduate deaneries and with curricula set by the respective medical Royal 
Colleges. Progression through training is competency-based and typically takes three years for 
General Practice, and five to seven years for other specialties. Successful completion of training 
results in a Certificate of Completion of Training (CCT) and eligibility for entry to the GMC's Specialist 
or GP Register (NHS Careers 2013).   
 
As is apparent, the structure, delivery and regulation of PGME is complex and subject to multiple 
influences from diverse organisations. A constant tension remains in striving to produce a capable 
medical workforce (through education), whilst ensuring the delivery of safe, effective healthcare. It 
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is therefore crucial that patient safety remains at the fore in the development and delivery of PGME. 
Moreover, given increasing calls for medical leadership and engagement in patient safety, PGME 
must support this. This is discussed further next. 
2.2 Medical Engagement in Safety and Quality 
Increasingly, the onus is on doctors to not only maintain high standards of personal practice, but to 
also actively engage in safety and quality improvement efforts (House of Commons 2009).  
Evidence shows that the quality of healthcare improves when doctors are engaged (Ham et al. 
2008), however wide-scale medical engagement in safety and quality remains a challenge both in 
the UK and internationally (Neale et al. 2007, Pronovost et al. 2009, Shine 2013). Historically in the 
UK, patient safety has fallen under the remit of risk managers and shrouded under the umbrella of 
‘Clinical  Governance’ (Scally et al. 1998). However, a number of recent drivers are shifting the focus 
back towards medical leadership for safety and quality. I have summarised these in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Recent drivers for medical engagement in safety and quality 
Driver Comments 
The Francis Inquiry into 
Mid-Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust 
 
This report highlighted the lack of medical engagement as a key contributor to failings at 
Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.  This included too great a tolerance of 
substandard care by clinicians including doctors and a failure to tackle challenges to the 
creation of a positive safety culture (House of Commons 2013). 
Patient safety and quality 
improvement explicitly 
referenced in appraisal and 
revalidation requirements 
of all doctors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All doctors will be expected to demonstrate a commitment to quality and safety as part of 
revalidation in order to maintain a license to practise with the General Medical Council 
(GMC) (General Medical Council 2012b). Supporting information required for appraisal and 
revalidation includes: 
 Quality  improvement  activity  defined  as  ‘activities  that  review  and  evaluate  the  quality  
of  the  doctor’s  work.  Examples  include clinical audit; review of clinical outcomes; case 
review or discussion; audit and monitoring of the effectiveness of a teaching 
programme and evaluating the impact and effectiveness of a piece of health policy or 
management  practice’  (General Medical Council 2012c). 
 Discussion of significant event(s)  defined  as  ‘any  unintended  or  unexpected  event(s),  
which could or did lead to harm of one or more patients.’ Guidance advises that 
‘discussion of such events should emphasise those that have led to a specific change in 
the  doctors’  practice  or  which  demonstrate  learning’  (General Medical Council 2012c). 
Recognition of medical 
leadership as a core role of 
all doctors 
 
 The GMC produced new guidance on leadership and management in 2012, highlighting 
how all doctors have a role in leadership and quality improvement (General Medical 
Council 2012d). 
 Moreover, the Faculty of Medical Leadership and Management (FMLM) was 
established in 2011 as a UK-wide organisation, endorsed by the Royal Colleges and 
which aims ‘to promote the advancement of medical leadership, management and 
quality improvement at all stages of the medical career from medical student to 
medical  director,  for  the  benefit  of  patients’  (Faculty of Medical Leadership and 
Management 2011). 
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2.2.1 Trainees  as  ‘agents  for  change’   
With over 55,000 doctors in training in the UK at any one time, the majority of healthcare in the 
hospital setting is delivered by trainees. Trainees therefore have a critical role in the maintenance of 
patient safety at the frontline (Long et al. 2009). However, factors such as clinical inexperience, 
inadequate training or supervision and workload pressures often expose patients to harm 
(Rodriguez-Paz et al. 2009). Moreover, when errors or adverse events do occur, barriers to 
disclosure and reporting are often felt more acutely by trainees, due to their position within the 
medical hierarchy (Kaldjian et al. 2008). It is against this backdrop that a core aim of educational 
regulation is to safe-guard patients against the risks posed by trainees (General Medical Council 
2011). 
 
However, far from being a threat to patient safety, trainees are being increasingly recognised as an 
underutilised resource in driving safety and quality improvement efforts (Swanwick 2012). Robert 
Francis QC in his final report into failings at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust argues that 
trainees  are  ‘invaluable  eyes  and  ears’  of  the  system  (House of Commons 2013). Although their 
frequent rotations as part of medical training may lead to their being perceived as  ‘renters’ rather 
than ‘owners’ of the workplace (Padmore et al. 2009), working across and within diverse 
organisations makes trainees well-placed to identify areas of good and poor practice and to pose 
potential solutions for improvement (Gilbert et al. 2012).  
 
A recent survey of UK trainees found favourable attitudes towards patient safety (Durani et al. 
2013). Moreover, trainees express a strong desire and ability to engage in quality improvement 
(Gilbert et al. 2012, Parvizi et al. 2012). Notably, ‘The  Network’, an online community of medical 
students and trainees interested in medical leadership and management recently published a 
casebook of 50 trainee-led quality improvement projects across the UK, with an additional bank of 
over 100 examples accessible online (The Network 2012). 
 
However, there are a number of barriers to medical (including trainee) engagement in quality and 
safety. These include lack of time and competing clinical commitments; lack of formal roles and 
recognition for safety and quality improvement activities and insufficient education in both the 
science of patient safety and quality improvement and skills in leadership and management 
(Pronovost et al. 2009, Bagnall 2012, Gilbert et al. 2012). For trainees in particular, organisational 
resistance presents a significant barrier to engagement (Bagnall 2012, Gilbert et al. 2012). The focus 
of this thesis is on addressing the barrier of inadequate education for trainees.  
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2.3 Education to Improve Patient Safety 
Reflecting on the narrative so far, when considering how postgraduate medical education (PGME) 
may optimise the trainees’  role  in  patient  safety,  supporting  the  attainment  of  clinical  competencies  
is not enough. Trainees must develop non-technical skills to ensure safe clinical practice at the 
frontline and also understand the science of safety in order to engage in wider safety improvement 
efforts. Educational interventions in patient safety may therefore fall into two broad categories: (i) 
courses in core concepts of patient safety and (ii) training in non-technical skills. Here I examine the 
evidence for each of these in turn and highlight factors influencing their mainstream integration into 
medical curricula and training programmes.  
2.3.1 Courses in core concepts of patient safety  
Recent years have seen a rapid proliferation in the number of published patient safety courses for 
trainees. Wong et al conducted a recent systematic review on ‘teaching  quality  improvement  and  
patient  safety  to  trainees’  (Wong et al. 2010). The authors included  ‘any  study  that  as  a  minimum  
described a curriculum that explicitly identified its goal as exposing medical students or residents to 
concepts in quality improvement or patient safety and that outlined specific teaching methods used 
to achieve  this  educational  goal’  (Wong et al. 2010). 41 reports published between January 2000 and 
January 2009 were identified. The majority of studies were conducted in the USA (93%) and involved 
residents (junior doctors, 59%) as opposed to medical students. Core content of the courses 
included root cause analysis, systems thinking and quality improvement methodologies (Wong et al. 
2010). Among the 27 reports that included an evaluation, the study approach most commonly 
involved a before-and-after design and methodological limitations were typically related to small 
participant numbers and single-centre study sites. The interventions were mostly well received by 
participants and resulted in improvements in safety and quality knowledge scores. However, few 
studies  were  able  to  demonstrate  changes  in  learners’  behaviour or potential patient benefit (Wong 
et al. 2010).  
 
Building on published work, a number of dedicated patient safety curricula and frameworks have 
been developed for undergraduate and postgraduate medical education. For example, the World 
Health  Organisation’s  (WHO)  Patient  Safety  Curriculum  Guide  for  Medical  Schools  (World Health 
Organisation 2009) and more recently their multi-professional edition (World Health Organisation 
2011) include 11 core topics (Box 2.1). Such curricula aim to guide and support educators in 
developing and implementing educational programmes in patient safety.  
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Box 2.1 WHO Patient Safety Curriculum Guide Topics 
 
1. What is patient safety 
2. Why applying human factors is important to patient safety 
3. Understanding systems and the impact of complexity on patient care 
4. Being an effective team player 
5. Learning from errors to prevent harm 
6. Understanding and managing clinical risk 
7. Using quality improvement methods to improve care 
8. Engaging with patients and carers 
9. Infection prevention and control  
10. Patient safety and invasive procedures  
11. Improving medication safety 
 
 
2.3.2 Non-technical skills training to improve patient safety  
As highlighted in Chapter 1, non-technical skills (NTS) are critical to the delivery of safe, effective 
clinical care and include a range of cognitive and interpersonal skills (Yule et al. 2006). Drawing on 
lessons from the aviation industry and other high-reliability organisations, there is a growing 
literature of NTS training in healthcare, particularly within the craft specialties of Surgery and 
Anaesthetics (Flin et al. 2009).  
 
Importantly, there  is  often  confusion  surrounding  the  concept  of  ‘non-technical  skills’.  For  example, 
Gordon et al ambitiously sought to  review  ‘any  studies  involving  an  educational  intervention  to  
improve non-technical skills amongst undergraduate or postgraduate staff in an acute health care 
environment’  (Gordon et al. 2012). However, the search strategy lacked both sensitivity and 
specificity and the authors included just 22 studies, of which 6 did not involve NTS training but 
teaching in core concepts of safety described in 2.3.1.  Moreover,  the  term  ‘human  factors’  is  often  
incorrectly used as a synonym for non-technical skills. Human factors is a broader concept to 
describe  ‘…the  effects of teamwork, tasks, equipment, workspace, culture and organisation on 
human behaviour and  abilities…’ (Catchpole 2013).  
 
Looking at more focused studies of NTS training, one of the most popular training interventions 
under study in healthcare is team training. A systematic review of teamwork training for medical 
students and residents found that such training produced a modest improvement in knowledge, 
skills, attitudes and behaviours in the short-term (Chakraborti et al. 2008). A study of aviation-style 
crew-resource management training for surgical teams demonstrated significant improvements in 
technical error rates and NTS (McCulloch et al. 2009). More recently, a large-scale study across 108 
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Veteran Health Association facilities in the USA found that team training was associated with 
significantly lower surgical mortality (Neily et al. 2010).  
Other examples of NTS targeted for training interventions include mental readiness and stress 
management. A randomised controlled trial of mental practice in surgeons demonstrated significant 
improvement in technical performance in the simulated setting (Arora et al. 2011). Similarly, stress 
management training (including coping strategies, mental rehearsal and relaxation) produced 
beneficial effects on coping, stress and teamwork skills in a trial of surgeons in the simulated setting 
(Wetzel et al. 2011). 
2.3.3 Factors influencing curricular integration  
Despite increasing evidence for the efficacy of educational interventions in patient safety, the wider 
implementation and adoption of successful interventions has been slow (Woodward et al. 2010, 
Wong et al. 2012). In terms of courses teaching core concepts of patient safety and quality 
improvement, Wong et al identified a number of common barriers by textual analysis of studies 
included in their review. These barriers included lack of expert faculty, poor learner engagement, 
competing educational priorities and an unsupportive institutional culture (Wong et al. 2010).  
 
Although a comparable analysis of barriers to the integration of NTS training is lacking, a number of 
recent studies indicate that factors such as cultural resistance (McCulloch et al. 2009), lack of expert 
faculty (Hull et al. 2012), and insufficient understanding of NTS and their impact on technical 
performance (Hull et al. 2012b) may hinder the development and delivery of NTS training. 
Moreover, given that such training commonly utilises simulation-based modalities or involves 
multidisciplinary teams, logistical and resource constraints may also influence the sustainability and 
spread of NTS training interventions (Savoldelli et al. 2005).  
 
As a result, recommendations to promote curricular integration of patient safety education aim to 
address the factors outlined above. These recommendations include investing in faculty 
development, promoting patient safety as a science and integrating patient safety competencies 
into accreditation standards and certification examinations, to ensure protected time and incentives 
for medical engagement (Pronovost et al. 2009, Wong et al. 2012). 
2.4 Patient Safety in UK Postgraduate Medical Education  
Focussing on the UK context, in 2009, the House of Commons Health Committee Inquiry into Patient 
Safety concluded that patient safety is taught implicitly within medical education and called for its 
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explicit integration into the education and training curricula of all healthcare workers (House of 
Commons 2009). Here I examine the current state of patient safety education in UK postgraduate 
medical education (PGME) and highlight emerging opportunities for elevating its status within the 
educational landscape. 
2.4.1 Patient safety education in PGME: the current state 
In 2010, the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges commissioned the NHS Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement (NHSIII) and  the  Royal  College  of  Surgeons  to  devise  ‘guidance  on  improving  patient  
safety  in  postgraduate  medical  education’  (NHS III 2010). As part of this, a review of postgraduate 
curricula  was  conducted  and  found  that  there  was  ‘no  individual  module  in  any  postgraduate  
curricular  programme  on  patient  safety’.  However,  this  review  was  ill-timed as it coincided with a 
recent iteration and resubmission of curricula by the Royal Colleges to PMETB (the then regulator of 
PGME). In fact, a number of postgraduate medical curricula do stipulate core competencies in 
patient safety and quality improvement including the Foundation Programme curriculum and that of 
the Royal College of General Practitioners (UK Foundation Programme Office 2010, Royal College of 
General Practitioners 2012). This working group also reviewed established national and international 
patient safety curricula and with the support of a panel of industry and patient safety experts, they 
produced  a  ‘Curriculum  Creator  Tool’,  to  support  and  inform  the  delivery  of  patient  safety  education 
in PGME (NHS III et al. 2010). This tool enables curriculum developers to map their curricula against 
content covered in five broad modules: domains of patient safety; organisational/ contextual issues; 
measurement/ tools; personal attributes that support patient safety and collaborative working 
practices (NHS III et al. 2010).  
 
However, the inclusion of safety and quality competencies into curricula is just one step. In the UK, 
the provision of education to help develop these competencies is severely lacking (NHS III 2010). 
Various short-courses are offered by external organisations such as the NHS Institute for Innovation 
and Improvement and medico-legal organisations including the Medical Protection Society. Online 
courses by various providers (e.g. BMJ Quality) and degree- level courses are also available (e.g. 
Imperial  College  London’s  MSc  programme  in  Quality  and  Safety  in  Healthcare).  However  these  
invariably appeal to a self-selected group and may not be accessible to doctors across all grades and 
specialties.   
 
With regards training in non-technical skills (NTS), the Health Committee Inquiry concluded that 
healthcare was ‘lagging behind’ other safety-critical industries (House of Commons 2009). 
Subsequently, two editorials in the British Medical Journal echoed calls for the integration of NTS 
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training into routine medical education (Flin et al. 2009, Paterson-Brown 2011). Whilst some NTS 
such as communication skills training is embedded in undergraduate and particularly GP 
postgraduate training programmes (Royal College of General Practitioners 2012), there are 
increasing calls for introducing training in other NTS including leadership and management (Faculty 
of Medical Leadership and Management 2011) and team training (Sevdalis et al. 2012). 
 
Moreover, disappointingly, there is a dearth of UK-based published research in educational 
interventions in patient safety. Wong’s  review  of  courses  teaching  patient  safety  and  quality  
improvement identified only one study as having been conducted in the UK (Wong et al. 2010). In 
contrast, the UK is pioneering work in the training and assessment of NTS (McCulloch et al. 2009, 
Hull et al. 2012b). However, the sustainable integration and spread of such interventions into PGME 
remains a challenge. 
2.4.2 Opportunities to embed patient safety education into PGME  
A number of factors present the opportunity to embed patient safety education into PGME. The 
GMC as the single professional regulator across the continuum of medical education is well-
positioned to hold education commissioners and providers to account in supporting medical 
students and doctors of all grades to meet standards in clinical practice and patient safety (General 
Medical Council 2010). The introduction of revalidation presents an important start in embedding 
patient safety and quality improvement competencies into the appraisal and licensing processes of 
registered doctors (General Medical Council 2012b).  
 
The  recent  ‘Better  Training  Better  Care’  (BTBC)  programme  launched  by  MEE  (and  to  be  taken  
forward  under  HEE)  in  response  to  the  ‘Time  for  Training’  and  ‘Foundation  for  Excellence’  reports  
makes explicit the critical relationship between high quality medical education and high quality 
patient  care.  The  BTBC  programme  aims  ‘to  identify  how  best  to  ensure  high  quality  medical  
education and training with proper trainee support, at the same time as improving the quality and 
safety of  patient  care’  (NHS Medical Education England 2012).  
 
Moreover, in 2010 Sir Bruce Keogh, Medical Director of the Department of Health / NHS 
Commissioning  Board  established  the  Department  of  Health’s  Human Factors Reference Group ‘to  
identify how human factors might be better acknowledged and integrated in the NHS in England, to 
benefit service delivery  and  safer  patient  care’ (DH Human Factors Reference Group 2012). The 
group aims to work with Health Education England and other stakeholders to take forward 
recommendations  for  education  and  training  in  ‘human  factors’.        
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Finally, the Shape of Training Review – an independent review of PGME sponsored by MEE, the 
GMC, the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges (AoMRC), the Medical Schools Council (MSC) and the 
Conference of Postgraduate Medical Deans of the UK (COPMeD) amongst others - presents a 
generational opportunity to influence the shape of PGME to meet the needs of the future NHS 
(General Medical Council 2013b). Capitalising on the opportunities outlined here is essential to 
elevate the status of patient safety education within PGME. 
 
In summary, in this Chapter I have discussed how PGME and the delivery of safe, effective 
healthcare are linked. I have examined education as a means of optimising the role of trainees in 
maintaining and promoting patient safety and have identified that whilst the evidence base for 
patient safety education is growing, its integration into routine UK PGME remains a challenge. 
Reflecting on current opportunities for change, in my view, the time is ripe to embed patient safety 
education into PGME. In order to do this, it would be prudent to explore key educational theory and 
approaches that may be applied to inform the development and delivery of educational 
interventions in patient safety. This is the subject of Chapter 3. 
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3 Patient Safety Education: Applying Theory into Practice  
Following on from Chapters 1 and 2, in this Chapter I discuss the application of educational theory 
and approaches to inform the development of patient safety education in postgraduate medical 
education (PGME). I begin with outlining key theory and approaches in adult education, with a focus 
on andragogy, reflective practice and experiential learning. I move on to discuss the application of 
these theoretical approaches in optimising learning in PGME, using the examples of portfolio-based 
learning, peer learning and feedback and debriefing. Finally, I draw recommendations for the 
development and delivery of patient safety education in PGME.  
3.1 Theory and Approaches in Adult Education  
Traditional approaches to education have centred on the role of teacher as transmitter of 
knowledge and facts and learner as passive recipient. However, although one may learn through 
such didactic transmission, the knowledge gained often remains at an abstract, theoretical level. In 
order to ensure deeper learning, one needs to draw personal meaning from the knowledge gained 
through reflection, and to learn from experience.  
 
Dewey  was  one  of  the  earliest  proponents  of  a  ‘progressive  approach’  to  education  (Dewey 1938). 
He believed that learner engagement and interaction with their surroundings helped them to gain 
applied, rather than abstract knowledge. Further, he contended that the role of the teacher then is 
to support learners to make sense of and to learn from their experiences (Dewey 1897). The work of 
Dewey and others has contributed to the development of a number of adult learning theories, which 
may be used to inform educational practice in order to optimise learning. For the purpose of my 
thesis I outline three theoretical approaches, which are popularly applied within medical education 
(Swanwick 2005): andragogy, reflective practice and experiential learning.  
3.1.1 Andragogy  
Knowles  introduced  the  concept  of  andragogy  as  ‘the  art  and  science  of  helping  adults  learn’  to  
distinguish  adult  learning  from  the  traditional  ‘pedagogic’  (child) way of learning. He proposed a 
number of adult learning principles, which are listed in Box 3.1 (Knowles et al. 1984). It is widely 
accepted that andragogy is not a theory of how adults learn, but a description of the characteristics 
of the adult learner (Kaufman et al. 2010). Nonetheless, these principles have been hugely influential 
in informing educational practice, including for example in emphasising the need for learner 
autonomy  and  in  recognising  the  value  of  learners’  life  experiences  as  a  learning  resource.  
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Box 3.1 Principles of adult learning (Knowles et al. 1984) 
 As a person matures, they become more self-directing, capable of determining their own learning 
needs and of finding the means to meet them  
 Adults accumulate life experiences, which are a rich resource for learning and which may inform and 
enhance new learning 
 Learning needs are more often determined by life circumstances. Adults value learning that integrates 
with the demands placed on them in their everyday life 
 Learning is problem-centred rather than subject-centred. Adults value learning that can be applied to 
authentic problems that they encounter in everyday life  
 Internal drivers such as personal goals and the desire to succeed have a greater effect on motivation 
for learning than external incentives 
 
3.1.2 Experiential learning  
Kolb built on the work of Dewey and Knowles, amongst  others  to  define  learning  as  a  ‘process  
whereby  knowledge  is  created  through  the  transformation  of  experience’  ((Kolb 1984), p41). He 
proposed a four-stage cycle of experiential learning (Figure 3.1).  
 
The  entry  point  to  Kolb’s  cycle  is  a  ‘concrete  experience’,  which  forms  the  basis  for  observation  and  
reflection, during which learners make sense of the  experience.  ‘Abstract  conceptualisation’  involves  
learners  assimilating  their  ‘reflective  observations’  into  a  ‘theory’,  identifying  what  can  be  learnt,  
forming an opinion on what that means to them and assimilating this into their existing knowledge. 
‘Active  experimentation’  involves  the  learner  ‘testing’  what  they  have  learnt  in  response  to  further  
experiences. These new experiences in turn form new concrete experiences for further processing in 
the  cycle.  In  this  way,  Kolb’s  cycle  illustrates  how  learning is influenced by increasing experience and 
how previous experience may influence learning from new experiences.  
 
There  is  criticism  regarding  Kolb’s  cycle  in  it  being  too  simplistic  and  neglecting  to  consider  factors  
that influence the transfer of learning, such as context (Wallace 1996). However, researchers and 
educators find that it and other experiential learning theories describe the best of experiential 
learning in medical workplaces very well (Chung et al. 2003, Yardley et al. 2012b).  Moreover,  Kolb’s  
cycle is helpful in guiding the development of educational programmes. Learning is enhanced if 
students are encouraged to use all four components of  Kolb’s cycle. Therefore learners need 
opportunities to experience diverse situations, to observe and reflect on what they have learnt, to 
develop their own understanding of the experience(s) and to experiment new ways of being - in 
order for learning to occur (Kolb 1984). Importantly, learners should be supported through each 
stage of the learning cycle (Yardley et al. 2012b). 
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Figure 3.1 Kolb's Learning Cycle (Kolb 1984) 
 
3.1.3 Reflective practice  
Kolb is not alone in highlighting the importance of reflection in learning from experience. Reflection 
has attracted its own body of theory and evidence and a number of definitions have been proposed 
(Mann et al. 2009, Sandars 2009). In general, all such definitions emphasise reflection as the 
deliberate, critical analysis of knowledge and experience, in order to achieve a deeper understanding 
to inform future action.  
 
Various models of reflection and reflective practice exist. One model, which has gained validity in 
health professional education and fits well with theories on the development of professional 
expertise (Beecher et al. 1997, Klemola et al. 1997, Mamede et al. 2004) is the model of reflective 
practice proposed by Schon (Schon 1983, Schon 1987). Schon argued that formal theoretical 
knowledge is often not useful to the solution of the complex, ill-defined problems of real-life 
practice. The reflective practitioner is one who is able to relate professional knowledge to practical 
competence and professional activity (Kaufman et al. 2010). He achieves this by first noticing that a 
particular  problem  eludes  his  ‘knowing-in-action’  (that  is,  his  area  of  competence).  This  triggers  two  
types  of  reflection:  ‘reflection-in-action’  and  ‘reflection-on-action’.   
 
‘Reflection-in-action’  occurs  during  the  event  and  involves  reframing  the  problem  from  different  
perspectives, critically reviewing the understanding of the problem, and understanding the elements 
and  implications  present  in  the  problem,  its  solutions  and  consequences.  ‘Reflection-on-action’  
occurs after the event and involves a reconstructive review of the situation to determine what may 
have contributed to the problem and how this may affect future practice (Schon 1983). Both types of 
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reflection serve to generate insights and learning from experience, which may be incorporated into 
future  ‘knowing-in-action’  (Kaufman et al. 2010). In this way, reflective practice ensures on-going 
learning, maintenance of competence and improved professional practice (Slotnick 1996). Notably, 
studies of reflective practice in professional development demonstrate that reflecting on both 
successes and failures is important in on-going professional development. In particular, failures serve 
as a powerful motivator for improving practice (Pinsky et al. 1998, Kaufman et al. 2010).   
 
Other models of reflective learning have also been influential in adult education. For example, Boud 
et al emphasise the importance of recognising the emotional aspects of experience in order to 
ensure effective learning (Boud et al. 1985). Attending to emotion is therefore crucial when 
facilitating reflective learning (as in the case of post-simulation debriefing, which is discussed further 
below). 
 
So far, I have outlined key adult educational theory and approaches. Together, these highlight some 
of the core requirements of effective educational interventions. This includes the need to support 
learner autonomy, to provide opportunities to experience diverse situations and to facilitate 
reflection on these experiences - in order to inform learners’ development and future practice. I now 
move on to consider examples of the application of these theoretical approaches in the context of 
postgraduate medical education.  
3.2 Enhancing Learning in Postgraduate Medical Education: Theory into Practice  
Trainees must continually develop and update their clinical knowledge and skills in order to deliver 
safe and effective care, in the face of complex and changing healthcare systems. Drawing on the 
adult learning theory discussed above, there are a number of educational approaches that may be 
used to optimise learning in postgraduate medical education (PGME). Here I discuss three examples: 
portfolio-based learning, peer learning and feedback and debriefing. These approaches go beyond 
the traditional didactic approach to teaching and learning in Medicine to promote reflective practice 
and learning from experience.   
3.2.1 Portfolio-based learning 
There  are  various  definitions  of  the  term  ‘portfolio’.  In  general,  the  better  definitions  emphasise  a  
purposeful collection of material that records and reflects on the professional activity and 
development of the individual (Pitts 2010). Such material may comprise curriculum vitae, logbooks, 
and reflective writing and project reports. Effective portfolio-based learning is rooted in the 
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principles of experiential learning whereby the learner critically reflects on experience(s) to identify 
the learning derived from the experience(s) and ultimately decide what further education is required 
to fill gaps revealed by the analysis of the experience (RCGP 1993, Pitts 2010). In this way the learner 
acts autonomously and is able to make meaningful links between his experiences, the learning 
opportunities and the requirements of his professional role (RCGP 1993). 
 
The use of portfolios has grown throughout the continuum of medical education from 
undergraduate education, through postgraduate and continuing medical education. Recent 
systematic reviews conclude that portfolios encourage reflective practice, enhance personal 
responsibility for learning and support professional development (Buckley et al. 2009, Tochel et al. 
2009). Indeed in UK PGME, maintenance of a portfolio is required as part of Foundation training, GP 
training and many specialty training programmes. Moreover, the professional development portfolio 
underpins the appraisal and revalidation of doctors with the General Medical Council (General 
Medical Council 2012c).  
 
Whilst the use of portfolio-based learning promotes individual reflective practice, such individual 
reflection  risks  ‘single-loop learning', whereby inadequate or inaccurate reflection confirms current 
behaviours, rather than critically identifying performance gaps (Jennett et al. 1990). It is therefore 
recommended that learners should seek input from peers and seniors to assist in the identification 
of learning needs (Teunissen et al. 2008). This may be achieved through peer learning and feedback, 
which I discuss in the following examples. 
3.2.2 Peer learning  
Peer learning is rooted in social constructivist principles whereby learners co-construct knowledge 
and make sense of new ideas and information by engaging with others (Kaufman et al. 2010). In this 
way, it is not only individual experiences that can be a rich resource for learning, but also the shared 
experiences and insights of others, resulting in collective learning (Lockyer et al. 2004). 
 
An example of the use of peer-supported reflective practice within PGME is the Balint group. 
Originally  developed  by  the  psychoanalysts  Michael  and  Enid  Balint,  Balint  groups  aim  ‘to help GPs 
reach a better understanding of the emotional content of the doctor-patient relationship and so 
improve  their  therapeutic  potential’ (The Balint Society 2013). Balint groups are now active 
worldwide and are used as an educational activity during specialty training, particularly in Medicine 
and General Practice. Groups typically comprise four to ten doctors and one or two leaders whose 
role is to facilitate a safe forum and to focus discussion on the doctor-patient relationship. Members 
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volunteer to describe a patient encounter that particularly resonated with them and the group 
engages in reflective discussion. Results from qualitative studies of Balint groups have demonstrated 
enhanced reflective practice (Balint et al. 1966), improved competence in managing difficult patients 
(Kjeldmand et al. 2004) and increased job satisfaction (Kjeldmand et al. 2008). 
 
Reflecting on the use of peer learning, it is clear that the role of facilitator is crucial to maintain focus 
on the task at hand and to ensure a safe forum that is conducive to open discussion. Reflective 
practice may also be facilitated through direct feedback, which I discuss next. 
3.2.3 Feedback and debriefing  
Feedback  is  defined  as  ‘specific  information  about  the  comparison  between  a  trainee’s  observed  
performance  and  a  standard,  given  with  the  intent  to  improve  the  trainee’s  performance’  (van de 
Ridder et al. 2008). Both the use of experiential learning and reflective practice aims to promote a 
deep approach to learning, whereby the learner seeks to understand the learning material and to 
relate it to previous knowledge and understanding (Moon 2004). Feedback may further enhance 
learning by providing facilitated or guided reflection to help bridge the gap between experiencing an 
event and making sense of it (Fanning et al. 2007). Best practice in PGME therefore ensures that 
learners receive feedback on their performance in order to optimise learning.  
 
An example of the use of feedback in PGME is post-simulation debriefing. With the rise of 
simulation-based  medical  education  (SBME),  there  is  increasing  interest  in  debriefing  or  ‘post-
experience  analysis’  (Lederman 1983) as  a  ‘special  kind  of  feedback  process’  (Fanning et al. 2007) 
whereby  ‘new  insights  are  co-created  in  a  dialogue  between  instructor  and  students’  (Rudolph et al. 
2008). Indeed a comprehensive systematic review of SBME deemed feedback to be the most 
important factor in promoting effective learning in simulation (Issenberg et al. 2005). Drawing on the 
experiences of the military and experimental psychologists, various models of debriefing exist 
(Thatcher et al. 1985, Lederman 1991, Petranek 1994) with some explicitly referencing theories of 
reflective practice and experiential learning (Rudolph et al. 2007, Rudolph et al. 2008).  
Irrespective of the model used, the debriefing process generally comprises three key phases, which 
map to the stages of the experiential learning cycle: a descriptive phase to reflect on the experience 
including its emotional impact; an analysis phase during which trainer and trainee views regarding 
the desired and actual performance are analysed; and an application phase, during which the trainer 
and trainee agree on actions required in order to address performance gaps (Fanning et al. 2007, 
Rudolph et al. 2008). Effective debriefs are learner-centred, non-judgemental and are based on 
specific, observable behaviours (Rudolph et al. 2006).  
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Disappointingly, despite the evidence for feedback and debriefing in improving clinical performance 
in both real (Veloski et al. 2006, Ivers et al. 2012) and simulated clinical settings (Issenberg et al. 
2005, McGaghie et al. 2010), feedback and debriefing is not as prevalent as it ought to be in practice, 
for example within Surgery (Sender Liberman et al. 2005) and Anaesthetics (Tan 2005). Competing 
clinical commitments and various personal and interpersonal factors may preclude feedback giving 
and seeking in practice (Pelgrim et al. 2013). Encouraging feedback and debriefing in routine clinical 
practice would therefore be a potential area to explore when considering educational interventions 
to improve practice and safety.  
 
In summary, drawing on adult learning principles and the theories of reflective practice and 
experiential learning, I have illustrated how learning may be enhanced in practice in PGME through 
various approaches. I now move on to reflect on the implications of these approaches when 
considering how best to develop and deliver educational interventions in patient safety. 
3.3 Implications for the Development and Delivery of Patient Safety Education  
As discussed in Chapter 2, patient safety education for trainees is necessary in order to ensure safe 
practice at the frontline and also to promote engagement in wider efforts to improve the healthcare 
system. Reflecting on the educational theory and approaches outlined above and their applications 
to enhancing learning in PGME, I may draw a number of recommendations for the development and 
delivery of patient safety education. I have listed these in Box 3.2. 
 
Drawing on these recommendations, a fruitful avenue to explore with regards embedding patient 
safety into PGME would be to use the experiences of trainees themselves as a basis for educational 
interventions in patient safety. Using personal experiences would ensure relevance to trainees and 
promote  their  engagement.  Given  that  failure  is  a  powerful  motivator  for  change,  using  trainees’  
experiences of error and adverse events may serve as an invaluable resource for learning about 
patient safety. Moreover, an educational intervention that promotes group reflection on these 
experiences would enhance individual and collective learning. However, errors and adverse events 
have a strong emotional impact (Wu 2000) and creating a safe learning environment through 
effective facilitation will be critical in ensuring that learning is constructive as opposed to 
destructive.  
 
Aside from promoting learning from the experiences of adverse events, learning from the 
experiences of routine clinical practice could also be significantly enhanced through the provision of 
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regular feedback to help identify performance gaps. An educational intervention to promote 
feedback as a core non-technical skill would optimise experiential learning in PGME and ensure that 
every clinical encounter is an opportunity to learn and improve practice at the frontline. Together, 
interventions that promote learning from adverse events and that improve feedback would foster 
the  creation  of  an  ‘open  and  learning’  safety  culture  within  Medicine  and  PGME,  which  is  critical  to  
progressing safety improvement efforts (Department of Health 2000).  
 
Box 3.2 Recommendations for the development and delivery of patient safety education 
 Promoting learner autonomy  
 Learners should be empowered to direct their own learning. This will ensure their engagement – lack 
of which presents a significant barrier to the implementation of patient safety education (Wong et al. 
2010). 
 Opportunities to reflect 
 Moving from the acquisition of abstract knowledge to applied knowledge requires opportunities to 
reflect and to learn from experience. As well as transferring content knowledge, patient safety 
education should promote experiential learning. 
 Individual experience as a resource 
 Individual experiences are a rich resource for learning. Using these experiences as learning material 
will ensure relevance to learners and promote their engagement.  Within the experiential learning 
environment of PGME, these experiences may be derived from everyday clinical practice. 
 Using failure as a motivator for change 
 Reflection on failure is a powerful motivator for change. In the context of patient safety, these 
‘failures’  may  refer  to  errors  and  adverse  events. 
 Attending to emotion 
 Recognising the emotional aspects of experience is critical in order to ensure effective learning. This is 
particularly important when these experiences may be errors or adverse events. Ensuring support for 
learners by appropriately trained faculty is key. 
 Guided reflection to enhance learning 
 Individual reflective practice may be enhanced through both peer learning, and feedback and 
debriefing.  
 Group reflection promotes collective learning from experiences. However, excellent facilitation is key 
to ensure focussed reflection and a safe learning environment. 
 Feedback and debriefing by a senior provides guided reflection to help identify performance gaps and 
improve future practice. Indeed, in the context of Surgery, feedback-seeking is regarded as a core 
non-technical skill (NTS), critical to the delivery of safe, effective care (Yule et al. 2006).  
 
Next, I move on to summarise the introductory section of my thesis (Chapters 1 to 3) before 
highlighting the aims and structure of the thesis. 
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Section Summary  
Patient safety has rapidly emerged as a science in its own right. Since the publication of seminal 
reports over a decade ago, we now have a much greater understanding of the nature and scale of 
harm in healthcare and a maturing evidence-base of interventions to improve patient safety. 
However, internationally, success in the quest to improve patient safety is critically dependent on 
the people within the healthcare system supporting and engaging with strategies to improve safety.  
 
As frontline clinicians with decision-making authority, doctors are essential in maintaining and 
promoting patient safety. However, it is not only their clinical competence that is key in the delivery 
of safe, effective care, but also their non-technical skills such as teamwork, communication and 
situational awareness; their humility, honesty and an acceptance of fallibility. Moreover, with 
trainees  (junior  doctors)  providing  the  majority  of  frontline  care,  their  role  as  potential  ‘agents  for  
change’  must  be  exploited  if  we  are  to  develop  a  workforce  with  the  drive  and  capability  to  progress  
patient safety efforts. 
 
Education is an essential means of enhancing the role of trainees in improving patient safety. Whilst 
routine postgraduate medical education (PGME) supports the development of clinical competencies, 
opportunities to develop the non-technical skills and to understand the science of patient safety are 
lacking. Such education will lead to trainees being better equipped to not only ensure safe clinical 
practice at the frontline but to also engage in efforts to improve the wider healthcare system. 
 
Although the evidence base for patient safety education is growing internationally, the UK is lagging 
behind. Drawing on adult learning principles and the theories of reflective practice and experiential 
learning, using the experiences of trainees themselves may be a fruitful approach to develop and 
deliver educational interventions in patient safety. Encouraging collective learning from adverse 
events could present a powerful means of learning the science of safety. Promoting the use of 
feedback as a core non-technical skill would enhance learning from the experiences of routine 
clinical practice. Moreover, both proposed interventions may encourage an open and learning safety 
culture, which is critical to progressing safety improvement efforts. However, barriers to the 
implementation of patient safety education must be addressed to ensure its sustainable integration 
into postgraduate medical education. 
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Thesis Aims 
The over-arching aim of this thesis is to build on the evidence base for patient safety education for 
trainees in order to accelerate its integration into routine PGME and promote the development of a 
medical workforce, which constantly strives to improve individual practice at the frontline, and also 
engages in efforts to improve the wider healthcare system. 
 
The specific objectives of this thesis are:  
 
1. To examine the latest evidence for patient safety education for trainees (Chapter 4) 
2. To  explore  the  value  of  trainees’  reflections  on  adverse  events  (Chapters  5  and  8) 
3. To build capacity and capability for delivering patient safety education (Chapters 6 and 7) 
4. To develop and evaluate educational interventions for trainees that are informed by clinical 
users, the evidence base and educational theory and that aim: 
(i) To promote learning from adverse events through peer learning (Chapters 6 to 9) 
(ii) To promote learning from routine practice through feedback (Chapters 10 and 11) 
 
For clarity, I have structured the thesis into five sections. An outline of the thesis is displayed on the 
following page.  
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Thesis Outline  
SECTION ONE: Introduction and Aims 
Chapter 1 
Patient Safety and the Role of 
the Doctor 
Chapter 2 
Education and Engagement for 
Patient Safety 
Chapter 3 
Patient Safety Education: 
Applying Theory into Practice  
SECTION TWO: Trainees and Patient Safety Education: An Initial Exploration 
Chapter 4 
Patient Safety Education for Trainees: An 
Update of the Evidence 
Chapter 5 
Do Foundation Trainees Reflect on Patient Safety 
Incidents? A Retrospective Review of Portfolio 
Entries 
SECTION THREE: Lessons Learnt: Building a Safer Foundation 
Chapter 6 
Development and 
Delivery of the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  
Programme 
Chapter 7 
Faculty Development 
for  the  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  Programme 
Chapter 8 
Prospective Analysis of 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  Cases: 
A Pilot Study 
Chapter 9 
Evaluation of the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  
Programme: A Pre-Post 
Intervention Study 
SECTION FOUR: Operation Debrief: Improving Feedback in Surgery 
Chapter 10 
What Makes an Effective Debrief in Surgery?  
The User Perspective  
Chapter 11 
Development  and  Evaluation  of  a  ‘SHARP’  
Intervention to Improve Debriefing in Surgery 
SECTION FIVE: Discussion and Conclusions 
Chapter 12 
Discussion  
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SECTION TWO: Trainees and Patient Safety Education: An Initial 
Exploration 
As described in Chapter 2, patient safety education may fall into two broad categories: educational 
interventions (courses) to teach core concepts of patient safety and educational interventions to 
develop non-technical skills (NTS training). This Section of my thesis focuses on the former category 
to report exploratory research to inform the development of a course to teach core concepts of 
patient safety to Foundation trainees - junior doctors at the very start of their careers.  
 
To begin with, in Chapter 4 I report a systematic review to update and build upon the study by Wong 
et al (Wong et al. 2010) to review key features of courses teaching patient safety to trainees, their 
impact on learning and the factors influencing their sustainable integration into medical curricula. 
Then, in Chapter 5 I report a retrospective review of Foundation  trainees’ portfolio entries, to 
determine the feasibility of using real-life adverse events experienced by trainees as the basis for a 
course in patient safety.  
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4 Patient Safety Education for Trainees: An Update of the 
Evidence 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, education is an essential means of enhancing the capacity and capability 
of trainees in improving patient safety. The recent  systematic  review  ‘teaching  quality  improvement  
and  patient  safety  to  trainees’  published  by  Wong  et  al  in  2010  was  very  comprehensive  (Wong et al. 
2010).  The  authors  included  ‘any  study  that  as  a  minimum  described  a  curriculum  that  explicitly  
identified its goal as exposing medical students or residents to concepts in QI or PS and that outlined 
specific teaching methods used to achieve this educational goal’  (Wong et al. 2010). They identified 
41 reports published between January 2000 and January 2009, which met their criteria. Among the 
27 reports that included an evaluation, they found that courses were generally well received by 
trainees and effectively improved knowledge in safety and quality improvement, with some courses 
leading to improvements in care processes. However, few studies were able to demonstrate changes 
in  learners’  behaviour  or  potential  patient  benefit.  Moreover,  thematic  analysis  of  the  articles’  text  
identified multiple barriers to sustainable integration of the courses, which spanned learner, faculty 
and institutional factors (Wong et al. 2010). 
 
Disappointingly, Wong identified only one study as having been conducted in the UK (Wong et al. 
2010). This study involved 110 final-year medical students and involved a 5-hour evidence-based 
module  on  ‘understanding  error  in  healthcare’  (Patey et al. 2007). The course was well received by 
learners and led to improvements in knowledge and perceived personal control over patient safety. 
Notably,  Wong’s  review  included studies published up to 1 January 2009 only. Given that education 
in patient safety is a rapidly emerging field, I wanted to review the latest evidence for courses 
teaching core concepts of patient safety, in order to inform the development and delivery of such an 
intervention.  
4.1.1 Study aims 
The aim of this study was to conduct a focussed systematic  review  to  update  and  build  upon  Wong’s  
work by reviewing studies of courses teaching core concepts in patient safety targeting medical 
students and trainees (junior doctors) and published since 1 January 2009. I aimed (i) to describe the 
educational content and teaching methods employed, (ii) to evaluate learning outcomes achieved 
and (iii) to explore factors influencing implementation of the courses.  
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4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Developing and refining the search strategy  
Guidance from the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination recommends that the main features of a 
research question include the population to be studied; the intervention(s) to be applied; the 
comparator(s) (where applicable) and the outcome(s) relevant to the purpose of the review i.e. the 
‘PICO’  format (Centre for Reviews and Dissemination 2009). I chose not to limit my research 
question to any particular outcome (e.g. individual learning or patient benefit) as I wanted to ensure 
a sensitive search, and to subsequently apply eligibility criteria for inclusion with regards outcome 
measures (see 4.2.2).  The  key  facets  of  my  research  question  were  therefore  ‘medical  students  
and/or trainees’  (population)  and  [‘education’  and  ‘patient  safety’]  (intervention). I drew up a list of 
search terms by brainstorming related terms and using key words from core reference texts (Vincent 
2010) and relevant articles (Wong et al. 2010). 
 
I selected the following databases to search: Embase 1996 to 2012 Week 52, Ovid MEDLINE(R) 
without Revisions 1996 to December Week 4 2012; and PsycINFO 2002 to December Week 4 2012. 
The start dates of the databases were selected in order to allow me to check the sensitivity of the 
search by cross-checking with five reference papers which I had previously identified as examples of 
highly relevant studies which I hoped that the search strategy would retrieve (Coyle et al. 2005, 
Halbach et al. 2005, Madigosky et al. 2006, Patey et al. 2007, Bechtold et al. 2008). 
 
In order to maximise the sensitivity of my search, I used a combination of MeSH terms and free text 
words (truncated wherever appropriate). Following  a  pilot  search,  I  found  that  ‘medical  education’  
successfully  encompassed  both  ‘education’  as  the  intervention  and  ‘medical  students  and/or  
trainees’  as  the  population  of  interest.  I  therefore  chose  to  remove  the  ‘population’  facet  for  my  
final search strategy to achieve a balance between specificity and sensitivity of my search. I limited 
the  studies  to  ‘Human’  and  ‘English  Language  only’.  I  then  performed  a  sensitivity  check  of  my  
search and found that the search strategy successfully retrieved the five reference papers previously 
identified as being highly relevant to my review.  I was therefore able to confidently limit my review 
at this stage to include studies published from January 2009 only (the end date of Wong’s review). 
Finally, I removed duplicates. This returned 2894 articles to be subject to an initial title screen.  
 
My final search strategy is summarised in Table 4.1. In addition, I hand-searched the reference lists 
of all included papers for additional relevant titles and included those which met the eligibility 
criteria (see 4.2.2). 
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Table 4.1 Systematic review search strategy 
 Search terms Number of 
articles 
1 patient safety/ or 'patient safety'.mp. or risk management/ or incident report/ or 'incident 
report*'.mp. or 'error report*'.mp. or  systems analysis/ or "root cause analysis"/ or 'root cause 
analy*'.mp. or Organizational Culture/ and Patient Safety/ or 'safety culture'.mp. or 'human 
factors'.mp. or 'human error*'.mp. or malpractice/ or iatrogenic disease/ or medical error/ or sentinel 
event/ or 'sentinel event*'.mp. or 'adverse event*'.mp. or 'patient safety incident*'.mp. or 'clinical 
incident*'.mp. or 'never event*'.mp. 
328395 
2 medical education/ or teaching/ or learning/ or training/ or curriculum/ or competence/ or skill/ 428533 
3 1 and 2 9387 
4 Limit 3 to English language 8970 
5 Limit 4 to human 6780 
6 Sensitivity check for Bechtold, Coyle, Halbach, Madigosky and Patey  Passed 
7 Limit  5  to  yr=  “2009  – 2012” 3226 
8 Remove duplicates 
Embase <1996 to 2012 Week 52> (2594) 
Ovid MEDLINE(R) <1996 to December Week 4 2012> (156) 
PsycINFO <2002 to December Week 4 2012> (144) 
2894 
 
4.2.2 Eligibility criteria  
I aimed to include any article that described and evaluated an educational intervention that explicitly 
exposed medical students and/or trainees to core concepts of patient safety. I devised a set of 
eligibility criteria for the studies. The definition and rationale for the eligibility criteria used are 
detailed in Table 4.2. 
 
With  regards  to  the  criterion  of  intervention  evaluation,  I  used  Kirkpatrick’s  model  to  classify  the  
studies (Table 4.2). Kirkpatrick’s  four-level model of evaluation was originally introduced as a means 
of evaluating training programmes in industry but has gained widespread use within other fields 
including Medical Education (BEME 2013).  The  original  four  ‘levels’  of  evaluation  are:  reaction 
(learner satisfaction), learning (of new knowledge or skills and improved attitudes), changes in 
learner behaviour, and organisational change (i.e. the results of the learning opportunity) 
(Kirkpatrick 1967). In recent years, the Best Evidence Medical Education (BEME) collaboration has 
adopted  a  modified  version  of  Kirkpatrick’s  levels  as  a  grading  standard  for  systematic reviews 
(detailed in Table 4.3).   It is worth noting however, that there is criticism regarding the validity of 
these  levels  and  in  particular  their  use  as  a  ‘hierarchy  of  evidence’  (Yardley et al. 2012a). For the 
purpose of my review, I  sought  to  use  Kirkpatrick’s  model  as  a  means of classifying learning 
outcomes for each study rather than as a grading tool. 
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Table 4.2 Study eligibility criteria 
Criterion Definition Rationale 
Paper includes 
sufficient empirical 
data  
It is not a review, commentary, letter or editorial.  
 
 
 
It is not a conference abstract or short report 
without a full accompanying paper. 
 
Empirical studies minimise the 
risk of biases that may occur with 
other types of studies.  
 
This ensures sufficient 
information for data extraction 
and quality assessment.  
 
Participants include 
trainees or medical 
students 
Study involves trainees (junior doctors) or medical 
students as participants.  
 
Participants may include mixed group health care 
professionals involving trainees or medical 
students. 
 
Although the focus of my thesis is 
on developing educational 
interventions in patient safety for 
trainees, interventions targeting 
medical students/ other health 
professionals in conjunction with 
trainees will help to inform this. 
 
Study involves an 
educational 
intervention  
Study reports an educational intervention offered 
to participants. 
 
It is NOT a study involving novel systems or 
strategies without an educational intervention.   
 
Explicit educational interventions 
are the focus of this systematic 
review. 
 
 
Educational 
intervention includes 
‘patient  safety’  as  
core content  
 
Intervention includes one or more of the following 
as core content: patient safety, human factors, 
systems thinking, root cause analysis, medical 
error/ adverse events/ patient safety incidents. 
 
It is NOT an intervention primarily aimed at 
developing specific safety-related skills 
with/without inclusion of core concepts of patient 
safety e.g. team training, safe prescribing training, 
handover training, error disclosure training 
 
Educational interventions 
teaching core concepts of patient 
safety are the focus of this 
systematic review.  
 
Specific skills-based educational 
interventions are outside the 
scope of this review. Moreover, 
focussed systematic reviews on 
these subjects have recently 
been undertaken, for example 
team training (Cumin et al. 2013), 
prescribing training (Ross et al. 
2009), handover training (Gordon 
et al. 2011)  and error disclosure 
training (Stroud et al. 2013). 
 
Study includes 
evaluation of the 
educational 
intervention 
Intervention is evaluated with regards to at least 
one of  Kirkpatrick’s  levels  of  evaluation: 
 
Level 1: Participation 
Level 2a: Modification of attitudes/ perceptions 
Level 2b: Modification of knowledge/ skills 
Level 3: Behavioural change 
Level 4a: Change in organisational practice 
Level 4b: Benefits to patient/ clients 
 
It is NOT a purely descriptive study. 
 
To enable comparative analysis 
of the effectiveness of 
interventions wherever possible. 
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Table 4.3 Modified Kirkpatrick's levels as described in the BEME coding sheet 
Instructions: Code the level of impact being studied in the item and summarise any results of the intervention at the 
appropriate level. Note: include both predetermined and unintended outcomes  
Kirkpatrick hierarchy Description 
Level 1: Participation Covers  learners’  views  on  the  learning  experience,  its  organisation,  
presentation, content, teaching methods, and aspects of the 
instructional organisation, materials, quality of instruction 
Level 2a: Modification of attitudes/ perceptions Outcomes relate to changes in the reciprocal attitudes or perceptions 
between participant groups towards the intervention/simulation 
Level 2b: Modification of knowledge/ skills For knowledge, this relates to the acquisition of concepts, 
procedures and principles; for skills this relates to the acquisition of 
thinking/problem-solving, psychomotor and social skills 
Level 3: Behavioural change Documents the transfer of learning to the workplace or willingness of 
learners to apply new knowledge and skills 
Level 4a: Change in organisational practice Wider changes in the organisation or delivery of care, attributable to 
an educational programme 
Level 4b: Benefits to patient/ clients Any improvement in the health and well-being of patients/clients as 
a direct result of an educational programme  
4.2.3 Article review process   
I reviewed the titles of the 2894 articles retrieved by the search strategy and discarded those which 
very obviously did not meet the eligibility criteria. Each of the resultant abstracts were assessed for 
inclusion by two independent reviewers (myself and Matthew Kirkman, experienced clinical 
academic trainee) according to the criterion-led scoring system below:  
 0 = criterion definitely not met (abstract excluded if scores 0 for any criterion) 
 1 = unclear whether criterion met (abstract included for further review) 
 2 = criterion clearly met (abstract included for further review) 
Disagreements were resolved through consensus, involving a third reviewer (Nick Sevdalis, patient 
safety researcher) as necessary. This produced a shortlist of titles for full paper review. I retrieved 
and read these full papers and again subjected them to the inclusion and exclusion criteria.  
4.2.4 Data extraction and quality assessment  
Consistent with BEME recommendations (BEME 2013), I extracted administrative data (including 
publication details and country of origin); topic related data (including details of the educational 
intervention and number and type of participants) and research related data  (including 
methodology and results). In addition, I extracted information on factors influencing curricular 
implementation of the intervention – as described by authors themselves within  the  articles’  text. I 
used  the  framework  devised  in  Wong’s  study to categorise these under four broad headings: learner 
factors, teacher factors, curricular factors and learning environment factors (Wong et al. 2010).  
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Assessing the quality of interventions is a well-documented challenge of systematic reviews of 
educational interventions (Reed et al. 2005). The BEME review protocol recommends a rating system 
for assessing the quality of studies (BEME 2013): Grade 1 when no clear conclusions can be drawn, 
Grade 2 when results are ambiguous but exhibit a trend, Grade 3 when conclusions can probably be 
based on the results, Grade 4 when results are clear and very likely to be true, and Grade 5 when 
results are unequivocal. However, BEME provides no additional guidance as to how to apply these 
grades. I therefore assessed quality by extracting information on both stated and perceived 
limitations of the study as assessed by study design, sample size, completeness of data and overall 
coherence between study aims, methods and conclusions. 
4.3 Results  
The initial title screen of articles retrieved by the search strategy identified 230 potentially relevant 
titles for the abstract review stage. Independent review of abstracts against the eligibility criteria by 
two reviewers followed by consensus resulted in 52 papers for review. The agreement between the 
reviewers was excellent (kappa = 0.905). Review of the full papers identified 19 papers, which met 
the eligibility criteria and were included. Review of the reference lists of all included papers 
identified one additional paper, which met the eligibility criteria. Therefore I included a total of 20 
papers in my review. This process is summarised in Figure 4.1.  
4.3.1 Characteristics of included studies 
The characteristics of the included studies including study design, participant number and type, and 
course structure and content are summarised in Table 4.4. The majority of studies were conducted in 
the USA (13, 65%). Of the remaining studies, three (15%) came from the UK (Anderson et al. 2009, 
Arora et al. 2012, Slater et al. 2012), two from the Netherlands (Jansma et al. 2010a, Jansma et al. 
2010b), one from China (Leung et al. 2010) and one from the Republic of Korea (Myung et al. 2012). 
Participants comprised trainees in half of the studies (majority resident or specialty trainee/registrar 
grade) and medical students in the other half. Participants learned in multidisciplinary groups in four 
of the studies; three involved students (Anderson et al. 2009, Cox et al. 2009, Wilson et al. 2012) and 
the other both junior and senior doctors (Slater et al. 2012). One study involved senior doctors 
(consultant or attending grade level) as participants as part of faculty development activities, 
although their learning outcomes were not directly assessed in this study (Cox et al. 2011)  
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Figure 4.1 Flow-diagram illustrating the search strategy 
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Table 4.4 Study characteristics, course structure and content 
Lead author 
Year 
Country 
 
Study type Participant number & specialty Course structure Course content 
Aboumatar 
2012 
USA 
Before and 
after study  
120 third-year medical students.  
Recruited from single institution. 
 
3-day clinically oriented patient safety intersession using role-play and 
simulation, skills demonstrations, small group exercises and case-
based learning. 
 
Medical error understanding and 
prevention, teamwork and communication, 
systems thinking. 
Anderson 
2009 
UK 
Before and 
after study 
199 students including 58 final 
year medical students learning in 
uni-professional groups and 36 
learning in inter-professional 
groups as part of regional 
programme. 
 
1-day workshop involving DVD and small-group facilitated discussion 
to analyse key safety issues using the NPSA root cause analysis tool. 
Supporting handbook containing additional relevant materials. Nine 
events held over 2 years. 
DVD of patient journey to focus on learning 
themes of situational awareness, 
communication, leadership and 
empowerment. Root cause analysis. 
Arora 
2012 
UK 
Before and 
after study 
27 surgical residents. Recruited 
from across 19 hospitals. 
3-hour training programme comprising lectures, video demonstrations 
and small-group discussions. 
Patient safety overview, adverse events, 
human factors, systems-based analysis, 
communication and teamwork in Surgery.  
 
Cox 
2009 
USA 
Before and 
after study  
Over 787 multi-professional 
teams of medical, nursing, health 
administration and respiratory 
therapy students. Recruited from 
across 3 sites. 
 
4-week curriculum comprising lectures, problem-based learning, small-
group work, simulation. Participants given cases describing a medical 
error. Team-based simulation of root cause analysis and use of 
performance improvement tools. Presentation on completion. 
Patient safety overview, root cause 
analysis, quality improvement overview, 
teamwork. 
Cox 
2011 
USA 
Prospective 
cohort study 
12 Faculty members and 46 
Internal Medicine residents. 
Recruited from single institution. 
 
3 hour-long faculty development session including videos, role-play 
and mock facilitation sessions. Plus manual of key safety education 
topics. Implementation of an alternative reporting system for 
anonymous narratives of 'care that did not go as intended'. Monthly 
'Safety Story' sessions of 4-6 residents with faculty member to discuss 
contributing factors and propose potential solutions. 
 
Faculty training included patient safety 
overview, root cause analysis and 
teamwork.  
Dudas 
2011 
USA 
Retrospective 
pre-post study 
108 medical students (second, 
third and fourth-year students as 
part of paediatric clerkship). 
Recruited from single institution. 
 
During course of 9-week clerkship, 25-minute online video on systems-
based analysis of medical errors. 60-minute large-group faculty 
demonstration of Learning From Defects tool. Subsequently self-
directed small-group identification and analysis of medication errors in 
practice. Group presentation at closing 60-minute session. 
 
Systems-based analysis.  
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Lead author 
Year 
Country 
 
Study type Participant number & specialty Course structure Course content 
Hall 
2010 
USA 
Before and 
after study and 
comparison 
with historical 
control  
146 third year medical students 
undertaking a medicine 
clerkship. 65 in intervention 
group, 81 in control group. 
Recruited from single institution. 
 
Two mandatory 1 hour patient safety 'booster' conferences. First 
conference involved RCA brainstorming exercise of an adverse event. 
Assignment to identify and summarise an actual patient safety event 
or concern. During second conference case presentation including 
proposed system modifications to improve patient safety. 
Root cause analysis including proposed 
system modifications for improvement. 
Holland 
2010 
USA 
Before and 
after study 
26 PGY-3 internal medical 
residents. Recruited from single 
institution. 
 
4-week rotation comprising web-based patient safety and quality 
improvement curriculum including interactive modules and self-
directed reading and assignments. Completion of quality improvement 
proposal and presentation at end of rotation. 
 
Patient safety overview, quality 
improvement overview including PDSA, 
medical error, root cause analysis, human 
factors engineering, safety interventions. 
Jansma 
2010a 
The 
Netherlands 
 
Before and 
after study with 
6-month 
follow-up 
33 specialty registrars (GP, 
Anaesthetics, Dermatology, 
Internal Medicine). Recruited 
from single institution. 
 
2-day course comprising plenaries, group discussions and role-play. Patient safety overview, human error, 
disclosure, medico-legal aspects of critical 
incidents, root cause analysis, tips and 
tools to improve safety in practice. 
 
Jansma 
2010b 
The 
Netherlands 
 
Prospective 
cohort study 
71 residents (surgical and non-
surgical). Recruited from 5 
hospitals. 
Multi-specialty 2-day patient safety course including plenaries and 
small-group sessions. At end of course participants asked to formulate 
one action point to improve patient safety. 
Patient safety overview, human factors, 
teamwork, contribution to safer care 
(including root cause analysis), medico-
legal aspects. 
 
Jericho 
2010 
USA 
Before and 
after study 
Anaesthesiology residents 
(approx. 51 -number not clearly 
stated). Recruited from single 
institution. 
 
90-minute interactive case-based lecture coupled with an expectation 
of adverse event reporting. Supplemented with education manual.  
Quarterly conferences to discuss reports and near-immediate feedback 
from Department of Safety and Risk Management.  
 
Patient safety definitions, adverse event 
reporting, investigation/process 
improvements, communication, and 
apology and remedy. 
Leung 
2010 
China 
Before and 
after study 
130 third year medical students. 
Recruited from single institution. 
 
Two 60-minute whole-class lectures using contemporary medical 
incidents as illustrative cases. 
Based on WHO curriculum: Patient safety 
overview, human factors, systems thinking, 
team-working, understanding and learning 
from error, introduction to quality 
improvement, medication safety.  
 
Myung 
2012 
Republic of 
Korea 
Before and 
after study 
156 second-year medical 
students. Recruited from single 
institution. 
 
1-week course composed of interactive lecture, discussion and small-
group debriefing. 
Based on WHO curriculum: As above plus 
root cause analysis. 
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Lead author 
Year 
Country 
 
Study type Participant number & specialty Course structure Course content 
Paxton 
2010 
USA 
Before and 
after study with 
control group 
and follow-up 
51 surgical clerkship students 
including 46 medical and 5 
physician assistant students. 
Recruited from single institution. 
 
2-hour small-group discussion incorporating slide presentation.  Patient safety overview, root cause 
analysis, epidemiology, error theory, error 
disclosure, legal considerations. 
Scott 
2011 
USA 
Prospective 
cohort study 
680 residents across medical and 
surgical specialties. Recruited 
from single institution. 
 
Economic incentive comprised retirement benefit of 1.5% of residents' 
annual salaries. Multifaceted educational campaign including monthly 
email notifications, audience presentation at major conferences (exact 
frequency not stated) and one-on-one discussion. 
 
Presentation covered mechanics of 
incident reporting, discussing barriers and 
dispelling myths. 
Shaw 
2012 
USA 
Randomised 
controlled trial 
371 interns across medical and 
surgical specialties. Recruited 
from across 2 hospitals. 
2 interventions compared: Online Spaced Education (SE) programme 
consisting of cases and questions that reinforce over time and SQ 
programme comprising online slide-show followed by quiz.  
 
Covered all nine 2009 National Patient 
Safety Goals (NPSGs) including handover, 
patient identification, hand hygiene and 
medication safety. 
Slater 
2012 
UK 
Before and 
after study  
11 multi-professional teams 
comprising 55 health 
professionals (including 16 junior 
doctors and 12 senior doctors). 
Recruited from across 5 sites. 
 
20-week 'TAPS' programme (Training and Action for Patient Safety). 2-
hour online learning module; multi-professional workshops to conduct 
QI project, executive group discussion for organisational learning. 
Human error, quality improvement tools 
(process mapping, fishbone diagrams, 
measurement for improvement). 
Smith 
2012 
USA 
Prospective 
cohort study 
280 Internal Medicine residents 
over 2 years. Recruited from 
single institution. 
 
Monthly noontime quality improvement conference (QIC). Root-cause 
analysis of selected real-life safety events (selected by seniors, 
analysed by residents not associated with the case). Limited RCA with 
online resources and mentorship. Presentation to fellow residents and 
seniors. Intervention proposed and followed through where possible. 
  
Root cause analysis and quality 
improvement. 
Stahl 
2011 
USA 
Before and 
after study with 
control group  
110 third year medical students 
on surgical clerkship (67 in 
intervention group, 43 in control 
group). Recruited from single 
institution. 
 
Two-part patient safety curriculum: all students attend one-day lecture 
on introductory theories, video and small-group discussion (first year). 
Intervention group attended additional 1.5-2 hour clinically oriented 
classroom discussion, videos, simulation and role-play (third year). 
 
Patient safety principles, crew resource 
management, team skills, task 
management and situational awareness.  
Wilson 
2012 
USA 
Prospective 
cohort study 
23 graduate level students 
(including 7 medical students).  
Recruited from single institution. 
 
Weekly 3-hour sessions held over 15-week period. Each session 
comprised a presentation by a visiting expert, discussion on assigned 
reading material and small-group patient safety project work. 
 
Patient safety overview, human factors 
analysis, systems-approach to error 
analysis, crew resource management, law 
and policy and team-building. 
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4.3.2 Characteristics of the courses  
The features of the courses including the teaching modalities employed and the core content 
covered are summarised in Table 4.5. The majority of courses employed a mixture of didactic and 
experiential teaching methods. Lectures and small-group discussions were commonly used 
approaches (55% and 50% of courses respectively). Specifically, case-based learning utilising real-life 
examples of adverse events identified by participants themselves was used as a core feature in 25% 
of courses (Hall et al. 2010, Jericho et al. 2010, Cox et al. 2011, Dudas et al. 2011, Smith et al. 2012). 
Multimedia approaches including web-based content, videos and/or DVDs were also employed (7 
studies, 35%), mostly as an adjunct to other approaches and less so as a central feature of the course 
(Anderson et al. 2009, Holland et al. 2010, Shaw et al. 2012). Project work (quality or safety 
improvement) was used in 5 studies (25%) and role-play and simulation was used in only 4 studies 
(20%). The latter is in contrast to studies of NTS training (such as team training), which typically rely 
on resource-intensive simulation-based teaching modalities (Cumin et al. 2013). 
 
Nine  studies  (45%)  described  a  ‘standalone’  design  to  the  course.  This  ranged  from  a  2  hour  lecture  
and discussion for students on a surgical rotation (Paxton et al. 2010) to a one-week curriculum for 
pre-clinical medical students (Myung et al. 2012). A further nine studies adopted a more 
‘longitudinal’  /  integrated  approach  to  delivery  of  the  course.  This  typically comprised regular 
(typically monthly) case-based discussions of adverse events (Cox et al. 2009, Jericho et al. 2010, 
Smith et al. 2012) or involvement in a longitudinal project requiring a presentation on course 
completion (Cox et al. 2009, Holland et al. 2010, Dudas et al. 2011, Slater et al. 2012, Wilson et al. 
2012). This integrated design was more commonly found in studies involving trainees (6, 60%) versus 
students  (3,  30%).  Two  studies  (10%),  both  involving  students,  described  a  ‘booster’  course to 
supplement patient safety education delivered earlier in the course of training (Hall et al. 2010, Stahl 
et al. 2011). 
 
The commonest content of the courses included a general overview of patient safety (including key 
terminology and the emergence of patient safety) and root cause and/or systems-based analysis 
(both featured in 12 studies, 60%). Communication and teamwork skills (both  core  ‘non-technical 
skills’)  and  quality  improvement  principles  and  methodologies  were  the  next  commonest  content  
(45%  and  35%  respectively).  ‘Human  factors  (engineering)’  and  ‘systems  thinking’  were  also  covered  
in some studies, although these phrases were typically ill-defined by authors. Other less frequently 
covered content included medication safety, error disclosure, and incident reporting methods and 
barriers.  
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Only 3 studies (15%) explicitly based their curricular content on the World Health Organisation’s  
Patient Safety Curriculum Guide for Medical Schools. Interestingly, all three were non-USA based 
studies (Leung et al. 2010, Arora et al. 2012, Myung et al. 2012). Of studies conducted in the USA, 
around half of them (6, 46%) cited regulatory standards in education as the rationale to their work. 
This included reference to the Association of American Medical Colleges Medical Schools Objective 
Project report which recommends that medical schools deliver patient safety education to 
undergraduates (Association of American Medical Colleges 2001) and the Accreditation Council for 
Graduate Medical Education (Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education 2011) which lists 
common competencies in practice-based learning and systems-based practice.  
 
Table 4.5 Core features of the courses studied 
Characteristic Studies involving 
students (n=10) 
Studies involving 
trainees (n=10) 
All studies (n=20) 
number (%) 
Educational modality    
Lecture 6 5 11 (55%) 
Small-group discussion 7 3 10 (50%) 
Multi-media (web, DVD) 3 4 7 (35%) 
Case-based learning  2 3 5 (25%) 
Project/ presentation requirement 2 3 5 (25%) 
Simulation/ role-play 3 1 4 (20%) 
Core content    
Patient safety overview (includes key 
terminology, emergence of safety) 
6 6 12 (60) 
Root cause /systems-based analysis 6 6 12 (60) 
Communication and teamwork 5 4 9 (45) 
Quality improvement 3 4 7 (35) 
'Human  factors’ 2 4 6 (30) 
‘Systems thinking’ 3 0 3 (15) 
Medication safety 2 1 3 (15) 
Error disclosure 1 1 2 (10) 
Incident reporting (methods, barriers) 0 2 2 (10) 
 
4.3.3 Study design and quality assessment  
The majority of studies employed a before and after study design (14, 70%). Three of these included 
a control group: one involved a contemporaneous control (Paxton et al. 2010), one an historical 
control (Hall et al. 2010) and one a randomised contemporaneous control group (Stahl et al. 2011). 
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Only two (10%) studies included additional long-term follow-up at 6 months (Jansma et al. 2010a) or 
‘between  1  and  12  months’  (Paxton et al. 2010). Five (25%) studies involved a post-intervention 
evaluation only. One (5%) study was a randomised controlled trial, however due to logistical 
constraints, the control group did not undergo matched assessment of behavioural outcome 
measures (Shaw et al. 2012). 
 
The median sample size was 109 participants (inter-quartile range 47 – 188). One study involved 
‘over  787’  participants  pooled  over  several  years  (Cox et al. 2009). The majority of studies were 
conducted across a single institution (14, 70%).  Other common methodological limitations included 
poor response rates (Scott et al. 2011, Aboumatar et al. 2012, Slater et al. 2012, Smith et al. 2012), 
inadequate description of the course (Shaw et al. 2012, Slater et al. 2012) and/or inadequate 
reporting of results (Cox et al. 2009, Jericho et al. 2010, Wilson et al. 2012). Limitations relating to 
the assessment tools employed are described in the following section. 
4.3.4 Study evaluation and main findings 
Table 4.6 displays the levels of evaluation assessed across the studies categorised by participant type 
(medical student or trainee). Studies involving students primarily focussed on participant 
satisfaction, attitudes, and knowledge/ skill acquisition, with lesser emphasis on behavioural change. 
In contrast, the majority of studies involving trainees examined behavioural change as a learning 
outcome, with three studies examining organisational impact through participant engagement in 
quality improvement work (Holland et al. 2010, Slater et al. 2012, Smith et al. 2012). None of the 
studies explored patient benefit as a result of the course.   
 
Table 4.6 Kirkpatrick’s  levels of evaluation assessed across the studies 
Kirkpatrick’s level of 
evaluation 
Studies involving medical 
students (n=10) 
Studies involving trainees 
(n=10) 
All studies                     
(n=20)(%) 
1: Participation 6  8  14 (70) 
2a: Attitudes / perceptions 8  7  15 (75) 
2b: Knowledge / skills 7 4  11 (55) 
3: Behavioural change  2  9 11 (55) 
4a: Organisational change 0 3  3 (15) 
4b: Patient benefit 0 0 0 
 
The outcome measures, main findings and level(s) of evaluation reported in each study are displayed 
in Table 4.7. Assessment tools used and main findings are discussed further under the respective 
Kirkpatrick’s level headings below. 
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Level 1: Participation / satisfaction  
Satisfaction was mostly assessed using questionnaires post-intervention requiring responses on a 
Likert scale from very low satisfaction to very high satisfaction. Three studies supplemented 
satisfaction questionnaires with either focus groups (Anderson et al. 2009, Shaw et al. 2012) or 
interviews with participants (Slater et al. 2012). Satisfaction with the courses was generally high 
although response rates were poor in two studies (Aboumatar et al. 2012, Smith et al. 2012). Two 
studies evaluating courses that included web-based content reported poor uptake (Dudas et al. 
2011) or lower satisfaction rates (Slater et al. 2012) with the web-based learning component.    
 
Level 2a: Attitudes / perceptions 
Patient safety attitudes/ perceptions were assessed using a variety of tools. Bespoke questionnaires 
comprising items mapped to course learning objectives were used in eight studies (Anderson et al. 
2009, Cox et al. 2009, Holland et al. 2010, Jericho et al. 2010, Cox et al. 2011, Scott et al. 2011, 
Myung et al. 2012, Shaw et al. 2012). Two studies used modified versions of validated tools (Dudas 
et al. 2011, Arora et al. 2012) and a further three studies used modified versions of previously 
published questionnaires (Hall et al. 2010, Leung et al. 2010, Jansma et al. 2010a). One study 
assessed systems-based thinking using a validated scale (system thinking scale, STS) (Aboumatar et 
al. 2012) and one study assessed perceived patient safety  culture  using  the  modified  ‘Hospital  
Survey  on  Patient  Safety  Culture’  (Slater et al. 2012). Of studies evaluating patient safety attitudes 
pre-post intervention, the majority of studies reported significant improvement in at least some 
domains. The study assessing systems-based thinking reported significant improvement in STS scores 
post-intervention (Aboumatar et al. 2012), whilst the study evaluating perceived patient safety 
culture reported no change post-intervention (Slater et al. 2012)  
 
Level 2b: Knowledge/ skill acquisition  
Eight studies evaluated knowledge acquisition using objective and/or self-report measures. 
Objective tests were used in six studies (Holland et al. 2010, Paxton et al. 2010, Aboumatar et al. 
2012, Arora et al. 2012, Shaw et al. 2012, Slater et al. 2012); these comprised multiple choice or 
true/false questions mapped to course learning objectives. All studies demonstrated significant 
improvements in knowledge acquisition, although in one study a poor response rate precluded 
statistical testing (Slater et al. 2012). Learners’ patient safety skills were assessed in four studies (Cox 
et al. 2009, Hall et al. 2010, Holland et al. 2010, Shaw et al. 2012), all of which employed self-
reported measures and demonstrated significant improvement in most or all items. 
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Level 3: Behavioural change 
Changes in safety-related behaviours were assessed in a number of ways: behavioural intentions 
assessed via questionnaire (Holland et al. 2010, Jansma et al. 2010a, Aboumatar et al. 2012); self-
reported safety-related actions (e.g. incident reporting) (Jansma et al. 2010a, Jansma et al. 2010b, 
Stahl et al. 2011, Slater et al. 2012) or by safety-related actions determined objectively (Jericho et al. 
2010, Scott et al. 2011, Arora et al. 2012, Shaw et al. 2012, Smith et al. 2012, Williams et al. 2012). Of 
these latter studies, objective assessment included qualitative assessment of patient safety 
observations (Arora et al. 2012); National Patient Safety Goal (NPSG) related behaviours assessed via 
simulation (Shaw et al. 2012); engagement in quality improvement work (Smith et al. 2012) and 
incident reporting assessed via submissions to formal reporting systems (Jericho et al. 2010, Scott et 
al. 2011, Williams et al. 2012). All studies reported favourable changes in safety-related behaviours, 
with the exception of one study, which found that whilst learners’ intentions towards reporting 
significantly improved post-course, actual (self-reported) incident reporting did not improve 
following the course (Jansma et al. 2010a). 
 
Level 4: Organisational change 
Three studies evaluated organisational change as an outcome measure of their course. Each of these 
studies involved learner engagement in quality improvement work and reported subsequent positive 
impact at organisational level (Holland et al. 2010, Slater et al. 2012, Smith et al. 2012). For example, 
Holland et al found that a 4-week web-based patient safety and quality improvement curriculum 
resulted in 20 quality improvement projects being initiated by trainees, with half of these projects at 
various stages of implementation. However, the means by which ‘project implementation’ was 
assessed is unclear (Holland et al. 2010).  Smith et al found that a resident-led hospitalist-facilitated 
limited root cause analysis programme resulted in 18 successful quality improvement interventions. 
These interventions led to objective system-wide or subjective behavioural change. However, the 
authors accepted that  ‘success’  of  implementation  as  defined  by  the  authors  themselves  may  be  
subject to observer bias (Smith et al. 2012). Finally, the team-based  ‘Training  and  Action  for  Patient 
Safety  (TAPS)’  programme  by  Slater  et  al  found  that  8  of  the  11  interdisciplinary  teams  were  able  to  
demonstrate improvements in patient safety outcomes and/or practice through the use of weekly 
data plotted on run charts (Slater et al. 2012).  
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Table 4.7 Study outcome measures and main findings 
Lead author 
Year 
 
Outcome measures Main findings Level of 
evaluation 
Aboumatar 
2012 
Primary outcome measures: pre-post intervention safety 
knowledge (19-item test), self-efficacy in safety skills (9-item 
survey), system-based thinking (using validated system 
thinking scale STS). Secondary outcome measures: Post-
intervention student satisfaction and safety intentions (2-item 
survey). 
High participant satisfaction – intersession quality rated as excellent or very good by 92%. 
Significant improvement in safety knowledge scores pre-post (64% vs. 83%, p<0.001). 
Significant improvement in composite systems thinking scores (61.15 to 67.56, p<0.001). 
Significant improvement in self-efficacy for all taught communication and safety skills 
(p<0.001). High self-reported safety behavioural intentions – 85% reported they would 
speak up about safety concerns. 
 
1, 2a, 2b, 3 
Anderson 
2009 
Multi-method evaluation. Pre-post questionnaire assessing 
safety knowledge and perceptions of course (hopes, concerns 
and expectations). Additional post-course satisfaction 
questionnaire and focus groups. 
Majority (>50%) satisfied with course; however low scores on perceived preparation for the 
course. Significant  improvement  in  students’  knowledge  whether working uni- or inter-
professionally (p=0.001). Post-course medical student concerns emerged as being 
unfounded and hopes and expectations in both the uni- and inter-professional groups were 
met. Focus group revealed consensus of added value in working inter-professionally. 
 
1, 2a, 2b 
Arora 
2012 
Participant satisfaction post-course. Patient safety knowledge 
(MCQs) and safety attitudes (modified validated 
questionnaire) pre-post. Safety event identification and 
reporting 6-months post-course via proforma. 
High participant satisfaction – overall satisfaction mean 4.63/5. Significant improvement in 
objective safety knowledge (45.3% to 70.6%, p<0.01) and subjective safety knowledge 
(p<0.01). Significant improvement in 2 of 4 safety attitudes domains (attitudes to error 
analysis and improving safety, and ability to influence safety). Post-course, participants 
recorded a higher number of observations associated with greater understanding, 
recognition and analysis of patient safety issues.  
 
1, 2a, 2b, 3 
Cox 
2009 
Professional group differences in attitudes and skills on 6 
subscales (human fallibility, disclosure of medical errors, 
teamwork/ communication, event reporting, systems of care, 
curricular time spent with other professionals). Assessed by 
survey pre-post intervention. 
 
Significant professional group differences pre-intervention in all 6 sub-scales. Post-
intervention differences in four subscales were resolved with the exception of human 
fallibility (p<0.001) and curricular time spent together (p<0.001). Medical students scored 
significantly worse on all subscales apart from human fallibility.  
 
2a, 2b 
Cox 
2011 
Satisfaction via simple survey. Qualitative analysis of 
narratives using constant comparative method. 
High participant engagement – 78% residents submitted a story and 87% attended at least 
one safety session. 79 narratives submitted by residents over 3 months. Majority of stories 
involved errors (86%). High participant satisfaction - 85% rated it as a positive learning 
experience. 44% self-reported improvement in safety attitudes.  
 
1, 2a 
Dudas 
2011 
Participant satisfaction. Patient safety attitudes (modified 
items derived from Safety Attitudes Questionnaire). 
High participant satisfaction – 76% recommended session continue. Significant 
improvements in patient safety attitudes pre-post in 9 of 10 items (p<0.01).  
 
 
1,2a 
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Lead author 
Year 
 
Outcome measures Main findings Level of 
evaluation 
Hall 
2010 
Patient safety attitudes and self-reported safety skills 
(previously published tool). Comparison pre- and 1 year post-
intervention and with historical control. Analysis of student-
submitted reports compared with contemporaneous reports 
from patient safety reporting system (PSN). 
At baseline no differences in any patient safety attitudes or safety skills between 
intervention and control. At 1 year post-course, intervention group expressed significantly 
higher comfort level in identifying the cause for an error post-intervention (3.72 vs. 3.27, 
p<0.05). No significant difference in PSN worthy reports or in blame tone between 
participants and PSN reporters. Significantly higher robustness of proposed solutions by 
participants compared to PSN reporters (3 vs. 0, p<0.001). 
 
2a, 2b 
Holland 
2010 
Objective knowledge assessed via MCQs and true/false items 
pre and immediately post-course. Reflection on learning 
assessment at year-end including knowledge, skills, abilities 
and beliefs items. Curriculum evaluation. 
Significant improvement in knowledge (19.50 to 23.00, p<0.05). Residents perceived 
significant improvements in knowledge, skills, abilities, beliefs and commitment to improve 
quality of care (all p<0.001). High satisfaction with curriculum (mean 3.53/ 4). 20 quality 
improvement projects proposed, 50% at various stages of implementation. 
 
1, 2a, 2b, 3, 
4a 
Jansma 
2010a 
11-item questionnaire exploring attitudes, intentions and 
behaviour towards reporting incidents (using vignettes and 
modified previously published tool). Assessed at baseline, 
immediately post-course and 6-months post-course. 
 
Attitudes towards incident reporting significantly improved (5 out of 6 vignettes), p<0.001. 
Intentions towards incident reporting significantly improved between baseline and 6-month 
follow-up (p<0.05). No significant improvement in reporting behaviour.  
 
2a, 3 
Jansma 
2010b 
Satisfaction and patient safety behaviours (via semi-structured 
interview) 3-months post-intervention to assess whether 
action implemented and the barriers and promoters to 
action(s). 
High participant satisfaction – mainly positive reaction by 67%. 91 action points formulated 
by 68 participants.  62 (90%) residents reported taking action at 3 months; 50 (55%) actions 
were carried out fully. Barriers to implementing actions mentioned more than twice as 
frequently as compared to promoters. Barriers mostly related to work pressures and 
rotations. 
 
1, 3 
Jericho 
2010 
Attitudes towards adverse event reporting assessed pre and 
post-intervention (12 months). Quarterly adverse event 
reports submitted by residents. 
Significant improvement in attitudes towards reporting (no p-value). Number of reports 
increased from 0 per quarter in the 2 years pre-intervention to 28 per quarter for the 7 
quarters post-intervention, with no sign of decay. 
 
2a, 3 
Leung 
2010 
 
Patient safety attitudes and self-report knowledge (adapted 
previously published questionnaire) assessed pre and 3-
months post-course. 
Participants supportive of inclusion of patient safety in curriculum and in professional 
exams. Significant improvement in 8 of 15 items on patient safety attitudes. Significant 
improvements in all 5 items on self-reported patient safety knowledge; however mean 
scores still perceived as 'fair' or 'poor'. 
 
2a, 2b 
Myung 
2012 
 
Patient safety awareness (40-item questionnaire) pre-post. 
Participant satisfaction (method not described). 
Significant improvement in patient safety awareness in 36 of 40 items (p<0.05). Student 
and faculty commented on repetition of some material and desire for more interactive 
educational methods. 
 
 
1, 2a 
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Lead author 
Year 
 
Outcome measures Main findings Level of 
evaluation 
Paxton 
2010 
 
Patient safety knowledge assessed via MCQ pre and post 
course and again at between 1 to 12 months post-course. 
Application of learning assessed on long-term follow-up. 
Control group compared pre and 6 months post-course. 
Significant improvement in knowledge score at short-term (29.3% to 73.7 %, p<0.001) and 
long-term follow-up (49.1%, p<0.001). 57.1% said they had applied the information learned 
in practice. No significant difference in knowledge found in control group.  
 
2b 
Scott 
2011 
 
% of all adverse event reports submitted by residents via 
electronic reporting system. Participant attitudes and 
motivation regarding reporting and intervention. Satisfaction 
with reporting mechanism. 
Monthly average number of adverse events reported by residents significantly increased by 
5.5 times (6 (1.6%) to 33 (9%), p<0.001). Significant improvement in relative proportion of 
near-miss reports (0.3 (6%) to 9 (27%), p<0.001). Main motivators for reporting were 
patient wellness (87%) and financial incentive (64%). 83% felt the system was burdensome. 
 
1, 2a, 3 
Shaw 
2012 
 
NPSG-knowledge improvement using MCQ test pre-post 
intervention. NPSG-compliant behaviours in a simulation 
scenario. Self-reported confidence in safety and quality. 
Programme satisfaction using 7-item survey post-intervention 
and focus group to explore experiences. 
Both online programmes significantly improved knowledge (p<0.001). No significant 
difference in knowledge in control group. Significantly higher proportion of SE interns 
responded positively to satisfaction and self-reported confidence items (4 of 7 items, 
p<0.05). Higher proportion of SE participants with improved NPSG-behaviours (mean 
4.79/13 vs. 4.17/13 in SQ group; significant for surgical participants: 5.67 SE group vs. 2.33 
SQ group, p<0.05). SE participants found cases authentic, engaging and memorable. 
 
1, 2a, 2b, 3 
Slater 
2012 
 
Satisfaction questionnaire to evaluate online module and each 
workshop. Patient safety culture assessed using modified 
'Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture' pre-post course. 
Knowledge assessed using MCQs pre-post. Project outcomes 
using run-charts. Interviews to explore experiences with TAPS.  
High rates of satisfaction for workshops (mean score 4.1/5), less so for online module (3.3). 
Of the 5 participants who completed pre-post knowledge test, all but 1 improved score. No 
change in safety culture scores for most dimensions apart from significant improvement in 
'communication/ openness' (p<0.01). Eight of 11 teams demonstrated improvements in 
patient safety practices/ outcomes via run-charts. Improved multi-professional 
communication and teamwork reported via interview. 
 
1, 2a, 2b, 3, 
4a 
Smith 
2012 
 
Satisfaction questionnaire to cohorts across the 2 years. 
Qualitative analysis of cases presented, interventions 
proposed and success of follow-through. 
High participant satisfaction – overall quality of QIC mean 4.49/5. 46 interventions 
suggested; attempt to initiate 25 (54%) and of these 18 (72%) deemed successful: 8 led to 
objective permanent system-wide change and 10 resulted in subjective behavioural change. 
 
1, 3, 4a 
Stahl 
2011 
 
Participant satisfaction. Participant knowledge pre-post (24-
item questionnaire based on previous studies). Participant 
behaviour post-course (number of times observed and 
intervened in a patient safety risk). 
Significantly greater satisfaction in intervention vs. control group (75% vs. 54%, p<0.05). 
Significantly greater improvement in patient safety knowledge in intervention vs. control 
group (83% vs. 75%, p<0.001). Significantly greater proportion of intervention group self-
reported intervening to avoid error compared to control group (77% vs. 61%, p<0.05). 
 
 1, 2b, 3 
Wilson 
2012 
 
Evaluation based on class participation (30%), peer evaluation 
(15%) and group project paper and presentation (total 55%). 
Course satisfaction. 
The attendance score for medical students was the lowest (8.59 out of 10). Peer evaluation 
of all  students  was  high;  medical  students  were  the  ‘low  outlier’  in  8  of  10  categories.  
Students rated assigned reading material as extremely helpful. Learners’  perceived  that  
analysing the case studies in multidisciplinary groups gave more insight into understanding 
the problems and proposing solutions. 
1 
75  
4.3.5 Factors influencing curricular implementation 
I was able to extract information on factors influencing implementation of the courses from each of 
the 20 studies. Table 4.8 displays the key factors identified with selected illustrative quotes, 
categorised under the framework headings devised by Wong et al (Wong et al. 2010).  
 
In terms of learner factors, many studies identified the need to ensure personal / clinical relevance 
of the material to learners, with opportunities to apply the learning in order to enhance 
engagement. For studies involving doctors, competing clinical commitments was identified as a 
barrier to engagement (Arora et al. 2012). In studies employing inter-professional modalities, 
improved teamwork and communication was a welcome additional benefit of the course (Slater et 
al. 2012). However, difficulties in delivering such inter-professional learning were highlighted (Cox et 
al. 2009). Most studies identified the need for adequate faculty, with protected time to support 
delivery of the course. Some commented on their now maturity of the faculty infrastructure 
(Aboumatar et al. 2012), whilst others aspired to broaden their faculty infrastructure to ensure 
sustainability of the course (Holland et al. 2010). Faculty role-modelling and clinical credibility were 
noted to be important influencing factors (Leung et al. 2010). 
 
Competing curricular demands was commonly cited as a barrier to sustainability of the courses, with 
some suggesting instituting the course as a mandatory requirement to ensure protected time for 
learning (Arora et al. 2012). Promoting safety as a science was felt to be a key factor for successful 
implementation by the authors of one study (Aboumatar et al. 2012). The majority of studies 
appreciated the need to strike a balance between didactic and experiential teaching modalities and 
of the need for sufficient reinforcement whilst avoiding repetition and duplication of material. The 
authors of one study recognised that delivering a centrally-administered intervention to the whole 
trainee population may ensure greater sustainability of the course than delivering it to a sample of 
the trainee cohort (Cox et al. 2011). 
 
In terms of institutional/ learning environment factors, many studies recognised the institutional 
patient safety culture as a key determinant of successful implementation. Ensuring a safe learning 
environment to allow open discussion of sensitive material (e.g. relating to adverse events) was 
recognised as being of particular importance when delivering education in patient safety. Forging 
improved links between the service provider (hospital) and the training providers was recognised as 
key to ensuring sustainability, particularly for courses which aimed for engagement in quality 
improvement work as a follow-on to the course (Smith et al. 2012).  
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Table 4.8 Factors influencing implementation of patient safety courses  
Factors Illustrative quotes 
Learner factors  
Enhancing learner engagement by 
ensuring clinical relevance  
The cases, exploring incidents that were largely based on events that had in fact 
happened, were felt to be realistic and directly applicable to the context of the 
interns (Shaw et al. 2012). 
Empowering learners through 
application of learning 
Our program challenges residents to apply their skills in systems-based practice 
to a resident-driven, hospital-based project in an effort to solidify their 
commitment to QI beyond the structured rotation (Holland et al. 2010). 
Competing clinical / service delivery 
commitments 
Although all general surgical residents were invited, just more than one half 
actually attended, citing scheduling conflicts and service delivery pressures as 
reasons for not doing so (Arora et al. 2012). 
Learning inter-professionally improved 
teamwork and communication 
The programme promoted better multi-professional communication and 
teamwork (Slater et al. 2012). 
Teacher factors  
Investment in faculty development is 
essential 
Successful implementation of this curriculum, however, requires attention to 
faculty development. It took several years at our institution to achieve this and 
some schools may not have similar resources (Aboumatar et al. 2012). 
Faculty role-models and importance of 
clinical credibility 
Faculty had clinical background and we feel that our students can relate to them 
more readily (Leung et al. 2010). 
Protected faculty time  
 
The residency program further invested in quality by naming both an assistant 
and associate program director for quality amounting to roughly 0.1 full-time 
equivalent spent working on the QICs and subsequent project implementation 
(Smith et al. 2012). 
Curricular factors  
Promoting safety as a science The  topic  of  safety  was  approached  as  a  ‘science’  with  a  defined  set  of  principles  
and theories, and supported with published literature (Aboumatar et al. 2012). 
Competing curricular demands Whole-class lectures are by no means the best way to teach patient safety but we 
find it the easiest format to integrate into a busy curriculum (Leung et al. 2010). 
Making the course mandatory would have been one way of overcoming this but 
this would require curricular change at regional level (Arora et al. 2012). 
Balance between didactic and 
experiential learning 
The students want to increase small-group discussions and simulation sessions, 
which would be more effective than didactics (Myung et al. 2012). 
Balance between reinforcement of 
learning and repetition of teaching 
material 
 
The rapid decline in long-term post-test scores indicates that...students would 
benefit from frequent reinforcement of the application of this material (Paxton 
et al. 2010). 
Only half of the students elected to view it (online video)...this may be due to the 
perceived redundancy of the information presented (Dudas et al. 2011). 
Central administrative support 
necessary for sustainability  
We were able to arrange small-group sessions for the randomised, decentralized 
project for three months, but a core educational activity that includes all 
residents and is managed centrally would be more sustainable (Cox et al. 2011). 
Creating inter-professional learning 
opportunities is challenging 
It is complicated and time-intensive to plan and deliver meaningful and satisfying 
inter-professional learning experiences (Cox et al. 2009). 
77  
Learning environment factors  
Institutional culture as key to 
implementation 
It is important to focus not only on individual attitudes and intentions, but also 
on a stimulating environment, including hospital culture and patient safety 
policies (Jansma et al. 2010a). 
Ensuring a safe learning environment Several residents commented that they felt safe with the reporting 
methodologies and follow-up (Jericho et al. 2010). 
We believe that few of these reports of safety concerns would have been 
brought forward without providing a structured forum for discussion in a trusted 
and collegial environment (Hall et al. 2010). 
Forging improved links between 
training programmes and hospital 
improvement activities 
To foster engagement and sustainability, we are now working to more 
deliberately and consistently integrate patient safety education with the 
hospitals’  systems  improvements  (Cox et al. 2011). 
The chair of the department and the program director were very supportive of 
this endeavour (Smith et al. 2012). 
Financial support to fund the 
programme 
 
VA hospital’s  willingness  to  financially  support  2  residents  per  month  in  this  
intensive patient safety and quality improvement rotation...Dedicated faculty 
rotation leaders supported by the VA with protected time to teach and mentor 
residents (Holland et al. 2010). 
 
4.4 Discussion 
This study aimed to systematically review the latest evidence for courses teaching core concepts of 
patient safety to medical students and trainees. I identified an additional 20 studies as having been 
published in the 3 years since the review by Wong et al (Wong et al. 2010), demonstrating on-going 
interest in developing, delivering and evaluating courses  teaching  patient  safety.  As  in  Wong’s  
review, I found that the majority of studies were conducted in the USA (65%). Only three studies 
were conducted in the UK; interestingly, two of these were authored by faculty affiliated with 
established centres of patient safety research (Arora et al. 2012, Slater et al. 2012). In addition, it 
was encouraging to  find  literature  emerging  from  countries  not  identified  in  Wong’s  earlier  review  – 
with two studies from East Asia (Leung et al. 2010, Myung et al. 2012) and two from The 
Netherlands (Jansma et al. 2010a, Jansma et al. 2010b).  
 
The studies identified were targeted at an equivalent number of medical students and trainees (50% 
each). This is in contrast to the study by Wong et al, which found that 59% of studies targeted 
residents (=trainees). This may reflect the focus of my review on courses teaching core concepts of 
patient safety only as opposed to courses teaching core concepts of patient safety and quality 
improvement – the latter are more prevalent in studies targeting trainees (Wong et al. 2010). In line 
with good educational practice, the majority of studies employed experiential learning modalities 
(such as group discussion and project work), although one study relied on didactic lectures to 
facilitate  integration  into  a  ‘busy  curriculum’  (Leung et al. 2010). Interestingly, case-based learning of 
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real-life adverse events was used in few studies (5, 25%), despite the recognised value of reflecting 
and learning from error and adverse events (Pilpel et al. 1998). The core patient safety content of 
the courses was similar to that found in Wong’s  study  with  key  principles  of  patient  safety  and  root  
cause analysis featuring commonly. It was reassuring to see use of the World Health Organisation’s  
Patient Safety Curriculum Guide for Medical Schools by some authors (Leung et al. 2010, Arora et al. 
2012, Myung et al. 2012) and of reference to national curricular standards in half of the USA studies. 
This demonstrates that authors are keen to explicitly cite the rationale for their work as being rooted 
in established curricula and guidance.  
 
In  terms  of  learning  outcomes,  as  found  in  Wong’s  review,  many  of  the  courses  resulted  in  high  
learner satisfaction and knowledge acquisition. Patient safety attitudes also showed positive change 
in many studies. However,  in  contrast  to  Wong’s  review,  I  found  that  amongst  these  more  recent  
studies,  behavioural  outcomes  (Kirkpatrick’s  Level  3)  were  more  commonly  assessed,  particularly  for  
courses targeting trainees. All such studies demonstrated favourable safety-related behaviours post-
course.  Only three of the studies included in my review examined organisational change as an 
outcome  (Kirkpatrick’s  Level  4)  and  again  this  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  my  review  did  not  
include quality improvement courses, which more commonly assess Level 4 outcomes as found in 
Wong’s  review.  Finally,  it  was  encouraging  to  see  that  many  authors  utilised  previously  published  
and/or validated assessment tools, demonstrating a knowledge and appreciation of the emergent 
evidence base in patient safety education. 
 
With regards to factors influencing implementation of the courses, I found a similar breadth of 
factors  spanning  learner,  teacher,  curricular  and  learning  environment  factors,  as  in  Wong’s  study.  
However,  in  contrast  to  Wong’s  review, I found that a number of studies explicitly commented on 
the sustainability of the course studied and how it was situated amidst established safety 
educational interventions within their institutions. This perhaps demonstrates maturity in the 
approach taken by authors in actively considering the longer-term sustainability and spread of their 
course. Moreover, three studies reported data from courses which had been sustained over at least 
two years (Anderson et al. 2009, Cox et al. 2011, Smith et al. 2012) and two studies reported 
‘booster’  courses  designed  to  enhance/ reinforce established safety educational interventions 
delivered earlier in the course of training (Hall et al. 2010, Stahl et al. 2011). 
4.4.1 Limitations of this study 
This review is limited by the quality of the studies included. The majority of studies were before and 
after studies with no control group. There was significant heterogeneity across the studies in terms 
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of number and type of participant targeted, the educational content of the course, the teaching 
methods employed, assessment tools used and the outcomes measured.  Therefore, as found by 
Wong et al it was not appropriate to conduct a quantitative synthesis of the results. Moreover, the 
identification of factors influencing implementation of the courses was wholly dependent on the 
quality of reporting of such factors by the authors, many of who did not stipulate identifying such 
factors as the primary aim of their study. It may be that important barriers and enablers to the 
sustainable integration of patient safety courses remain unreported. Nonetheless, it is reassuring 
that the factors identified in this review map well to the framework reported in Wong’s  review  
(Wong et al. 2010).  
 
Finally,  the  eligibility  criterion  with  regards  ‘patient  safety  as  core  content’  was  quite  narrow  and  
hence relevant studies may have been missed. However, the search strategy was sensitive in 
identifying five highly relevant studies that I hoped would be retrieved. Moreover, I believe this 
criterion to be justified given the scope of my thesis and the rationale for my review in informing the 
development and delivery of a course in core concepts of patient safety.  
4.4.2 Summary and implications for further research 
In summary, there continues to be a rapid proliferation of courses in patient safety targeting medical 
students and trainees. The majority of such courses are well accepted by learners, improve patient 
safety knowledge, skills and attitudes and result in positive behavioural change. Moreover, a few 
courses result in positive organisational impact through the subsequent engagement of trainees in 
quality improvement projects. Much of the evidence for patient safety education continues to arise 
from the USA and may be attributable to the explicit integration of competencies in patient safety 
and quality improvement within national curricular statements and guidance (Association of 
American Medical Colleges 2001, Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education 2011). 
Significant barriers remain to the sustainable integration of education in patient safety, but in the 
USA at least there appears to be a maturation of the infrastructures required to support on-going 
delivery.  This  reaffirms  that  education  and  training  providers  in  the  UK  have  much  to  do  to  ‘catch-up’  
with progress made in the USA. 
 
Reflecting on these findings, I may draw a number of implications for further research.  Although 
root cause analysis is a core feature of many courses teaching patient safety, I find it disappointing 
that few such courses utilise real-life adverse events experienced by trainees as core learning 
material. As highlighted in Chapter 3, using experiences of trainees themselves ensures relevance to 
learners and promotes engagement. Moreover, studies  exploring  trainees’  preferences  for  learning  
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about error and patient safety have found that discussion of real-life examples of adverse events is a 
popular modality (Fischer et al. 2006, Teigland et al. 2013). 
 
In addition to considering the structure and content of any proposed patient safety course, if I am to 
ensure its sustainability I will need to bear in mind the breadth of factors influencing the 
implementation of such interventions. For example, I will need to optimise learner engagement, 
ensure the provision of adequate faculty, and work with training programme directors and 
administrators to ensure the necessary infrastructure to support delivery of the course. 
 
As an initial next step, in the following Chapter, I examine whether UK Foundation trainees reflect on 
adverse events in order to determine the feasibility of using these experiences as the basis for a 
course teaching patient safety.  
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5 Do Foundation Trainees Reflect on Patient Safety Incidents? A 
Retrospective Review of Portfolio Entries 
5.1 Introduction 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, explicit opportunities to learn about patient safety within postgraduate 
medical education (PGME) are scarce. As frontline clinicians, trainees often experience adverse 
events in the workplace, but may be reluctant to disclose or report such incidents (Padmore et al. 
2009). Uncertainty about what or how to report, lack of time, feelings of guilt and helplessness and 
fear of retribution may all pose as significant barriers to reporting (Kaldjian et al. 2008).  This limits 
the potential for learning from these events, both amongst peers and indeed across the wider 
organisation. Therefore, aside from formal reporting systems, other methods are required to 
identify adverse events, which trainees are aware of and are likely to use to disclose such incidents.    
 
I considered that reviewing trainees’  portfolios might be a fruitful approach. As discussed in Chapter 
3, portfolios are being used increasingly throughout the continuum of medical education to enhance 
reflective practice and promote professional development (Tochel et al. 2009). These portfolios may 
contain log-books, project reports and reflective writing (Pitts 2010). As with many postgraduate 
training programmes, the Foundation Programme requires trainees to maintain a portfolio of 
personal and professional development (UK Foundation Programme Office 2010). Indeed, as a 
Foundation  trainee  myself,  I  regularly  completed  ‘Reflective  Practice’  entries  as  part  of  my  portfolio.  
Some of these entries related to adverse events experienced by myself as, as others have reported 
(Chisholm et al. 2004), I found the process of reflecting on such events cathartic. 
 
Previous studies within undergraduate medical education have evaluated medical  students’  written  
reflections on diverse aspects such as first patient experiences (Pitkala et al. 2004), lapses in 
professionalism (Hodges et al. 2011) and medical error (Martinez et al. 2008). However, to the best 
of my knowledge, no study to date has evaluated junior doctors’  reflections  on  adverse  events.  I  
therefore sought to determine whether my peers too engage in individual reflection on adverse 
events and so determine the feasibility of using these experiences as the basis for a patient safety 
course to promote shared learning from these events.  
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5.1.1 Study aims 
The aim of this study was to determine whether Foundation trainees reflect on adverse events in 
their portfolios and to explore the potential value of these events for learning about patient safety.  
5.2 Methods 
This was a cross-sectional, retrospective record review of professional development portfolios. 
5.2.1 Study setting and participants 
The Foundation Programme is a two-year training programme, which forms the bridge between 
medical school and specialty training in the UK. The aims of the Foundation Programme are 
highlighted in Box 5.1. Foundation programmes are locally managed by Foundation Programme 
Directors (FPD) and their associated administrators. As a first study of its kind, I obtained consent 
from the FPD at the Central Manchester Foundation Programme (Simon Carley) to review the 
‘Reflective  Practice’  portfolio  entries  made by all Foundation Year 1 (FY1) trainees (n= 30) within his 
programme. Following consultation with patient safety researcher Sonal Arora (SA), we felt that this 
approach would ensure an adequate sample to inform further research.  
 
All  ‘Reflective  Practice’  entries  made  by  FY1  trainees in their first year of clinical practice (from July 
2008 to August 2009) were extracted by the FPD from the e-portfolio  provider  (‘Horus’).  Entries  
were issued to me in an anonymised form so as to maintain trainees’  confidentiality. Any data, 
which may have identified any individual trainee or patient, was screened out by the FPD. The local 
research ethics committee confirmed that ethical approval was not required for this review of 
anonymised data.  
 
Box 5.1 The Foundation Programme curriculum aims (UK Foundation Programme Office 2010) 
The Foundation Programme curriculum provides the educational framework to support the professional 
development of new doctors in the first two years of clinical practice. The curriculum is based on the General 
Medical  Council’s  ‘Good  Medical  Practice’  document,  which  provides  guidance  on  the  principles  and  standards  
of clinical care, competence and conduct (General Medical Council 2013). 
Foundation Year 1: Aims to build upon the competencies acquired during undergraduate training, completion 
of which leads to full registration with the General Medical Council (the regulatory body for UK doctors). 
Foundation Year 2: Aims to build upon Foundation Year 1 with a specific focus on the assessment and 
management of the acutely ill patient, as well as generic professional skills (team-working, communication, 
time-management). 
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5.2.2 Study procedure 
‘Reflective  Practice’  entries  were  structured  around  a  proforma  comprising  the following prompts:  
1. Describe interesting, difficult or uncomfortable experiences. Try to record both positive and 
not so positive elements. What made the experience memorable? 
2. How did it affect you? 
3. How did it affect the team? 
4. What did you learn from the experience and what would you do differently next time? 
 
For the purpose of this study, following consultation with SA, I used the UK-based National Patient 
Safety  Agency’s  (NPSA) definition of patient safety incident (PSI) to  cover  terms  such  as  ‘adverse  
event’,  ‘near-miss’  and  ‘significant  event’  - i.e. ‘any  unintended  or  unexpected  incident  that  could  
have or did lead to harm for one or more persons receiving NHS-funded  healthcare’ (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2004). Moreover, rather than develop a bespoke coding framework, we 
sought to analyse the reflective entries using an existing PSI taxonomy. The NPSA guide  ‘Seven  Steps  
to  Patient  Safety’  was  chosen  for this purpose (National Patient Safety Agency 2004).t This report 
describes the steps that NHS organisations need to take to improve patient safety and highlights the 
recommended dataset domains and taxonomy to be used for voluntary reporting of PSIs at national 
level.  We used this national taxonomy to devise a proforma for the description and analysis of the 
‘Reflective  Practice’  entries  in  this  study  (a  copy  of  the  proforma is displayed in Appendix 1).   
5.2.3 Data analysis 
All ‘Reflective  Practice’ entries were reviewed independently by myself and Graham Neale (GN, 
consultant experienced in retrospective record review of adverse events). All entries were firstly 
read and re-read to ensure full immersion in the data. For entries rated positive (i.e. PSI identified) a 
content analysis approach was used to code the PSI into incident type, contributing factors and 
patient outcome using the proforma (Appendix 1). It was also noted whether the PSI was formally 
reported through the Hospital Incident Reporting System (through trainee self-report within the 
reflective entry). I served as primary coder and any disagreements were settled through discussion 
between myself and GN, involving a third reviewer (SA) as necessary. 
 
The level of coding agreement between us (MA and GN) was  assessed  using  Cohen’s  kappa  
coefficient.  Descriptive statistics using SPSS v 17.0 were used to calculate absolute and relative (%) 
frequencies of PSIs, their type, contributing factors and outcome. Confidence intervals (95%) are 
reported with all statistical indices.  
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5.3 Results 
One hundred and thirty-nine reflective entries were completed by 30 trainees (15 male, 15 female; 
mean age 24). On average, each trainee made 5 reflective entries (range 1 to 12). Of the total 
number of these 139 entries, 68 (49%, 95% CI 41-57%) reflected on a PSI. The formal reporting of 
incidents to Hospital Incident Reporting Systems was mentioned in only 3 of these cases (4%, 95% CI 
0.7-6%). Inter-rater reliability analyses revealed that the coding of the incidents was robust for 
presence of a PSI (kappa=0.83, 95% CI 0.73-0.92), type of PSI (kappa=0.82, 95% CI 0.71-0.94) and 
patient outcome (kappa=0.70, 95% CI 0.56-0.85). Key characteristics of the PSIs reflected on in terms 
of incident type, contributing factors and incident outcome are discussed in turned below. 
5.3.1 Incident type  
Certain types of incident were more commonly reflected on than others. The most common types of 
incident reflected on were errors in clinical assessment (delayed or wrong diagnosis) and delays or 
failures to access care, both n=15 (22%, 95% CI 14-33%). Examples of errors in clinical assessment 
extracted from the portfolios are as follows:  
“…A  gentleman  with  a  history  of  resected  laryngeal  cancer  was  admitted  to  the  ward  as  ‘off  legs’.  On  
our ward round he was found to have neurological signs of acute cord compression that had not 
been picked up previously...” (FY1 trainee 8).  
 
“…The fact that I incorrectly diagnosed acute pulmonary oedema as an escalating pneumonia and 
consequently almost gave the patient further fluids to treat her hypotension was very frightening...” 
(FY1 trainee 11). 
 
An example of a delay or failure to access care is below:  
“…I was shocked that despite communicating my senior-approved management plan to the staff on 
day duty that it had not been carried out – with the result that the patient received suboptimal care. 
His Trop T (cardiac troponin) was still positive 3 days later and he had not had any further clexane 
(low-molecular weight heparin) since attending A&E...” (FY1 trainee 30). 
 
Twelve PSIs (18%, 95% CI 10-28%) were assigned to infrastructure/staffing deficiencies and 11 (16%, 
95% CI 9-27%) were assigned to medication errors. The remaining PSIs were due to disruptive or 
aggressive behaviour (5, 7%), failure to monitor/review (4, 6%), self-harming behaviour (3, 4%), 
treatment or procedure complication (2, 3%) and failure to communicate outside of team (1, 1%). 
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5.3.2 Contributing factors  
Each PSI was associated with an average of 2 (range 1 to 4) contributing factors. Certain types of 
contributing factor were more commonly reflected upon than others. The distribution of 
contributing factors reflected on is displayed in Table 5.1. The most commonly cited contributing 
factors to PSIs were team and social factors (23%, 95% CI 17-31%) and patient factors (22%, 95% CI 
16-29%). An example relating to both these factors is cited below:  
“…An 82 year old lady was admitted to the surgical ward and developed a deep venous thrombosis 
(DVT). We commenced the patient on warfarin therapy as recommended by guidelines on the 
prescription  sheet.  The  patient’s International Normalised Ratio (INR) post loading was 8.1. The 
consultant in charge of the patient was extremely annoyed. I felt disheartened at being blamed for 
the situation and for potentially putting the patient at increased risk of bleeding. I learnt from this 
experience that each patient must be treated individually. The patient was frail and very small and 
doses prescribed generally for average sized patients may not  be  applicable  to  all  patients…” (FY1 
trainee 22). 
 
Task factors and communication factors were the next most common cause (both 13%, 95% CI 9-
20%). An example relating to both these factors is cited below:  
“…Phlebotomists provide a blood-taking service on the ward 3 times a week. On many occasions I 
would find that not all the bloods had been taken...I recommended that any bloods that cannot be 
done need to be brought to the attention of the junior doctors so that they can be attempted later. I 
realised from this experience that effective communication between members of healthcare staff is 
essential to provide patients with good medical care...” (FY1 trainee 13). 
 
Table 5.1 Contributing factors reflected on by Foundation trainees 
Contributing factor* Frequency  
Team & social factors 31 
Patient factors 29 
Task factors 18 
Communication factors 18 
Equipment & Resources factors 17 
Education & Training factors 10 
Working conditions and environmental 6 
Individual factors 5 
* Please refer to the proforma in Appendix 1 for further details regarding the categories 
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5.3.3 Incident outcome  
There was insufficient information to determine PSI outcome in 19 (28%) cases. Of the entries where 
elucidation of outcome was possible (n=49), the majority (n=23, 47%, 95% CI 34-61%) led to no harm 
to the patient. Nine reflective entries described PSIs resulting in low harm (18%, 95% CI 10-31%) and 
7 resulting in moderate harm (14%, 95% CI 7-27%). A total of 10 (20%, 95% CI 11-34%) reflective 
entries described PSIs resulting in severe harm (n=4, 8%) or death (n=6, 12%). A summary of these 
latter cases is displayed in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Summary of PSIs with outcome 'severe harm' or 'death' 
Incident type Description  Outcome 
Consent, communication: failure 
to communicate outside of team 
Antibiotic treatment for MRSA septicaemia incorrectly 
stopped due to failure to handover to new team. 
Death 
Clinical assessment: missed 
diagnosis 
Missed diagnosis of spinal cord compression 
leading to paralysis and death. 
Death 
Clinical assessment: missed 
diagnosis 
Delayed recognition and treatment of post-operative 
hypotension. 
Death 
Clinical assessment: missed 
diagnosis 
Delayed diagnosis of ruptured abdominal aortic 
aneurysm. 
Death 
Treatment, procedure Complication of abdominal aortic aneurysm repair 
(aorto-enteric fistula). 
Death 
Clinical assessment: missed 
diagnosis 
Missed diagnosis of acute coronary syndrome. Death 
Medication error Medical cardioversion attempted in non-specialist 
setting, involving cardiac arrest. 
Severe harm 
Clinical assessment: missed 
diagnosis 
Missed diagnosis of small bowel obstruction, leading to 
bowel resection. 
Severe harm 
Infrastructure, staffing Emergency AAA repair involving inexperienced theatre 
staff. 
Severe harm 
Infrastructure, staffing Inappropriate transfer of complex case to ward setting 
(thoraco-abdominal aneurysm). 
Severe harm 
 
5.4 Discussion 
This study aimed to determine whether Foundation trainees reflect on adverse events in their 
professional development portfolios and to explore the potential value of these events for learning 
about patient safety. The results reveal that Foundation Year 1 (FY1) trainees commonly reflect on 
PSIs within their portfolios – thus demonstrating an awareness of patient safety issues in their 
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everyday clinical practice. Moreover, I was able to extract rich information from these reflections on 
the type of incidents experienced by trainees, their perceived contributing factors, and outcomes. 
This highlights the potential value of these reflections in learning about patient safety and in 
demonstrating how a combination of diverse factors spanning individual and organisational spheres 
may contribute to PSIs.  
 
Although  the  ‘Reflective  Practice’  proforma does not specifically enquire into PSIs, nearly half of all 
reflective entries made by FY1 trainees described a PSI as a memorable event. So whilst only 3 of the 
incidents reflected on in this study were apparently reported formally, it is clear that trainees are 
internalising such events and reflecting on them. This supports findings from other studies in the UK 
and abroad (Mizrahi 1984, Wu et al. 1991). In one early study, when young interns were asked ‘What  
were  your  most  memorable  experiences  during  training?’ 21% of the responses related to actual or 
potential mistakes (Mizrahi 1984). This is perhaps not surprising, given that errors and adverse 
events can be a source of considerable emotional distress for trainees (Firth-Cozens 1987). 
Reflecting on PSIs within personal portfolios therefore presents an opportunity for personal 
catharsis (Chisholm et al. 2004). As new doctors embarking on lifelong careers within the NHS, this is 
reassuring, especially given the introduction of revalidation, which expects all licensed doctors to 
reflect  on  ‘significant  events’  (which  the  GMC  defines  as  ‘PSI’)  to  inform  future  practice  (General 
Medical Council 2012c). 
 
Within this study the most frequent types of PSI reflected on were errors in diagnosis; delays or 
failures to access care; deficiencies in infrastructure/staffing and medication errors. These findings 
broadly mirror those found in a study which asked house officers to describe their most significant 
medical mistake in the last year (Wu et al. 1991). However, this pattern of incident type differs from 
that  found  in  the  data  summaries  from  the  UK’s  National  Reporting  and  Learning  System  (NRLS) 
(National Patient Safety Agency March 2013). The latest national data shows that the commonest 
PSIs reported via Hospital Incident Reporting Systems (HIRS) were patient accidents (27%), followed 
by medication errors (11%); treatment/procedural complications (11%); failures in implementation 
of on-going care/monitoring (9%), and delays or failure to access care (8%). Errors in clinical 
assessment/ diagnosis formed a minority of reported incidents at just 4% (National Patient Safety 
Agency March 2013). The different distribution of PSI type between national findings and reflections 
from this study probably reflects the different demographic of staff that report PSIs through HIRS. 
Nurses and allied health professionals tend to report incidents much more frequently than doctors 
(Wallace et al. 2008). Hence diagnostic errors, most commonly reflected on by doctors, do not 
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feature highly on national dataset summaries, whereas patient accidents involving slips, trips and 
falls - reported most commonly by nursing staff, feature heavily in such reports (Wallace et al. 2008, 
Sevdalis et al. 2010).  
 
A diverse range of factors were found to contribute to the PSIs reflected upon, supporting existing 
evidence that factors spanning individual healthcare professionals and healthcare systems impact on 
patient safety (Vincent et al. 1998). The most prominent contributing factor extracted from the 
reflections  was  ‘team  and  social  factors’  – this supports evidence that non-technical skills such as 
teamwork and communication are critical in the delivery of safe care (Flin et al. 2009). Although it 
was not possible to elucidate incident outcome in 28% of the entries, where this was possible, the 
majority of PSIs resulted in no apparent harm (47%), and this supports national data (National 
Patient Safety Agency March 2013). Six of the PSIs reflected on resulted in patient death, and on 
closer analysis the majority of these incident types were attributable to errors in clinical assessment: 
missed or delayed diagnosis. This supports evidence to show that diagnosis-related incidents are 
more likely to be associated with moderate/severe harm/death than incidents unrelated to 
diagnosis (Sevdalis et al. 2010).  
5.4.1 Limitations of this study 
The main limitation of this study relates to the fact that the quality of the information extracted 
from the reflective entries was wholly dependent on the quality and depth of reflections made by 
trainees – which could not be controlled.  Entries varied from four to five sentences to up to a full 
page and as a result it was difficult to extract sufficient information from some entries. For example, 
the incident outcome could not be elucidated in 28% of PSIs reflected on – and indeed this may be a 
function  of  the  ‘transient’  status  of  trainees  (Padmore et al. 2009), whereby it may not be possible to 
follow-through a PSI to its ‘completion’. Methods to verify the information, for example through 
interviewing trainees and other stakeholders would be required.  
 
In addition, this study was conducted on a small sample (n=30 trainees) and the reflective practice of 
these trainees may not be representative of the reflective practice of junior doctors on a national 
scale. A larger study to include trainees working at different hospitals across the UK and 
internationally would be required to assess the generalisability of these findings. However, despite 
the study limitations, I believe that this methodology was suitable for the purpose of this study in 
determining whether Foundation trainees reflect on PSIs and the potential value of these reflections 
for shared learning. Moreover, the high inter-rater reliability of the coding of PSIs using a national 
taxonomy system suggests that such a framework could be useful at a national scale to identify PSIs 
89  
from similar reflective sources. Further research could explore whether the reflective practice of 
senior trainees differs from that of Foundation trainees, and whether specialty-specific differences 
exist.  
5.4.2 Summary and implications for further research 
In summary, this study shows that FY1 trainees commonly reflect on PSIs within their portfolios and 
that these reflections are a potentially valuable resource for learning about patient safety. Given 
evidence that discussion and disclosure of  ‘medical  mistakes’  by trainees results in more 
constructive changes in practice (Wu et al. 1991), trainees should be encouraged to discuss PSIs with 
others – be it with their seniors or their peers.  
 
As a trainee myself, I am aware that trainees often discuss PSIs and safety concerns informally, and 
in an unstructured way. Introducing an educational intervention to formalise the opportunity for 
group reflection on PSIs may be a powerful way to improve practice and promote collective learning 
from PSIs. Using personal examples of incidents, such as those identified through this study will 
ensure relevance to trainees and promote deeper experiential learning. Moreover, given the 
difficulties in extracting sufficient information from the reflective entries, providing a framework 
similar to that used for coding data in this study would facilitate structured reflection on PSIs and 
optimise their potential as a learning resource. 
 
Drawing on the findings reported here and in Chapter 4, I now move on to report the development, 
delivery and evaluation of a patient safety educational programme for Foundation trainees to 
promote  learning  from  PSIs:  ‘Lessons  Learnt:  Building  a  Safer  Foundation’. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
90  
SECTION THREE: Lessons Learnt: Building a Safer Foundation  
Drawing on the exploratory research reported in Chapters 4 and 5, in this Section of the thesis I 
report the development,  implementation  and  evaluation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt:  Building  a Safer 
Foundation’:  an  educational  programme  aiming  to  formalise  the  opportunity  for  trainees  across  the  
North Western Foundation School to learn from patient safety incidents. 
 
In Chapter 6, I provide a general introduction to the development and implementation of the 
programme. In Chapter 7, I report a pre-post intervention study to develop senior medical faculty to 
support delivery of the programme. In Chapter 8, I report a pilot prospective qualitative analysis of 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  cases  to  examine  the  process underpinning the programme. Finally in Chapter 9, I 
report the larger pre-post intervention study to evaluate the impact of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme and identify factors influencing its implementation. 
 
For the purpose of this Section of the thesis, the  term  ‘patient  safety  incident’  is  defined  as  per  the  
National  Patient  Safety  Agency’s  definition  as  ‘any  unintended or unexpected incident that could 
have  or  did  lead  to  patient  harm’  (National Patient Safety Agency 2004). This definition encompasses 
terms  such  as  ‘adverse  event’,  ‘sentinel  event’  and  ‘near-miss’. 
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6 Development  and  Delivery  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Programme   
6.1 Introduction 
In the systematic review reported in Chapter 4, I found that whilst root cause analysis is a core 
feature of courses teaching patient safety, few such courses utilise real-life patient safety incidents 
(PSIs) experienced by trainees as core learning material (Jericho et al. 2010, Cox et al. 2011, Smith et 
al. 2012). In the study of reflective portfolio entries reported in Chapter 5, I found that Foundation 
trainees commonly reflect on PSIs, and concluded that these incidents could serve as a valuable 
resource for learning about patient safety. Using real-life incidents would ensure relevance to 
trainees and furthermore, as highlighted in Chapter 3, encouraging group reflection on these 
incidents would promote deeper experiential learning amongst trainees.  
 
However, in developing an educational programme in patient safety for trainees, I must be cognisant 
of the well-recognised barriers to implementation of patient safety education, paying attention to a 
range of learner, faculty and institutional factors, as reported in Chapter 4. In particular, given the 
sensitivity of the proposed learning material (i.e. PSIs), creating a safe learning environment will be 
critical in ensuring that the proposed intervention results in constructive, rather than destructive 
changes in practice.  
 
Drawing on these findings, in this Chapter I describe the development and delivery of ‘Lessons  
Learnt:  Building  a  Safer  Foundation’ (‘Lessons  Learnt’),  a  novel patient safety educational 
programme to promote peer learning from PSIs amongst Foundation trainees across the North 
Western Foundation School. I begin this Chapter by describing the setting for the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme and the pilot work, which I led as a Foundation trainee. Subsequently, I highlight the 
aims of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme, describe its development, and outline key milestones in its 
implementation.  
6.2 The  Setting  for  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Programme   
The North Western Foundation School is part of the North Western Deanery and oversees 
Foundation training for over 1000 Foundation trainees in 16 Foundation Programmes across 20 
hospitals in the Greater Manchester, Cumbria and Lancashire region of North West England (Figure 
6.1). Foundation programmes range in size from 32 to 136 Foundation trainees across two cohorts - 
Foundation Year 1 (FY1) and Foundation Year 2 (FY2). Foundation trainees attend protected 
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compulsory teaching (typically a half-day per week) targeted toward augmenting the Foundation 
Programme curriculum competencies achieved in clinical placements (UK Foundation Programme 
Office 2010). Delivery of the Foundation Programme at each site is overseen by Foundation 
Programme Directors (FPD – senior doctors) with the support of administrators (FPAs).  
 
Figure 6.1 Map of North Western Foundation School 
 
 
The UK Foundation Programme Curriculum 2010 stipulates a number of competencies in patient 
safety (selected competencies are displayed in Box 6.1). However, prior to the introduction of the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme, there was no formal education offered by the North Western 
Foundation School for Foundation trainees to develop these competencies.  
 
Box 6.1 Key patient safety competencies in the Foundation Programme curriculum, 2010 
Makes patient safety a priority in own clinical practice 
 Identifies and minimises potential risks and main hazards to patients 
 Describes a critical incident and methods of preventing an adverse event 
Promotes patient safety through good team-working 
 Draws attention to risks or potential risks to patients regardless of status of colleagues 
Understands the principles of quality and safety improvement 
 Demonstrates  knowledge  of  how  and  when  to  report  adverse  events  and  ‘near  misses’  to  local  and,  where  
appropriate, national reporting systems  
 Describes  opportunities  for  improving  the  reliability  of  care  following  adverse  events  or  ‘near  misses’   
 Describes root-cause analysis  
Knowledge 
 Understands the nature of human error and the importance of systems factors in relation to patient safety 
 Principles of the investigation and analysis of adverse events and PSIs as a means to making care safer 
 
1. Manchester Royal Infirmary  
2. Royal Bolton Hospital  
3. Blackpool Victoria Hospital  
4. Fairfield General Hospital 
5. Burnley General Hospital 
6. Royal Blackburn Hospital 
7. Royal Preston Hospital 
8. Barrow, Furness General Hospital  
9. Royal Lancaster Infirmary  
10. North Manchester General Hospital  
11. The Royal Oldham Hospital  
12. Rochdale Infirmary  
13. Hope Hospital  
14. Wythenshawe Hospital  
15. The Christie  
16. Stepping Hill Hospital  
17. Tameside General Hospital  
18. Royal Albert Edward Infirmary 
19. Chorley & South Ribble DGH 
20. Trafford General Hospital  
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6.3 The  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Pilot  
I  originally  conceived  the  idea  for  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  as  a  FY2 trainee in the Central 
Manchester Foundation Programme. Reflecting on my own experiences of PSIs encountered in 
practice, in October 2009 I secured approval from the FPD (Simon Carley) to introduce monthly 30-
minute discussions of PSIs, as part of the compulsory Foundation teaching programme. The FPD had 
previously undertaken patient safety training as part of his role as a Consultant in Emergency 
Medicine and agreed to facilitate the sessions, as part of FY1 teaching. For the first session, I 
delivered a short lecture on patient safety fundamentals (key terminology, theory and policy 
background) and presented an example of a PSI that I had been involved in. Subsequently, I 
recruited one of my FY1 colleagues (Stephenie Tiew) to lead ‘Lessons  Learnt’  for  her  cohort  of  30  FY1  
trainees and to recruit presenters from amongst them. I provided a copy of the data analysis 
proforma from the portfolio study (Appendix 1) to help guide structured discussion around the 
incident type, incident outcome and contributing factors. I incorporated an additional question into 
the proforma:  ‘what  are  the  lessons  learnt?’  in order to emphasise the focus of learning from the 
incidents discussed.  
 
The pilot was well received by FY1 trainees who felt that the sessions were a valuable addition to the 
Foundation teaching programme. Nine 30-minute sessions were held from October 2009 to June 
2010 and many sessions were oversubscribed with volunteers wishing to present. A simple 
satisfaction questionnaire revealed that 94% (n=16/17) agreed/ strongly  agreed  that  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
is a useful way to share learning from incidents and 100% agreed/ strongly agreed that all 
Foundation  trainees  should  have  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  ‘Lessons  Learnt’.   
 
In February 2010, NHS  North  West  launched  a  competition  ‘Junior  Doctors’  Dragon’s  Den’  inviting  
trainees from across the North Western Deanery to pitch ideas to improve service delivery, training 
or the working environment for junior doctors. They offered funding and mentorship to support 
trainees to bring their ideas to fruition. Following the success of the pilot, I submitted a proposal to 
implement  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  across  the  North  Western  Foundation  School  in  collaboration  with  the  
North  Western  Deanery  and  Imperial’s  Centre  for  Patient  Safety  and  Service  Quality  (CPSSQ).  The  
proposal was successful  and  I  was  awarded  the  ‘Junior  Doctor  Innovation  Award  in  Education  and  
Training’  with  £10,000  to  rollout ‘Lessons  Learnt: Building a Safer Foundation’.  Following  completion  
of Foundation Training in August 2010, I took up a Clinical Research Fellowship at Imperial College 
London to continue leading this work as part of this thesis. 
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6.4 Aims  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Programme 
‘Lessons  Learnt:  Building  a  Safer  Foundation’  aims to equip Foundation trainees with core patient 
safety competencies though promoting peer learning from patient safety incidents (PSIs) 
encountered in practice. The specific learning outcomes of the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  are 
derived from key patient safety competencies in the Foundation Programme curriculum (UK 
Foundation Programme Office 2010) and are listed in Box 6.2. In order to promote sustainable 
integration of the programme, the broader  aims  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  were to engage key stakeholders 
across Foundation training and to develop a core faculty in patient safety education. This is 
discussed next (‘Preparation  for  the  Lessons  Learnt  programme’). 
 
Box 6.2 Learning outcomes of the 'Lessons Learnt' programme 
Patient Safety Knowledge 
At the end of the programme, participants will be able to: 
 Define  a  ‘patient  safety  incident’  (PSI) 
 Describe the rates and types of PSIs in healthcare 
 Understand the nature of human error and the importance of systems factors in relation to safety 
 Understand the contributing factors to PSIs 
 
Patient Safety Skills 
At the end of the programme, participants will be able to: 
 Recognise a patient safety incident 
 Analyse a PSI using root cause analysis 
 Identify actions and recommendations to prevent future PSIs 
 
Patient Safety Attitudes 
At the end of the programme, participants will acknowledge the need to: 
 Foster an open and learning culture to improve patient safety 
 Raise and act on concerns about patient safety  
 Reflect and learn from error and PSIs 
 
6.5 Preparation  for  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Programme 
Through the pilot, I found that with FPD and FPA support, it was feasible to incorporate patient 
safety education into the existing Foundation teaching programme. In  order  to  scale  up  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  and  implement  it  across  the Foundation School I needed (i) to engage all key players and (ii) 
to  develop  capacity  and  capability  to  support  delivery  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’.  Moreover, in order to 
support sustainable  integration  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  I  had  to  ensure  that  my  approach  addressed  the  
well-documented barriers to implementation of patient safety education, described by Wong (Wong 
et al. 2010) and reinforced in my review reported in Chapter 4. Key features of the approach to 
implementation of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  are summarised in Table 6.1 and discussed further below.  
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Table 6.1 Addressing barriers to implementation of patient safety education 
Barrier to patient safety education  Addressing  the  barrier  with  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  approach 
Unsupportive institutional culture  Programme steering group formed with representation from 
the North Western Deanery and the Imperial CPSSQ  
 All key stakeholders across Foundation training engaged 
through Launch conference (includes FPDs, FPAs, trainee 
Leads and ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty) 
 Central team to support local implementation 
  
Lack of faculty trained in patient 
safety 
 
 Recruitment and training of local senior  doctors  as  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  faculty 
 Free training course accredited with Royal College of 
Physicians 
 Role aligned with GMC standards re: teaching and raising and 
acting on concerns about patient safety 
 
Poor learner engagement 
 
 Trainee-led  implementation  and  ownership  through  ‘Lead’  
roles 
 Certificates  to  incentivise  trainees’  participation   
 
Competing educational demands  Integrated into Foundation Programme teaching timetable 
(compulsory attendance) 
 Aligned with Foundation Programme curricular competencies 
in patient safety  
 
Lack of evidence to show 
improvement in care 
 
 Evaluation conducted in parallel to implementation to assess 
all  four  levels  of  Kirkpatrick’s  framework  for  evaluation (full 
details reported in Chapter 9) 
 
6.5.1 Stakeholder engagement 
I aimed to  engage  all  stakeholders  in  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  – from the trainees through to the training 
commissioners. I was keen to ensure that all involved understood the rationale and importance of 
implementing patient safety education for Foundation trainees in the Foundation School. I achieved 
this in the following ways: 
(i) High-level endorsement  
I set up a study steering group with representation from the North Western Deanery and the 
Imperial CPSSQ. This would ensure engagement at the highest level to support the development, 
implementation and evaluation of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’. 
(ii) Trainee leadership 
Learner engagement is crucial when implementing any educational intervention. Indeed, as a trainee 
myself (and consistent with the principles of adult learning), I appreciated the need to have 
ownership  of  my  learning  as  opposed  to  having  new  interventions  ‘imposed’  upon me. Therefore in 
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order  to  maximise  learner  engagement,  I  recruited  Foundation  trainee  ‘Leads’  at  each  site  to  lead  
local implementation (further details in 6.7.1).  
(iii) Launch conference 
I  arranged  a  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  launch conference inviting Foundation Programme representatives to 
engage  them  in  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  right  from  initiation.  Explicit roles and responsibilities for all key 
stakeholders were clearly communicated at the launch (Table 6.2; further details in 6.7.2).  
 
Table 6.2 Roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders 
 Stakeholder Responsibilities 
Central team Study Lead 
Clinical Research Fellow 
Project Lead  
Central project management  
Imperial CPSSQ faculty  
Experienced patient safety researchers 
Support Study Lead in development and 
delivery of intervention and evaluation tools 
Foundation School Director 
Directs Foundation training regionally 
Liaison between Study Lead and FPDs/ FPAs  
Postgraduate Dean 
Directs postgraduate medical training 
regionally 
High-level  endorsement  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’ 
Support with faculty training 
 
Local teams Foundation Programme Directors 
Direct Foundation Programme locally 
Facilitate local launch 
Local  endorsement  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’ 
Foundation Programme Administrators 
Administer Foundation Programme locally 
Timetable  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  locally 
Support in administering evaluation locally 
Lessons Learnt Faculty 
Consultant, GP or senior specialty trainee 
Facilitate local launch 
Facilitate  up  to  six  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions 
Escalate concerns as necessary to FPD/ FPA 
Lessons Learnt Leads 
Foundation trainee Year 1 or Year 2 
Lead local launch 
Recruit presenters and chair monthly sessions  
Coordinate local evaluation 
6.5.2 Developing capacity and capability   
As identified in my systematic review in Chapter 4 and as noted elsewhere (Wong et al. 2010), lack 
of expert faculty is a commonly cited barrier to implementation of patient safety education. 
Moreover, many educational interventions struggle to be sustained due to inadequate infrastructure 
to support delivery. My approach to developing capacity and capability involved the following: 
(i) Centrally-supported, locally-led 
With the support of the Foundation School Director (Paul  Baker),  I  devised  a  ‘centrally-supported, 
locally-led’  model  whereby  we  provided  support  and  direction  for  FPAs, FPDs and trainee Leads to 
deliver  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  locally (Table 6.2). I set up a dedicated email account to communicate and 
share information relating to key stages of implementation and to handle any queries 
(lessonslearntnw@gmail.com). Capitalising on the existing infrastructure for delivery of Foundation 
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training promoted local ownership by Foundation teams and minimised study costs through 
maximising use of local resources. This pragmatic approach also allowed me to test the long-term 
sustainability  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’,  enabling  me to  identify  ‘best  practice’  sites  and  those  that  may  
require further support. 
(ii) Development of senior faculty 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, facilitation of peer learning helps to guide group reflection and ensures a 
safe learning environment - of particular importance when discussing sensitive material such as PSIs.  
Therefore, I needed  to  develop  faculty  to  facilitate  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions.  Local  Foundation  teams  
have ready access to senior doctors involved in teaching as part of the Foundation Programme. 
However, I was aware that many senior colleagues would not be au fait with patient safety as it is a 
relatively new science which has only recently begun to be integrated into medical education (World 
Health Organisation 2009). I recruited interested consultants, GPs and senior specialty trainees from 
across the North Western Deanery, whose role would be to support trainee Leads, facilitate  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  sessions  and  escalate  concerns  as  appropriate.  Together with patient safety researchers Nick 
Sevdalis (NS) and Sonal Arora (SA), I developed a ‘Train-the-Trainers’  course and a comprehensive 
handbook to prepare them for their role (full details reported in Chapter 7). 
6.6 Development of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Programme   
As  highlighted,  the  pilot  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  comprised  monthly  30-minute case-based 
discussions of PSIs experienced by trainees. Building on the pilot work, I refined the structure and 
delivery of the programme by drawing on best educational practice and the available evidence. The 
rationale  for  each  of  the  key  features  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  is discussed in turn below 
before  presenting  the  finalised  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme. 
6.6.1 Building  on  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  pilot 
Case selection  
As  with  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  pilot,  I  used  the  validated  NPSA  definition  of  a  patient  safety  incident  
(PSI) – ‘any  unintended  or  unexpected  incident  that  could  have  or  did  lead  to  patient  harm’ (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2004). Trainees were tasked to bring forward real cases of PSIs that they had 
been involved in either directly or indirectly. Using real-life cases would ensure relevance to trainees 
and enhance experiential learning (Thistlethwaite et al. 2012). Through the pilot, I found that 
trainees were able to self-select appropriate cases for discussion based on this single criterion. I felt 
that  mandating  additional  criteria  for  case  selection  or  introducing  a  ‘screening’  process  by  a  third  
party would present an unnecessary barrier to  trainees’  engagement  and  participation.  
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Case discussion and analysis  
As highlighted in Chapter 1, lack of feedback and action poses a significant barrier to medical 
engagement in incident reporting (Benn et al. 2009). I was  keen  to  prevent  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  being  
reduced  to  a  ‘fruitless  exercise’  in  discussing  PSIs  only  for  nothing  to  be  done  about  them.  Indeed,  in  
the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  pilot  I found that trainees often took the initiative to propose actions and/or 
recommendations for improvement. I was keen to maximise trainees’  potential  as  ‘agents  for  
change’ (Swanwick 2012). Moreover, I wanted to employ a validated approach to the analysis of 
cases brought for discussion.  
 
Previous courses teaching patient safety have employed modified root cause analysis processes as a 
core component of the intervention (Hall et al. 2010, Dudas et al. 2011, Smith et al. 2012). There are 
many root cause analysis tools available (National Patient Safety Agency 2004). Following discussion 
with patient safety researchers NS and SA, we opted to base our approach on the London Protocol - 
a validated systems-based analysis tool which emphasises action-oriented outcomes (Vincent et al. 
1998). This tool has been developed by Charles Vincent and others at our research centre, and NS 
and SA were also trained in its use and could therefore train prospective faculty. Using key 
components of the London Protocol, we devised  a  ‘PSI  proforma’  (Appendix 2) to guide structured 
discussion of the PSI on what happened? Why did it happen (what were the contributing factors)? 
What can be done to prevent future recurrence? And finally what are the key lessons learnt? 
(discussed further in Chapter 8).   
Session frequency and timing  
My  experience  with  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  pilot  found  that  a  frequency  of  monthly ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
sessions worked well. However, I felt that 30-minutes per session would be insufficient to allow for 
discussion of actions and recommendations. Moreover, the pilot site FPA advised that 60-minute 
slots would be logistically easier to incorporate into Foundation teaching timetables. I therefore 
proposed 60-minute monthly ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions comprising a case presentation (10 minutes), 
analysis of contributing and mitigating factors (30 minutes) and discussion of lessons learnt and next 
steps (20 minutes)(discussed further in 6.7.5).  
 
With regards delivery of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme, having commenced the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
pilot in October 2009, I had managed to hold 9 sessions from October 2009 to June 2010. For 
Foundation School rollout, I set a start date of January 2011 to allow for the necessary preparation 
for the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  (to include stakeholder engagement and faculty development 
activities – see 6.5). Commensurate with this later start date, I set a modest target for each site to 
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hold at least five ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions from January to July 2011 (academic year-end). As with 
the pilot, the first  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session  would  be an introductory session to orient trainees to the 
programme (discussed further in 6.7.4). 
Safe learning environment  
Consistent with best educational practice (outlined in Chapter 3), and as found in my review in 
Chapter 4, ensuring a safe learning environment is a critical factor in the success of patient safety 
education (Hall et al. 2010, Jericho et al. 2010). Indeed, from the pilot, I appreciated that the 
material that trainees brought for discussion could be highly sensitive. Moreover, there was 
potential for serious incidents to be uncovered through the ‘Lessons  Learnt’ programme. I therefore 
wanted  to  ensure  that  trainees  felt  that  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  were  a  safe  forum  for  them  to  
discuss patient safety concerns and that any serious concerns would be escalated appropriately. My 
approach to ensuring both trainee and patient safety involved three key facets:  
(i) ‘Lessons  Learnt’  as  an  adjunct  to  incident  reporting   
The  aim  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt  was  to  act  as  an  adjunct  rather  than  as an alternative to incident 
reporting. As such, trainee presenters were encouraged to report any incident discussed as part of 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  through local hospital incident reporting systems, in line with professional guidance 
(General Medical Council 2012).  
(ii) Confidentiality and the Chatham House Rule 
Trainee presenters were required to anonymise their case presentations (remove patient and staff 
identifiable  information).  Furthermore,  sessions  were  held  under  ‘Chatham  House  Rule’  to  
encourage openness and the sharing of information. The Chatham House Rule states that 
‘participants are free to use the information received; but neither the identity nor the affiliation of 
the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed’ (Chatham House 2013).  
(iii) Senior faculty support  
As discussed in Chapter 3, guided reflection with the support of faculty enhances learning (Mann et 
al. 2009). Moreover, through the pilot I found that senior faculty presence was important to avoid 
discussions degenerating into a ‘blame  game’  whereby  trainees  failed  to  address  the  wider  systems  
factors involved. An additional key role of faculty was to escalate serious concerns (and potentially 
break confidentiality) for cases, which uncovered a serious risk to the safety of trainees or patients. 
With the support of the Foundation School Director (Paul Baker), I devised guidance for escalating 
concerns uncovered as part of the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme (Appendix 3). This guidance was 
drawn up in accordance with GMC guidelines (General Medical Council 2012) and was incorporated 
into the ‘Facilitator Handbook’. 
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6.6.2 The finalised ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme 
Based on the refinements to the pilot programme described above, the finalised ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme therefore comprised a series of monthly 60-minute sessions integrated into the 
compulsory Foundation teaching programme during which Foundation trainees lead a peer-group 
discussion of a PSI encountered in practice in a safe, facilitated forum using a London Protocol based 
analysis (Figure 6.2). The target  was  five  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  for each cohort (FY1 and FY2) at 
each site (n=16) from January to July 2011, with the first of these comprising an introductory launch 
session to orient trainees to the programme (discussed further in 6.7.4 and 6.7.5). 
 
Figure 6.2 The 'Lessons Learnt' programme  
 
6.7 Implementation  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Programme 
Bringing together the two preceding sections on the preparation for (6.5) and development of (6.6) 
the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme, key milestones for implementation of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme are depicted in Figure 6.3 and are described in turn below.  
 
Figure 6.3 Implementation  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme:  Key milestones  
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6.7.1 August 2010: Recruitment of senior faculty and Foundation trainee Leads  
As discussed, I wanted to maximise learner engagement by having trainees lead local 
implementation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’. I devised a flyer to recruit one Foundation trainee per cohort 
(FY1/FY2)  per  site  as  local  ‘Leads’  for  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  through  competitive  application (Appendix 4). 
The flyer was distributed via local FPAs and included an introduction to the ‘Lessons  Learnt’ 
programme, a role description and benefits of the role (which included a certificate of participation 
and an opportunity to demonstrate Foundation Programme competencies in patient safety and 
leadership). Interested trainees were asked to submit a 250-word statement on why they wished to 
undertake the Lead role and what they would bring to the role.   
 
I received 80 expressions of interest from trainees across the Foundation School, of whom 51 
submitted an application. Applications were reviewed jointly by NS (patient safety researcher) and 
myself who ranked applicants on the basis of (i) clarity of the statement (ii) interest in patient safety 
and (iii) relevant previous experience relating to leading an initiative. We appointed 34 Leads across 
the Foundation School (shared role at two of the sites due to larger cohort size). Similarly, I recruited 
senior doctors from across the Deanery to  undertake  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Faculty role (further 
details reported in Chapter 7). 
6.7.2 September 2010: Launch Conference  
I organised a half-day  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  launch  conference in order to engage key stakeholders in the 
‘Lessons Learnt’ programme and share lessons learnt from the pilot. I initially invited four 
representatives per Foundation Programme (FPD, FPA, FY1 and FY2 trainee Leads) via a flyer 
distributed by the Foundation School Director in August 2010. Due to increasing interest in the 
programme, I secured sponsorship from Wesleyan Medical Sickness, the Medical and Dental 
Defence Union of Scotland (MDDUS) and the Medical Protection Society (MPS). This enabled me to 
extend the launch invitation to additional Foundation trainees and prospective faculty on a first-
come first-served basis. 
 
I selected a central location to host the event to ensure accessibility to delegates from across the 
Foundation School. The agenda comprised short presentations from different perspectives across 
the Foundation School and question time was built into the agenda to encourage audience 
participation.  I invited James Reason as a local expert in patient safety and human error to deliver 
the keynote speech and engage attendees (Box 6.3). The launch was attended by 111 delegates from 
across the Foundation School and was very well received. A short satisfaction questionnaire revealed 
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that 87% of respondents (n=83) felt the event was well delivered and engaging and 82% were 
excited about  implementing  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  locally (additional results in Appendix 5). 
 
Box 6.3 'Lessons Learnt' launch conference agenda 
    Topic 
 
Speaker 
    Introduction to Lessons Learnt Dr Maria Ahmed 
Clinical Research Fellow, Imperial College London 
 
    Introduction to Patient Safety  
 
Professor James Reason 
Emeritus Professor of Psychology, University of Manchester 
 
    The Facilitator’s perspective Professor Simon Carley 
FPD, Central Manchester Foundation Trust 
 
    The Lead’s perspective  Dr Stephenie Tiew 
FY1 Lead; 2009-10, Central Manchester Foundation Trust  
 
    Lessons Learnt: Next steps  Professor Paul Baker  
Foundation School Director, North Western Deanery 
 
    Summary and close Professor Jacky Hayden,  
Postgraduate Dean, North Western Deanery 
 
 
6.7.3 November 2010: Lead and faculty training 
In collaboration with patient safety researchers from Imperial CPSSQ (NS and SA), I developed and 
delivered a half-day training course and supporting handbooks for appointed Leads and Faculty. 
These aimed to prepare Leads and faculty for their roles in implementing the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme.  A  key  responsibility  included  launching  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  locally,  using  a  truncated  
version of the course that they themselves had received (see next milestone below). In this way, 
core  patient  safety  education  was  delivered  to  all  Foundation  trainees  by  means  of  a  ‘cascade’  
approach. Further details of the course are provided in Chapter 7. 
6.7.4 January  2011:  Local  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  launches 
As outlined in 6.6.2,  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  comprised  a target of five monthly 60-minute 
sessions. The first of these was a local launch to orient trainees to the programme and provide core 
patient safety education. With the support of patient safety researchers NS and SA, I developed a 
standardised  ‘launch-pack’  for  trainee Leads and faculty to  launch  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  for  their  
respective cohort of Foundation trainees at each site. The local launch comprised a baseline (pre-
intervention) evaluation (10 minutes) and an annotated slide-pack including (i)  lecture  on  ‘patient 
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safety essentials’  (20  minutes)  (key  safety  terminology  and  policy, the nature and scale of harm, 
person vs. systems approach to error, and  the  rationale  to  ‘Lessons  Learnt’)  and  (ii) a mock  ‘Lessons 
Learnt’  session  based  on  a  real-life PSI for group discussion and analysis (30 minutes). A copy of the 
local launch-pack is included in Appendix 6. Evaluation is discussed further in Chapter 9. 
6.7.5 February to July 2011:  Monthly  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  
Following  the  initial  local  launch  session,  trainee  Leads  were  tasked  to  coordinate  monthly  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  sessions,  to  a  target  of  five sessions from January to July 2011. I provided Leads and FPAs 
with the following materials to support implementation, promote trainee engagement and facilitate 
evaluation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’:   
(i) Materials to support implementation of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’ 
I  developed  a  ‘how-to’  guide  to  running  a  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session  for  Leads  (Appendix  7). I also 
provided a one-page form listing the contributing factors from the London Protocol to facilitate 
group discussion (Appendix 8). Copies of both were provided in  the  ‘Lead  Handbook’. 
(ii) Materials to promote trainee engagement in  ‘Lessons  Learnt’ 
I developed a ‘presenters’ guide’  to  help trainees prepare their case for presentation (Appendix 9). 
In addition, I devised a certificate template endorsed by the North Western Deanery and Imperial 
CPSSQ to incentivise trainee participation (Appendix 10). FPAs were provided with the template for 
sign-off by the local FPD and trainee Lead, in order to reward trainees who presented a case as part 
of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’.  
(iii) Materials  to  facilitate  evaluation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’ 
Trainee  Leads  had  a  central  role  in  facilitating  evaluation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’.  They were tasked to 
submit a completed PSI proforma and faculty appraisal for  each  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session  to  enable  
analysis (further details in Chapters 7 and 8). In addition, I provided guidance to Leads and FPAs to 
coordinate data collection for the pre-intervention  evaluation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  (held  during  the 
initial local launch session) and the post-intervention evaluation (incorporated into the final monthly 
session) (further details in Chapter 9). 
 
In summary, in this Chapter I have outlined the rationale for the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  and  
discussed the preparation for, and the development and implementation of the programme. As 
evident, capacity-building is critical in ensuring the success and sustainability of the programme. I 
discuss this further in Chapter 7,  where  I  report  on  the  faculty  development  arm  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’. 
Subsequently, Chapter 8 examines the process underpinning the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme in 
further detail and Chapter 9 reports the evaluation of the ‘Lessons Learnt’  programme as a whole.  
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7 Faculty  Development  for  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Programme   
7.1 Introduction 
As  highlighted  in  Chapter  6,  in  order  to  scale  up  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  from the single pilot site and deliver 
it to all 1000+ Foundation trainees across the North Western Foundation School, I needed to 
develop the requisite faculty to support its implementation. Indeed, as noted by Wong (Wong et al. 
2010) and as reinforced in my systematic review in Chapter 4, the lack of trained faculty poses a 
significant barrier to the sustainable integration of patient safety education. Drawing on the 
evidence and my own experience, I believe that senior doctors represent an untapped resource in 
terms of forming  this  ‘expert  faculty’  for a number of reasons. I have summarised these in Box 7.1. 
 
However, I am aware that many senior colleagues will not have been exposed to patient safety 
education, as it is a relatively new science (Pronovost et al. 2009, Taitz et al. 2012). Moreover, 
disappointingly, there is a paucity of published research involving senior doctors as the target 
population for patient safety education (Mitchell et al. 2005, Mottur-Pilson 2005). In this Chapter I 
report  on  the  faculty  development  arm  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme,  spanning  two  
consecutive years of the programme (academic years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012).  
 
Box 7.1 Features supporting the use of senior doctors as patient safety faculty  
  
Clinical credibility Senior doctors have credibility in relation to their juniors: in contrast to external safety  ‘experts’  
or  ‘trainers’,  they  are  not  perceived  as  ‘outsiders’  to  clinical  practice  (Mottur-Pilson 2005).  
Role-modelling 
 
The role of senior doctors in workplace learning goes beyond ‘simple’  feedback and supervision: 
they have a powerful effect (both positive and negative) through role-modelling in terms of 
enculturation of professional qualities and safety-related behaviours such as hand hygiene 
(Kenny et al. 2003, Erasmus et al. 2009).  
Availability 
 
There are many more senior doctors than patient safety experts to deliver training. At times of 
financial austerity their costs may also be lower (compared to those of external  ‘trainers’)  as  
they can deliver teaching and training as part of their educational responsibilities to the Trust 
and their juniors. 
Authority Senior doctors are in a position of relative influence and power. They are therefore well placed 
to help their juniors navigate the healthcare system and secure essential resources to support 
focussed safety improvement efforts (French et al. 1960, Walsh et al. 2009). 
 
7.1.1 Study aims 
The aim of this study was to develop, implement and evaluate an educational intervention for senior 
doctors to become faculty for the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme.  
105  
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Setting  
As highlighted in Chapter 6, ‘Lessons  Learnt:  Building  a  Safer  Foundation’  is  a  patient  safety 
educational programme for all 1000+ Foundation trainees across the 16 Foundation Programmes in 
the North Western Foundation School. The programme aims to equip Foundation trainees with core 
patient safety competencies though promoting peer learning from patient safety incidents (PSIs) 
experienced by trainees in practice. The programme comprises monthly 60-minute sessions as part 
of Foundation teaching wherein trainees discuss and analyse a PSI encountered in practice, using a 
validated approach (Vincent et al. 1998). The creation of a safe, facilitated forum is critical to this, 
hence the need for facilitation by senior doctors trained in patient safety and incident analysis.  
 
To summarise, the role of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty is to: 
(i) Facilitate  the  launch  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  locally  (with the trainee Lead) 
(ii) Facilitate  up  to  six  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions,  held  monthly  between  January  to July during 
each academic year  
(iii) Escalate any safety concerns as necessary to the local Foundation Programme Director or 
appropriate authority in accordance with GMC guidance (General Medical Council 2012) 
7.2.2 Participant recruitment and selection  
As highlighted in Chapter 6, local Foundation teams have ready access to senior doctors involved in 
teaching as part of the Foundation Programme. All such senior doctors from across the 16 
Foundation programmes were invited to participate in this study by means of a recruitment flyer 
disseminated via FPAs (Appendix 11). The inclusion criteria for participation were kept deliberately 
broad in order to maximise recruitment and engagement of senior doctors. The criteria and 
rationale for each is displayed in Table 7.1. Recruitment was conducted on a first-come, first-served 
basis with an initial aim of appointing at least three faculty members per site (up to five at the larger 
sites). Senior doctors who responded to the flyer were invited to attend one of two half-day training 
courses (further details follow). 
7.2.3 Course development and delivery 
Course content and structure 
Together with patient safety researchers (NS and SA), we devised learning outcomes for the course, 
which mapped to the  role  requirements  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty  (Box 7.2).  
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Table 7.1 Participant inclusion criteria 
Criterion Rationale 
Consultant, General Practitioner (GP) or 
senior specialty trainee (ST3 or above) 
The aim was to recruit senior doctors to ensure both credibility in delivering 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  to  trainees  and  to  promote  sustainability  of  the  intervention  
for subsequent cohorts of trainees. 
Any clinical specialty PSIs occur in all healthcare specialties and furthermore trainees rotate through 
diverse specialties as part of their clinical training so it was important to ensure 
representation of senior doctors across all clinical disciplines. 
Interest in patient safety This criterion was kept deliberately simple, with doctors self-reporting their 
interest. This was done to maximise response amongst busy senior doctors by 
avoiding a complex application process. 
Experience in facilitating group learning 
(e.g. Problem-Based Learning, 
communication skills training) 
To avoid detracting from our primary aim of delivering training in patient 
safety we required participants to have experience in facilitating group 
learning as a minimum. 
 
Box 7.2 ‘Lessons Learnt’ faculty course: learning outcomes  
 
Patient safety knowledge 
At the end of this course, participants will be able to:  
 Define a patient safety incident (PSI)  
 Describe the rates and types of PSIs in healthcare 
 Understand the nature of human error and the importance of systems factors in relation to safety  
 Understand the contributing factors to PSIs  
 Understand the mechanisms for learning from error 
 Review the principles of effective facilitation  
 
Patient safety skills 
At the end of this course, participants will be able to:  
 Recognise a patient safety incident 
 Analyse a PSI using a London Protocol-driven approach  
 Facilitate group reflection and learning from error   
 
Patient safety attitudes 
At the end of this course, participants will acknowledge the need to: 
 Foster an open and learning culture to improve patient safety 
 Create opportunities for trainees to learn effectively from things that go wrong 
 Support trainees to engage in initiatives that aim to improve patient safety 
 
 
We developed the faculty course to achieve these learning outcomes. Core content included (i) 
Patient safety essentials (ii) Analysis of patient safety incidents and (iii)  The  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  project  
and roles and responsibilities of the faculty. Further information regarding course content and the 
educational modalities employed are summarised in Table 7.2. Core content (i) and (ii) were based on 
a previously developed and fully evaluated course for surgical trainees (Arora et al. 2012).   
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Table 7.2 ‘Lessons Learnt’ faculty course: content and delivery 
Core theme Content Educational modality 
(i) Patient safety essentials Key Patient Safety terminology 
Epidemiology of patient safety incidents and 
the UK policy context 
Person vs. Systems approach to error   
Tools and mechanisms to learn from PSIs 
Lecture 
(ii) Root cause analysis of 
Patient Safety Incidents 
Introduction to the London Protocol 
Analysis of a Patient Safety Incident 
Lecture 
Small-group root cause analysis and 
discussion 
(iii) The  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
project and Faculty role and 
responsibilities  
Introduction  to  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  and  the  
Faculty role 
Principles of small-group facilitation 
Mock  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session  run-through 
Lecture 
 
Discussion 
Small-group work and discussion 
 
Course delivery 
We delivered the course as two identical half-day courses during November 2010 in preparation for 
rollout of  the  main  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  in  January  2011.  In  line  with  best educational 
practice, a combination of didactic and experiential teaching methods was employed. A 
comprehensive  ‘Facilitator  Handbook’  containing  course  content  and  further  resources  was  provided  
to all participants. We deliberately chose to limit the course to a half-day to maximise accessibility 
for busy senior doctors. In addition, I sought continuing professional development (CPD) 
accreditation for the course with  the  UK’s  Royal  College  of  Physicians to further incentivise 
participation. Recruitment and course delivery was repeated again to develop a second cohort of 
faculty commencing January 2012. 
7.2.4 Course evaluation  
Course evaluation comprised a prospective longitudinal study conducted over 2 years with testing 
conducted pre and immediately post-intervention (training course) and retention tested with a 
further evaluation 8 months post-intervention  (‘year-end’  for  first  faculty  cohort). Ethical approval 
was not required for this study of an educational intervention.  
 
As described in Chapter 4, educational interventions can be evaluated at various levels, according to 
Kirkpatrick’s  four-level model of evaluation (BEME 2013). Given the available resources, we chose to 
evaluate outcomes across Kirkpatrick’s levels 1 to 3. The outcome measures are discussed in turn 
below. 
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Participants’  reaction/ satisfaction (Level 1) 
I developed a course satisfaction questionnaire, which was administered to participants immediately 
post-course (copy in Appendix 12). Respondents used a 5-point Likert scale to rate course delivery, 
how well the learning outcomes were met, and overall satisfaction with the course (1= not at all 
satisfied to 5=very satisfied). In addition, space was provided for free text comments. 
Participants’  learning  - knowledge, attitudes and skills (Levels 2a and 2b) 
Participants’  learning  was  assessed  immediately pre and post-course. With the support of SA and NS 
I devised multiple-choice questions mapped onto course content to assess knowledge objectively. As 
with the evaluation of the previously developed surgical course by our group (Arora et al. 2012) 
subjective knowledge and patient safety attitudes were assessed using a modified questionnaire 
(‘Medical  Student  Patient  Safety  Questionnaire’)  developed by Patey et al (Patey et al. 2007). The 
original questionnaire comprises seven sections in two parts. The first part comprises two sections 
rating the level of patient safety knowledge and one section exploring feelings about making errors. 
The second part comprises four sections  informed  by  Azjen’s  well-validated  ‘theory of planned 
behaviour’ (Azjen 1991), which proposes that behavioural intentions can be predicted from attitudes 
towards the behaviour, perceived behavioural control and subjective norms.  
 
For the purpose of our course evaluation, we selected one  knowledge  scale  (‘level  of  knowledge  of  
patient  safety’)  and  three  attitude scales (‘feelings  about  making  errors’  (part  3b  only),  ‘personal  
attitudes  to  patient  safety’  and  ‘personal  influence  over  patient  safety’).  We modified the 
terminology of some of the items to reflect our focus on PSI versus error. In addition, we devised 
items to assess self-reported confidence in facilitation skills. Items  included  confidence  in  ‘analysing 
a patient safety  incident’; ‘facilitating group reflection on patient  safety  incidents’  and  ‘supporting 
and  advising  trainees  on  how  to  respond  to  a  PSI’ all assessed on a 5-point Likert scale (1=very low 
confidence to 5=very high confidence). A copy of the questionnaire is displayed in Appendix 12. 
Participants’  behavioural change (Level 3) 
Self-reported behavioural intentions regarding patient safety were evaluated immediately pre and 
post course using the final scale from the questionnaire developed by Patey et al  (‘intentions  
regarding  patient  safety’).  In  addition,  given  that  the  aim  of  the  course  was  to  develop  faculty  for  
‘Lessons  Learnt’,  we  added  two  items  to  elicit  self-reported intentions to engage as faculty for the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme. Subsequent engagement as faculty was also evaluated via trainees’ 
assessment.  Trainee  ‘Leads’  at each site were asked to complete a faculty appraisal at the end of 
every  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session (Appendix 13). Items were assessed on 5-point Likert scales and 
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mapped to the faculty role description to include (i) General approach to facilitation, e.g. putting 
trainees at ease, (ii) Discussion and analysis of incident, e.g. encouraging discussion around aetiology 
and preventive actions, and  (iii) Summary and next steps, e.g. reinforcing lessons learnt and 
formulating an action plan.  
Retention survey 
At the close of the first year of rollout of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme in July 2011, 
(approximately 8 months post-course), a further evaluation was administered to the faculty cohort 
(a similar evaluation in the second year of the programme was not feasible due to resource 
constraints). This included repeat evaluation of patient safety knowledge, attitudes, skills and 
behavioural intentions as conducted pre- and immediately post-course.  In addition I included the 
following items to enquire into subsequent engagement with the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme: (i) 
number of sessions facilitated, (ii) desire to continue as faculty and to assist in training future faculty 
(5-point Likert scale 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) and (iii) barriers and enablers to 
engagement as faculty (free text comments). The survey was created using Survey Monkey software. 
An email invitation to complete the online survey was sent directly to participants, with a reminder 
sent at 2 weeks to non-responders.   
7.2.5 Data analysis  
I used SPSS version 19.0 for all analyses. Descriptive statistics (median and range) were reported for 
demographics, pre- and post-course and 8 months post-course/retention scores and course 
satisfaction. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was used to conduct matched pair-wise 
comparisons of knowledge, skills, attitudes and behavioural intentions pre- and immediately post-
course and again to compare post-course with scores at 8 months post-course (first cohort only). 
Cronbach’s  alpha  was  used  to  assess  the  internal  consistency  (scale  reliability)  of  survey  sub-scales 
(self-report knowledge, self-report skills, attitudes and behavioural intentions). For all statistical 
tests, p<0.05 was deemed to be statistically significant. 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Demographics  
Over the 2-year study, a total of 216 senior doctors across 20 hospitals volunteered to enrol as 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty.  122  doctors  were  appointed  based  on  the  inclusion criteria and course 
capacity (Figure 7.1). In the majority of cases non-attendance at the course following invitation was 
attributed to last-minute clinical commitments. The majority of faculty were consultant grade (84%) 
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followed by senior specialty trainees (16%). Of the consultant grade faculty, the majority (52%) had 
been in post for 5 years or less; 20% had been in post for 6-10 years and a further 28% for over 10 
years  (determined  via  the  General  Medical  Council’s  List  of  Registered Medical Practitioners). The 
most common specialties of appointed faculty were Medicine, Surgery and Anaesthetics and the 
least common was Primary Care (Figure 7.2). 
 
Figure 7.1 Faculty recruitment flow-chart 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Specialty of appointed faculty 
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7.3.2 Pre-post course evaluation  
In year one (2010-2011) 50 faculty (88%) completed the pre-course evaluation, 49 (86%) completed 
the immediate post-course evaluation permitting 45 (79%) matched pair-wise analyses. In year two 
(2011-2012) 59 faculty (91%) completed the pre-course evaluation, 53 (82%) completed the 
immediate post-course evaluation permitting 47 (72%) matched pair-wise analyses. Therefore there 
was a total of 92 matched pair-wise comparisons pre-post course on these measures. 
Participants’ satisfaction 
Across both cohorts, participants reported very high levels of satisfaction with the course in terms of 
content  (e.g.  92%  agreed  or  strongly  agreed  that  the  course  ‘Improved my understanding of how to 
analyse a patient safety incident’); course delivery (93% agreed or strongly agreed that ‘The  
information was provided  in  a  way  which  was  easy  to  understand’) and overall satisfaction (e.g. 89% 
would strongly recommend the course to a colleague).  Free-text strengths of the course included 
‘well-organised’, ‘explicit  objectives  set  and  achieved’ and ‘interactive  small-group  work’. Suggestions 
for improvement mainly related to extending the time available to allow for more group discussion.   
Participants’  learning  – knowledge, attitudes and skills 
Across both cohorts, there was a significant improvement in objective scores of patient safety 
knowledge from MedianPre-course=70% (range 10-100%) to MedianPost-course=80% (40-100%; P<0.001). 
Subjective scores of knowledge also improved significantly post-course: MedianPre-course=3.43 (1.86-
4.71), MedianPost-course=4.00 (3.14-5.00; P<0.001). Across both cohorts, self-reported confidence in 
patient safety skills (e.g. ability to analyse a PSI) significantly improved immediately post-course 
(MedianPre-course=3.38, range 1.75-5.00; MedianPost-course= 4.13, range: 3.00-5.00; P<0.001). Reliability 
in the form of internal consistency of the self-reported knowledge scale was very high (Cronbach 
alphaPre-course=0.915, Cronbach alphaPost-course=0.903) as was the internal consistency of the skills scale 
(Cronbach alphaPre-course=0.878, Cronbach alphaPost-course=0.924) (full results for each self-reported 
knowledge and skill item are reported in Appendix 14). 
 
With regards patient safety attitudes, across both cohorts there was a significant improvement in 
attitudes immediately post-course across each domain: ‘feelings about making error’,  ‘personal 
attitudes  to  patient  safety’  and  ‘personal  influence  over  patient  safety’.    Median  scores  (of the 
means for each domain) and p-values are displayed in Table 7.3. Internal consistency for the three 
attitude scales ranged from 0.516 to 0.852 (full results in Appendix 14).  
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Table 7.3 Participants’ patient safety attitudes pre and post course 
 Both faculty cohorts (n=92) First faculty cohort (n=28) 
 
Domain Pre-course 
Median 
(Range) 
Post-course 
Median 
(Range) 
P value* Post-course 
Median 
(Range) 
8 months post-
course Median 
(Range) 
P value* 
Feelings about making 
errors (4 items) e.g. 
Telling others about an 
error I made would be 
difficult (1) to easy (5) 
4.00 
(2.00-5.00) 
 
4.50 
(3.00-5.00) 
<0.001 4.00 
(3.00-5.00) 
4.00 
(3.25-5.00) 
1.000 
Personal attitudes to 
patient safety (6 items) 
e.g. Acknowledging 
and dealing with my 
errors is an important 
part of my job strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly 
agree (5) 
4.00 
(3.00-5.00) 
 
4.00 
(3.00-5.00) 
0.019 4.17 
(2.67-5.00) 
4.00 
(2.83-5.00) 
0.775 
Personal influence over 
patient safety** (6 
items) e.g. I am always 
able to ensure that 
patient safety is not 
compromised strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly 
agree (5) 
3.40 
(2.20-5.00) 
3.80 
(2.20-5.00) 
<0.001 3.80 
(2.20-5.00) 
3.70 
(2.80-4.40) 
 
0.220 
*Wilcoxon signed rank test 
**Item 1 excluded due to poor internal consistency 
 
Participants’  behavioural  change   
Participants’  mean behavioural intentions regarding patient safety showed significant improvement 
(MedianPre-course=4.22, range 3.11-5.00; MedianPost-course= 4.44, range: 3.56-5.00; P<0.001). 
Importantly,  responses  to  the  two  items  enquiring  into  intended  engagement  as  faculty  for  ‘Lessons 
Learnt’  were  very  high  pre-course and remained high post-course (no significant difference) (full 
results for each item are reported in Appendix 14). The internal consistency for this scale was 
excellent (Cronbach alphaPre-course=0.886, Cronbach alphaPost-course=0.934). 
Retention survey results (first faculty cohort only) 
29 (51%) participants completed the retention evaluation at 8 months post-intervention, permitting 
28 matched pair-wise analyses. Objective scores of patient safety knowledge 8 months post-course 
were sustained without significant loss (in fact, there was an improvement in the scores, albeit non-
significant): from 80% (60-100%) immediately post-course to 90% (60-100%) at 8 months (P=0.28).  
Similarly, self-reported knowledge was sustained: median 4.00 (3.15-5.00) immediately post-course 
to median 4.00 (3.00-5.00) 8-months post-course (P=0.19). Post-course improvement in self-
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reported patient safety skills was also evident without any significant skill loss at year-end: median 
4.13 (3.25-5.00) immediately post-course to median 4.00 (3.00-5.00) 8-month post-course (P=0.19). 
Improvements in patient safety attitudes were sustained (Table 7.3), as were improvements in 
behavioural intentions: median 4.44 (3.56-5.00) immediately post-course to median 4.11 (3.56-5.00) 
8-month post-course (P=0.808). Internal consistency for scales was excellent at retention for self-
reported knowledge (Cronbach alpha = 0.924), skills (Cronbach alpha=0.910), and behavioural 
intentions (Cronbach alpha=0.921). Internal consistency for the attitudes scales ranged from 0.507 
to 0.732 (full results in Appendix 14). 
Engagement in the ‘Lessons  Learnt’ programme 
Through combined analysis of trainees’ appraisals and participants’ self-report, 88 (72%) faculty 
facilitated  a  total  of  213  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  between  January  2011  to  July  2012;  an  average  of  
2 sessions per faculty member (range 1 to 8). Trainees rated faculty highly across all domains of 
facilitation skills: (i) general approach to facilitation (median=4.20, range 2.40-5.00), (ii) discussion 
and analysis of incident (median=4.25, range 2.50-5.00), and (iii) summary and next steps 
(median=4.00, range 2.00-5.00). Of the first faculty cohort surveyed 8-months post-course, 25 (89%) 
participants agreed/strongly agreed to stay on the programme as faculty and 19 (68%) 
agreed/strongly agreed to support training of subsequent cohorts of faculty. The most commonly 
cited  barrier/challenge  to  facilitating  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  was  clinical  commitments  clashing  
with scheduled sessions. The most commonly cited enablers to participation were enthusiastic 
trainees and supportive administrative staff (discussed further in Chapter 9).  
7.4 Discussion 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are increasing calls for doctors to actively take on leadership roles to 
drive safety and quality improvement efforts (Fisher et al. 2009, Pronovost et al. 2009). Being top of 
the medical hierarchy, senior doctors are well placed to assume these roles. With over 200 
applicants  for  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty  role,  this study shows that there is considerable appetite 
for senior doctors to engage in patient safety both as learners and teachers. This short course in 
patient safety and incident analysis was well received by senior doctors and led to significant 
improvements in safety knowledge, self-reported skills, attitudes and behavioural intentions. These 
improvements were sustained 8 months after the course – which I interpret as due to the faculty 
training course itself but also to the on-going ‘exposure’  to  this  subject  and  systematic  application  of  
learning  through  facilitation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions.  
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As evident in Figure 7.1, the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty  course has been oversubscribed for two 
consecutive years, thereby developing faculty to deliver patient safety education to two successive 
cohorts of 1000+ trainees from 2010-2012. I believe that the approach in particular: an inclusive 
person specification, provision of a free accredited course, and an explicit role description together 
with perceived benefits served to promote recruitment and engagement of senior doctors as core 
faculty. The majority of appointed faculty  (72%)  went  on  to  facilitate  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions.  
Trainees rated faculty highly. Not surprisingly, the most commonly cited barrier to both attending 
the  training  course  and  going  on  to  facilitate  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  was  clinical  commitments. 
Importantly, trainee enthusiasm and administrative support were enablers to facilitation, as noted 
elsewhere (Wong et al. 2010). Previous efforts to administer quality and safety education to senior 
clinicians have not focussed on doctors but on nursing staff, amongst whom recruitment has proved 
less challenging (Mitchell et al. 2005). Where doctors have been targeted, evaluation of the 
educational intervention has been lacking (Mottur-Pilson 2005, Cox et al. 2011, Williams et al. 2012). 
Recent studies whilst describing faculty development efforts have failed to report learning in faculty 
themselves (Cox et al. 2011) or have only reported end-user outcomes in terms of trainee 
engagement in root cause analysis (Williams et al. 2012). 
 
The majority of faculty came from the specialties of Medicine, Surgery and Anaesthetics. The greater 
engagement of medical and surgical senior doctors may reflect their historical contribution to 
teaching programmes as part of early postgraduate medical education (which now forms the 
Foundation Programme). The high recruitment amongst anaesthetists supports the view of 
Anaesthetics as  the  ‘leading  medical  specialty  in  addressing  patient  safety’ (Gaba 2000). Conversely, 
recruitment amongst Primary Care doctors (General Practitioners, GPs) was poor. This may be partly 
due to issues of service configuration and remuneration whereby GPs are independently contracted 
to the National Health Service. Indeed, given that clinical rotations in Primary Care account for one-
sixth of the Foundation Programme in the North Western Foundation School, I plan to launch 
targeted  recruitment  for  GPs  in  subsequent  cohorts  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme.  Moreover,  
the majority of faculty (52%) were  ‘junior’  consultants,  having  been  in  the  post  for  5  years  or  less.  
This may reflect the naturally high enthusiasm amongst this cohort in wishing to expand their 
portfolio of work to include involvement in teaching and patient safety. Finally, whilst 89% of the 
first faculty cohort agreed to continue in their role, only 68% agreed to support the training of 
subsequent cohorts. I believe that perceived lack of time may explain this finding. This requires 
further exploration as I aim  for  faculty  ownership  and  the  wider  sustainability  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme. 
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7.4.1 Limitations of this study 
In terms of limitations, participants were recruited from within a single Deanery and therefore the 
generalisability of the findings could be questioned. However, participants were recruited from a 
wide geographical area across a diverse range of clinical specialties so I am confident that the results 
are transferable to other settings. My approach to recruitment deliberately targeted senior doctors 
with an interest in patient safety so selection bias cannot be excluded. Notably, the effect size of 
pre-post course improvements in knowledge, self-reported skills and attitudes were small yet 
significant. It may  be  that  in  the  ‘general’  senior  clinical  population, the pre-course scores would be 
lower yielding larger effects post-course. Ultimately my aim was to recruit a cohort of senior doctors 
who would go on to act as  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty  so  I believe that the inclusion criteria were 
justified. The first faculty cohort response rate at 8 months was only 51% so I can be less certain in 
the results. However, the response rate is comparable to other internet-based surveys of clinicians 
(Braithwaite et al. 2003). I suspect that the lengthy survey affected completion of the follow up 
surveys, nevertheless it is reassuring that the majority of participants wish to continue in their role 
as  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty.   
7.4.2 Summary and implications for further research 
In summary, this study demonstrates that educating senior doctors in patient safety is feasible, 
acceptable and efficacious as a means of building capacity and capability for delivering education in 
this rapidly emerging field. The broader implications of this study with regards to policy impact and 
areas for further research will be discussed further in the main discussion of the thesis (Chapter 12). 
Of immediate relevance to this Section of the thesis, with the support of colleagues from the North 
Western Foundation School and Imperial CPSSQ, I have successfully developed a stable cohort of 
senior faculty to facilitate delivery of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme. I now wish to examine the 
process that this faculty supports by analysing a sample of facilitated discussions of PSIs experienced 
by Foundation trainees. This is reported in the following Chapter, before moving on to report the 
larger pre-post intervention study to evaluate the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  as a whole (in 
Chapter 9). 
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8 Prospective Analysis of ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Cases: A Pilot Study 
8.1 Introduction 
As highlighted in Chapter 6, ‘Lessons Learnt’  aims to equip Foundation trainees with core patient 
safety competencies though promoting peer learning from patient safety incidents (PSIs).  The core 
process of the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  is  monthly, group reflection on PSIs experienced by 
trainees, within a safe, facilitated forum. In this Chapter I examine this process further, before 
moving on to report the outcomes of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme in Chapter 9. 
 
As described in Chapter 6, with the support of patient safety researchers Nick Sevdalis (NS) and 
Sonal Arora (SA), I devised a PSI proforma based  on  the  London  Protocol,  a  validated  systems  (‘root  
cause’)  analysis tool (Vincent et al. 1998) (Appendix 2). The purpose of the PSI proforma is two-fold: 
(i) to support structured analysis and discussion of the PSI and (ii) to provide a record of the case 
discussion for subsequent analysis.  A single PSI is discussed during each 60-minute  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
session and Foundation trainee Leads are required to submit a ‘PSI  proforma’ for  each  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  session held. For the purpose of the thesis, I wanted to conduct a pilot analysis of a sample of 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  PSI  proformas  submitted  during  the 2010-2011 academic year. Such an analysis will 
inform a subsequent larger study of all cases discussed by Foundation trainees as part of the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme. 
8.1.1 Study aims  
The aims of this pilot study were: (i) to describe the type, outcome(s) and contributing factors of PSIs 
brought for discussion by trainees and (ii) to examine the impact of such discussion and analysis in 
terms of actions/ recommendations proposed and lessons learnt by trainees. 
8.2 Methods  
This  was  a  prospective  qualitative  analysis  of  a  sample  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  PSI proformas submitted 
by trainee Leads across the North Western Foundation School. 
8.2.1 Components of the PSI proforma  
A summary of the components of the PSI proforma is presented in Table 8.1 (full version in Appendix 
2). In line with principles of root cause analysis, the proforma focuses on three key questions:  
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(i) What happened? (Section B: case description and Section C: incident outcome, based on the 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) taxonomy)  
(ii) Why did it happen? (Section D, which lists the contributing factors from the London Protocol 
spanning patient, individual, team and system-wide factors)  
(iii) What can be done to prevent future recurrence? (Section E, wherein trainees propose 
actions/ recommendations for improvement) 
In addition, given the primary aim of the programme is on learning from PSIs (hence ‘Lessons  
Learnt’), Section F of the proforma asks trainees to identify the lessons learnt from each case. In a 
similar vein, whilst trainees were encouraged to carry out proposed actions/ recommendations for 
improvement (recorded in Section E), they were not held to account for this  - in recognition of the 
yet nascent infrastructure to support quality improvement work in the North Western Foundation 
School, and indeed elsewhere (Vaux et al. 2012). 
 
Table 8.1 Components of the 'Lessons Learnt' PSI proforma 
PSI proforma section heading & prompt(s) Data fields 
SECTION A: Session details 
 
 Trust and hospital  
 Date of session 
 Number of attendees 
 Facilitator name & specialty 
 Lead name & grade 
 Presenter grade, gender & specialty 
SECTION B: What happened? Provide a brief case description.  Free text box 
SECTION C: What was the incident outcome? Select one choice. National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) taxonomy used: 
 Death 
 Severe 
 Moderate  
 Low 
 No harm (includes impact prevented) 
SECTION D: Why did it happen? Following group discussion, 
identify which of the factors listed contributed to the incident. 
Provide a brief statement to explain each factor identified.  
 
Contributing factors listed from the London Protocol 
with free text box for each: 
 Patient factors 
 Task and technology factors 
 Individual staff factors 
 Team factors 
 Work environment factors 
 Organisational and management factors 
 Wider institutional context factors 
SECTION E: What can we do to prevent similar incidents from 
occurring? For each contributing factor identified, consider 
what actions for learning and improvement are recommended. 
Note that the actions can be aspirational. However, where the 
trainee(s) feel able to take forward the recommended actions, 
their contact details should be noted to determine progress at 
the end of the programme. Individual trainees will NOT be held 
to account for this – the primary aim is formative learning.     
Free text box for each of the following: 
 Contributing factor 
 Actions for learning or improvement 
 Person(s) actioning 
 
SECTION F: What are the Lessons Learnt? Following group 
discussion, summarise at least 3 key learning points.  
Free text box 
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8.2.2 Sample 
A total of 136 PSI proformas were submitted by  trainee  Leads  participating  in  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme in 2010-2011. Proformas were generally completed by trainees to a satisfactory 
standard. The volume of data typically comprised 100 to 500 words. All data were entered into an 
Excel sheet by a central data administrator. I used stratified random sampling to ensure a 
representative sample of cases were analysed. I chose a sample size of 30 to match the sample size 
used in the review of reflective entries reported in Chapter 5. I stratified the 136 cases by grade (FY1 
and FY2) and then used a random number generator to select 15 cases for analysis from within each 
of the FY1 case sample (n= 67) and the FY2 case sample (n=69).  
8.2.3 Data analysis  
I analysed the PSI proformas systematically as follows. I first noted demographic details regarding 
the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session  (Section  A of PSI proforma) including number of trainees present for the 
session, facilitator grade and specialty and trainee presenter’s  gender and specialty rotation.  As 
with the study reported in Chapter 5, I used the National Patient Safety  Agency’s  (NPSA)  taxonomy  
of patient safety incidents to code incident type (described in Section B of proforma) (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2004).  I noted incident outcome as recorded by trainees (Section C) and 
analysed the contributing factors (Section D) quantitatively and qualitatively to note both the 
number and type of factors attributed to the PSIs.  
 
For the recorded actions/ recommendations for improvement (Section E) and lessons learnt (Section 
F), I used thematic analysis to identify core themes (Pope et al. 2006). I firstly read and re-read all 
the data to identify an initial set of analytical categories inductively. I then systematically searched 
the data to group it under these initial categories and created additional categories as necessary, to 
ensure a comprehensive analysis. In order to ensure reliability of data analysis, all PSI proformas 
were independently reviewed by a second researcher (Paul Baker, PB) to code incident type (Section 
B) and verify core themes identified through analysis of the free text data reported in Sections E and 
F. Any disagreements were resolved through consensus, involving a third reviewer (Charles Vincent) 
where necessary.  
 
I used SPSS version 19.0 to calculate absolute and relative (%) frequencies for type of PSI, 
contributing factors and incident outcome. Confidence intervals (95%) are reported with all 
statistical indices. The level of coding agreement between PB and myself for incident type was 
assessed using  Cohen’s  kappa  coefficient. 
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8.3 Results  
The stratified sampling method produced a sample of 30 cases from across 14 of the 16 Foundation 
Programmes.  
8.3.1 Demographic details 
The  average  number  of  Foundation  trainees  attending  a  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  case discussion session was 
15 (range 6 to 34).  A trained faculty member was present in 25 (83%) of the 30 sessions. The most 
common specialties of faculty were Medicine and Anaesthetics (both 38%). The majority of faculty 
were consultant grade (88%). 19 (63%) of the trainee presenters were female. The commonest 
specialty rotation of trainee presenters was Surgery (33%), Medicine, and General Practice (both 
27%). The least common specialty rotation of presenters was Emergency Medicine and Paediatrics 
(both 3%). 
8.3.2 Incident type  
Certain types of incident were more commonly discussed than others. Inter-rater reliability revealed 
that the coding of incidents was robust for incident type (kappa=0.83, 95% CI 0.67 to 0.98). The 
commonest type of PSI was delay or failure to access care (n=7, 23%, 95% CI 12% to 41%).  An 
example of this type of case extracted from the PSI proformas is as follows: 
“...A  75  year  old  patient  was  admitted  with  an  exacerbation  of  COPD  (chronic  obstructive  pulmonary  
disease). He had multiple co-morbidities including end stage renal failure (ESRF) for which he 
received dialysis twice a week. A random troponin test was done = 0.08 with no documentation of 
why it was done or who had requested it. Nurse failed to send the patient for dialysis because of the 
slightly  raised  troponin.  The  patient’s  urea  and  electrolytes  (U&E)  worsened. The doctor advised the 
nurse that patients with ESRF may have raised troponin and that it should not be a contraindication 
to dialysis. The patient was rescheduled for dialysis the next day but was sent back to the ward 
without having received dialysis  and  with  no  documentation  of  why  she  wasn’t  dialysed.  The  
patient’s  U&Es  worsened,  she  rapidly  deteriorated  and  died  shortly  after...”  (Case 1).      
 
The next commonest types of PSI were errors in clinical assessment (delayed or wrong diagnosis) 
and medication errors (both n=6, 20%, 95% CI 10% to 37%). An example of a case of wrong diagnosis 
is described below: 
“...A  gentleman  presented  to  the  Emergency  Department  with  chest  pain.  He  was  referred  to  the  
medical  team  as  ‘complete  heart  block’.  The patient was reviewed by the medical registrar 10 hours 
later who noted the raised troponin and treated him for NSTEMI (non ST elevation myocardial 
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infarction). The consultant on the post-take ward round agreed with the plan. The following day the 
duty consultant noticed that the ECG on admission had shown STEMI (ST elevation myocardial 
infarction) and the patient had therefore missed the opportunity for timely PCI (percutaneous 
coronary  intervention)...” (Case 18). 
 
An example of a case of medication error is described below: 
“...A  surgical  patient  was  treated  for  acute  coronary  syndrome.  However, there was no cardiology 
follow-up documented in the notes. The FY1 called the cardiology registrar who recommended he 
start a beta-blocker  if  the  patient’s  heart  rate  was above 70 – which it was, and the beta-blocker was 
therefore prescribed. However, the patient was also on a calcium channel blocker (which can cause 
fatal bradycardia if used in conjunction with the beta-blocker). This potential interaction was picked 
up by his senior colleague and the patient did not receive the beta-blocker...” (Case 15). 
 
Of the remaining cases, 4 (13%, 95% CI 5% to 30%) were due to failure to communicate outside the 
team  (‘consent,  communication,  confidentiality’)  and  2  (7%) each were due to errors in 
documentation, deficiencies in infrastructure (inadequate staff and/or equipment) and failure to 
implement care or to monitor/review the patient. One PSI (3%) involved a patient fall.  
8.3.3 Contributing factors  
Foundation trainees listed 220 contributing factors across the 30 cases. On average, 7 contributing 
factors were cited for each case (range 2 to 12). Trainees generally allocated contributing factors to 
the appropriate category. Certain types of contributing factors were more commonly cited than 
others. A summary of the contributing factors together with illustrative quotes is displayed in Table 
8.2.  
 
Team factors were the most commonly cited contributing factor and amongst these, poor handover 
and team communication (65%) and lack of supervision and support (33%) were prevalent themes. 
Individual staff factors were the next commonest contributing factor. Of such factors, around half 
(52%) referred to a lack of technical knowledge or experience of the healthcare professional(s) 
involved in the case. However, poor non-technical skills (e.g. communication) (31%), and staff 
tiredness and over-work (17%) were also recognised as common contributors to individual errors 
and lapses. Work environment factors largely related to inadequate staffing with a few cases 
referring to problems with the physical workspace. Task and technology factors predominantly 
related to unavailability of a necessary protocol or failure to follow an established protocol. Patient-
related contributing factors typically referred to case complexity and atypical case presentations 
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posing diagnostic difficulty. Stated organisational and management factors commonly related to 
resource  constraints,  with  some  mention  of  a  general  poor  ‘safety  culture’.    Wider  institutional  
context factors were the least commonly cited contributing factors (6%). When cited, reference to 
the negative impact of the target culture (e.g. 4-hour treatment targets in Emergency Departments) 
and the European Working Time Directive (EWTD) was common.  
 
Table 8.2 Contributing factors to patient safety incidents 
Contributing factor  
Common sub-themes 
Frequency % (95% CI) Illustrative quotes 
Team factors 
 
Handover and team 
communication; supervision 
and support; hierarchy and 
‘turf  wars’ 
48 22 (17-28%) Poor handover (team not aware of transfer, 
consultant away, no documentation) between the 
medical and surgical teams, and also in between the 
different surgical teams (Case 5). 
 
Good job from FY1 but lack of support meant he was 
responsible for far too many sick patients on his own 
(busy respiratory ward) (Case 22). 
 
Individual staff factors 
 
Technical skills/ experience; 
non-technical skills; physical 
and mental health 
 
42 19 (14-25%) Limited knowledge and experience of doctors 
involved (Case 2). 
 
Tired - on ward alone at 8pm (Case 7). 
 
Work environment factors 
 
Staffing and skills mix; 
physical work-space 
 
34 15 (11-21%) Out of hours – ‘skeleton  team’  (Case  3). 
 
Doctors work-station situated in noisy, busy part of 
ward (Case 2). 
 
Task and technology factors 
 
Availability and use of 
protocols; system design (IT, 
investigations) 
 
31 14 (10-19%) Protocols available but not double checked 
(Case 10). 
 
No protocol for use of sharps in the community 
provided by GP practice (Case 20). 
 
Patient factors 
 
Patient complexity; unusual 
case presentation; non-
communicative 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
12 (8-17%) Patient was critically ill, complex with medical and 
social issues (Case 14). 
 
Atypical history on admission – only signs RBBB (right 
bundle branch block) and later low oxygen 
saturations (Case 25). 
 
Organisational and 
management factors 
 
Financial constraints; safety 
culture; priorities 
26 12 (8-17%) Money not available to get locums/agency nurses to 
cover short-staffed wards when people off sick etc. 
(Case 22). 
 
Generalised lack of safety culture in the Trust 
including consultant on call. Priorities are ensuring 
beds in hospital and patients discharged (Case 25). 
 
Wider institutional context 
factors 
 
Targets; working time 
regulations 
13 6 (3-10%) EWTD - loss of continuity of care due to on call shift 
patterns (Case 29). 
 
4  hour  breach  culture  of  ‘have  to  refer’  - patients not 
diagnosed properly (Case 30). 
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8.3.4 Incident outcome  
The incident outcome was recorded in 27 (90%) PSI proformas by trainees. In the three cases where 
outcome was not recorded, this was derived from the case description via consensus between the 
two reviewers. In 13 cases (43%, 95% CI 27% to 61%) the outcome was graded as no harm (13%) or 
low-impact PSIs (30%). Six PSIs (20%, 95% CI 10% to 37%) were regarded as having resulted in 
moderate harm and 11 PSIs (37%, 95% CI 22% to 54%) as having resulted in severe harm (20%), or 
death (17%). A summary of the cases resulting in death or severe harm is displayed in Table 8.3.  
 
Table 8.3 Summary of PSIs with outcome 'severe harm' or 'death' 
Incident type Brief case description Outcome 
Access, admission, transfer: 
failure/ delay to access care 
Patient not sent for dialysis despite medical instructions. 
Deteriorated and died. 
 
Death 
Medication error: wrong dose Patient in acute renal failure received excessive fluids. 
Developed massive pulmonary oedema and died. 
 
Death 
Patient accident: fall Patient fell from bed (no bed rails). Sustained extensive 
bilateral subdural haemorrhage and died. 
 
Death 
Clinical assessment: wrong 
diagnosis 
Delayed diagnosis of ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm. 
Patient died. 
 
Death 
Clinical assessment: wrong 
diagnosis 
 
Delayed diagnosis of ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm. 
Patient died.  
Death 
Infrastructure deficiencies: 
staff shortage 
Intensive care unit (ICU) step-down patient not reviewed 
for 3 days due to staff shortages. Arrested and died. 
 
Severe harm 
Clinical assessment: wrong 
diagnosis 
Delayed diagnosis of STEMI (ST elevation myocardial 
infarction), leading to missed opportunity for percutaneous 
coronary intervention (PCI). 
 
Severe harm 
Implementation of care/ on-
going monitoring or review 
Delay in treatment of sepsis in neutropenic patient. 
Deteriorated and died. 
 
Severe harm 
Access, admission, transfer: 
failure/ delay to access care  
Delay  in  treatment  of  unwell  patient  as  ‘DNR’  (Do  Not  
Resuscitate) status. Patient deteriorated and died 2 days 
later. 
 
Severe harm 
Medication error: wrong dose Patient with Clostridium difficile diarrhoea received 
excessive fluids. Developed pulmonary oedema and died 
soon after. 
 
Severe harm 
Implementation of care/ on-
going monitoring or review 
Request for chest x-ray not followed-up; delayed diagnosis 
and treatment of florid pneumonia.  
 
Severe harm 
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It appears that trainees struggled with defining incident outcome in some cases. Interestingly, in four 
of  the  cases  with  a  recorded  outcome  of  ‘severe  harm’  (versus  ‘death’),  the patient had ultimately 
died. Indeed  in  the  majority  of  the  cases  with  an  outcome  of  ‘severe  harm’  or  ‘death’  the  patient 
was described as complex and/or at high-risk of death. This included frail patients with multiple 
comorbidities and also two patients with a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm, well known for its 
poor prognosis. Without further information, it is not possible to deduce whether such cases 
represented failures in care or an inevitable (albeit accelerated) death in a high-risk patient.  
8.3.5 Actions/ recommendations for improvement  
Trainees were required to propose actions/recommendations for improvement based on the cases 
discussed. A total of 78 actions/recommendations were proposed by trainees across the 30 case 
discussions (average 3 per case, range 1 to 5). Analysis revealed seven key themes, which fell into 
two broad categories: (i) actions/recommendations to improve individual and/or team practice and 
(ii) actions/recommendations to improve systems and processes (Table 8.4).   
 
Table 8.4 Proposed actions/ recommendations for improvement  
Action/recommendation  Frequency Illustrative quotes 
Improving individual and/or team practice 
General advice/raising awareness of good 
practice 
 
 
Improve training and induction  
 
 
Improve handover 
47 (60%) 
21 
 
 
18 
 
 
8 
 
Whenever a radiograph is requested, the 
request should be discussed with the 
radiology department and agreed to be 
completed (Case 16). 
Include in teaching programme for junior 
doctors how to complete DNAR forms and 
how to discuss with patient (Case 26). 
We need to have a written handover of 
complex high-risk patients on busy medical 
takes (Case 21). 
Improving processes and systems 
Develop/ modify protocol and/or improve 
accessibility  
Improve systems (e.g. IT, filing, electronic 
prescribing) 
 
Improve trainees’  rota 
 
 
Conduct audit to inform improvement 
31 (40%) 
16 
 
7 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
 
Need bowel preparation protocol on the 
intranet (Case 27). 
Proper filing system for old and new notes 
needs to be introduced in General Surgery 
wards as soon as possible (Case 2). 
Discuss with rota-master about re-organising 
rota to avoid regular scheduled clashes in the 
rota and co-ordinate this with the nurse 
clinician rota (Case 11). 
Conduct audit on EWS (early warning score) 
use by nursing and medical staff (Case 26). 
124  
The proposed actions/recommendations mapped well to the contributing factors identified by 
trainees. For instance, in line with team factors and individual staff factors being the most frequently 
identified contributing factors to PSIs discussed, the majority of proposed actions/recommendations 
related to improving individual and team practice at the frontline (60%). The commonest  ‘action’/  
recommendation involved general advice and/or raising awareness of safe practice amongst peers 
(27%).  Improving training and induction to cover gaps identified in the teaching programme was 
also a common recommendation proposed (23%). Improving handover as a function of teamwork 
and communication was also reported, in recognition of failures in handover commonly contributing 
to the PSIs discussed.  
 
In line with ‘task and technology’ and ‘work environment’ factors being the next most commonly 
cited contributing factors, the remaining 40% of proposed actions/recommendations related to 
improving processes and systems. This included developing novel or modifying existing protocols 
and/or improving their accessibility (21%) and improving systems such as information technology 
(IT) (9%). Less commonly cited actions/recommendations included re-designing  trainees’  rotas and 
conducting an audit to inform system improvements. The fact that conducting an audit formed a 
minority of proposed recommendations (only 5%) may reflect the desire by trainees to not just ‘do 
another audit’, but to endeavour to close the loop and conduct a quality improvement project 
(Roland et al. 2011). 
8.3.6 Lessons learnt 
As highlighted in the PSI proforma (Table 8.1), trainees were asked to list at least three lessons learnt 
derived from every PSI discussed. A total of 75 lessons were recorded across the 30 PSI proformas 
(median 3 per case, range 1 to 4). Five key themes were identified. These are displayed together 
with illustrative quotes in Table 8.5. As evident, in line with individual and team factors being 
identified as the commonest contributing factors to the PSIs discussed, the majority of lessons (four 
of the five themes) pertained to enhancing individual and team performance to ensure safe practice. 
These lessons spanned both technical and non-technical domains. The final theme related to other 
generic lessons, which did not fit neatly within the other themes. 
 
Looking more closely at the data, the commonest lesson related to an appreciation of the 
importance of effective team-working and communication (37%). Being conscientious, in terms of 
clinical assessment; safe prescribing; clear documentation; chasing investigation results and checking 
patient identification were also a common lesson derived by trainees (31%). Indeed, these are 
fundamental aspects of good medical practice (General Medical Council 2013). ‘Working  within 
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limits’ was a theme I created to encompass vigilance and situational awareness, escalating care 
where necessary and the effective prioritisation of tasks (19%) – all recognised as essential non-
technical skills.  
 
Table 8.5 Lessons learnt: key themes 
Lessons learnt Frequency Illustrative quotes 
Effective team-working and 
communication  
 
Good communication 
 
Effective handover 
 
 
 
Good team-working 
28 (37%) 
 
 
12 
 
10 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
Be careful of asking leading questions (Case 9). 
 
The importance of handing over all important information, 
especially information pertaining to emergency management. Use 
a system to ensure things are not forgotten (e.g. SBAR)(Case 23). 
 
Need to work closely with the rota team to promote patient safety 
through better staffing arrangements (Case 11). 
 
Being conscientious in terms of: 
 
Clinical assessment 
 
Prescribing 
 
 
Documentation 
 
Checking test results 
 
Patient identification 
23 (31%) 
 
6 
 
5 
 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
 
Importance of full clinical assessment (Case 3). 
 
I will always check how to correctly administer medication when I 
am not 100% sure (Case 25). 
 
Ensure clear, legible documentation on request cards (Case 16). 
 
Always check report of scans (Case 4). 
 
Always check wrist-bands with patient and patient's notes (Case 9). 
 
Working within limits 
 
Vigilance & situational 
awareness 
 
Escalation of care 
 
 
Prioritisation of tasks 
14 (19%) 
 
6  
 
 
4  
 
 
4  
 
 
Be especially vigilant when dealing with unfamiliar patients 
(Case 2). 
 
Importance of seeking senior help when you reach limitations of 
your knowledge (Case 27). 
 
Acutely unwell patients especially with atypical presentation 
should always be at top of priority list (Case 5). 
 
Specific clinical lessons 5 (7%) Make sure ECGs are done on breathless patients (Case 6). 
 
Other general lessons 5 (7%) The role of an FY1 as an advocate for patients is very important 
(Case 11). 
 
Although it is difficult it is important to challenge senior decisions 
to promote patient safety (Case 6). 
 
Importance of HIRs (Case 17). 
 
Error as a driver for change (Case 20). 
 
Importance of policies and procedures in minimising risk and harm 
(Case 20). 
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Specific clinical lessons formed a minority of lessons derived from the cases (7%). The final theme of 
‘other  general  lessons’ included generic statements made by trainees which highlighted an 
appreciation of the role of the trainee as an advocate for patient safety; the importance of 
challenging seniors where necessary; the value of error as a tool for learning and improvement and 
the importance of incident reporting systems and policies to ensure safe practice.  
8.4 Discussion 
This was a preliminary qualitative study to examine the type of cases, which Foundation trainees 
typically  bring  for  discussion  as  part  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  and  to  explore  the  impact  of  
such  discussion  in  terms  of  actions/  recommendations  proposed  and  lessons  learnt.  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
sessions were well attended by trainees, and the majority were facilitated by trained faculty. 
Trainees brought a diverse range of cases for discussion. The most frequent types of incident were 
delay or failure to access care, delayed or wrong diagnosis and medication errors. Incident outcomes 
spanned the full range of severity from no harm to death. On average, seven contributing factors 
were attributed to each PSI; the most common contributing factors related to individual and team 
factors; the work environment and task and technology factors. Trainees proposed relevant 
actions/recommendations for improvement, which aimed to improve individual and team practice 
as well as wider systems and processes. Finally, numerous lessons were drawn from the case 
discussions, the majority of which related to improving personal practice to ensure safe care.  
 
Other studies have analysed errors and adverse events reported by trainees (Tomolo et al. 2005, 
Jericho et al. 2010, Cox et al. 2011, Scott et al. 2011). However, given the qualitative nature of such 
studies, there is substantial heterogeneity in the taxonomies used to code incident type, 
contributing factors and incident outcomes. Nonetheless the distribution of incident type correlates 
well with that found in previous studies (Wu et al. 1991, Tomolo et al. 2005) as well as the analysis of 
reflective entries reported in Chapter 5. As commented in Chapter 5, the distribution of PSI type 
identified by trainee self-report differs markedly from that collated nationally through formal 
incident reporting systems (National Patient Safety Agency March 2013). Interestingly, a recent 
study which combined an educational campaign with a financial incentive to boost incident 
reporting by trainees found that whilst reporting significantly improved, these reports most 
commonly related to systems issues rather than individual errors (Scott et al. 2011). This suggests 
that despite such incentives, the pervasive barriers to reporting (Kaldjian et al. 2008) mean that 
formal reporting systems will fail to uncover the true nature of PSIs commonly experienced by 
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trainees at the frontline and alternative methods such  as  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  must be 
explored.  
 
The distribution of contributing factors identified in this study also correlates well with other studies 
which found communication/ information mishaps (Cox et al. 2011) and inadequate supervision 
(Jericho et al. 2010) as significant contributors in trainee-reported adverse events. In terms of 
individual staff factors, trainees identified both inadequate technical skills and experience and poor 
non-technical skills in terms of communication and teamwork as core contributors to PSIs, as noted 
elsewhere (Gawande et al. 2003). Error-inducing factors including tiredness and job overload were 
also identified, supporting findings from a previous study of house officers’  mistakes (Wu et al. 
1991). Importantly, in addition to individual and team factors, trainees in this study also successfully 
considered broader organisational and institutional factors contributing to PSIs, such as financial 
constraints,  the  ‘target  culture’  and  working  time  regulations.   
 
The taxonomy of contributing factors used in this study differed from that used in the study 
reported in Chapter 5, therefore a direct comparison regarding the distribution of contributing 
factors identified is not possible. However, it is notable that the average number of contributing 
factors identified for each PSI discussed was much higher in this study than in the study of reflective 
entries reported in Chapter 5 (average of 7 versus 2 contributing factors identified per PSI). This 
suggests that group reflection, combined with a structured approach to incident analysis, results in a 
richer analysis of the contributors to PSIs, than that achieved via individual  ‘free-form’  reflection in 
portfolios. 
 
In terms of incident outcomes, there were an almost equivalent number of incidents, which resulted 
in little or no patient harm (43%) and severe harm or death (37%). This is in contrast to the study in 
Chapter 5, which found that 65% of incidents resulted in little or no harm versus 20% of cases, which 
resulted in severe harm or death. However, without further information, it is not possible to deduce 
whether incidents resulting in severe harm or death in either study were actual PSIs or whether they 
reflected inevitable outcomes in high-risk patients (and the subsequent distress amongst trainees 
prompting  disclosure  as  part  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme)(Firth-Cozens 1987). Nonetheless, 
that trainees were able to bring such a diverse range of incidents is perhaps testament to the 
successful creation of a safe forum for open discussion of PSIs and other stressful experiences. 
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The actions and recommendations proposed by trainees mapped well to the contributing factors 
identified. Recommendations to improve individual and team practice formed the majority (60%) 
over recommendations to improve systems and processes (40%). Similarly, the lessons drawn by 
trainees mostly related to enhancing individual and team effectiveness in the face of imperfect 
systems. Indeed, these lessons indicate that trainees exhibit a strong sense of personal 
accountability,  which  argues  against  claims  of  the  ‘blame  culture’  having  been  supplanted  by  a  ‘no-
blame’  culture (Taylor-Adams 2008). Moreover, it was encouraging to find that important broader 
lessons had been drawn by trainees, including their role as advocates for patients, and the 
importance of challenging others, including seniors where necessary. 
8.4.1 Limitations of this study 
Given the preliminary nature of this study, the sample size was necessarily small. However, the 
random stratified sampling method employed minimised selection bias and provides confidence that 
the cases were representative of the entire sample of PSIs submitted by trainees as part of the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme in 2010-2011.  The quality of information recorded on the PSI 
proformas varied and as a result it was difficult to extract sufficient information from some 
proformas. However, the strong inter-rater reliability for coding incident type, and the consensus 
qualitative methodology employed provides confidence that core themes were successfully 
identified.  
 
Perhaps  the  main  limitation  of  this  study  relates  to  the  actual  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  process,  which  
employs  an  ‘abbreviated’  approach  to  the analysis of PSIs. As discussed, this analysis is based on a 
validated systems-based analysis tool (the London Protocol) (Vincent et al. 1998). Full application of 
this tool would typically involve a multidisciplinary effort involving case-note review and interviews 
with key stakeholders. Such a detailed analysis is not feasible within the constraints of a teaching 
programme. Nonetheless, future work should involve an observational  study  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
sessions to enable real-time exploration of the process of analysis to examine the various influences 
on that process and the means to optimise it - within existing resource constraints.  
8.4.2 Summary and implications for further research 
In summary, this pilot study has uncovered rich information regarding the incidents that trainees 
bring for discussion as  part  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  and  has provided insight into the 
learning that occurs as a result. These findings offer support to previous studies that recommend 
reflection and discussion of PSIs to drive constructive change in practice (Wu et al. 1991, Kroll et al. 
2008). The findings here suggest that group reflection encourages deeper analysis of the 
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contributors to PSIs and as well as encouraging safe practice at an individual level, may also promote 
trainees’  engagement in wider safety improvement efforts through proposed recommendations to 
improve systems and processes.  
 
The broader implications of this study with regards to policy impact and areas for further research 
will be discussed further in the main discussion of the thesis (Chapter 12). Of immediate relevance to 
this Section of the thesis, it is necessary to examine the  impact  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  
on learning quantitatively and in relation to the specific learning outcomes of the programme as set 
out in Chapter 6. Moreover, it would also be useful to explore factors influencing the 
implementation  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme and thus engagement in the process examined 
here. I report on these aspects in the following Chapter.  
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9 Evaluation of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’ Programme: A Pre-Post 
Intervention Study  
9.1 Introduction 
The findings of the preliminary analysis of ‘Lessons  Learnt’  PSI proformas reported in Chapter 8 
indicate that Foundation trainees gain valuable learning through discussing patient safety incidents 
(PSIs), both in terms of enhancing their individual practice but also in considering ways to improve 
the safety of the wider healthcare system within which they work. Having examined the ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  process  and  the  learning  that  results  qualitatively,  I now wish to determine the impact of the 
programme  on  trainees’  learning quantitatively, and in relation to the stated learning outcomes as 
set out in Chapter 6  (Box 6.2 Learning outcomes of the 'Lessons Learnt' programme).  
 
Moreover, I wish to explore to what extent the preparatory efforts to support the sustainable 
implementation of the programme have succeeded. As outlined in Chapter 6, these efforts 
comprised two key facets: (i) stakeholder  engagement  comprising  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  launch 
conference, and recruitment of trainee ‘Leads’  to promote learner ownership and (ii) senior faculty 
development to facilitate delivery of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme.  Evaluation of the faculty 
development  arm  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  was  reported  in  Chapter  7. In this Chapter, I 
report  the  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  as  a  whole,  which was 
conducted in parallel to its implementation in the academic year 2010-2011.  
9.1.1 Study aims 
The aims of this study were (i)  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  on  
Foundation trainees’  patient safety knowledge, skills and attitudes and (ii) to explore the barriers 
and  enablers  to  implementation  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme.    
9.2 Methods 
9.2.1 Study design and population 
This was a pre-post intervention study involving all Foundation Trainees (n=1076), Foundation 
Programme Directors (FPDs, n=18), Foundation Programme Administrators (FPAs, n=18) and 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty (n=57) across the North Western Foundation School participating in the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  in  the  academic  year  2010-2011. Ethical approval was not required for 
this study of an educational intervention. 
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9.2.2 Intervention 
As described in Chapter 6, the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  intervention  comprises a series of monthly 60-minute 
sessions integrated into the compulsory Foundation teaching programme, during which Foundation 
trainees lead a peer-group discussion of a PSI encountered in practice, in a safe, facilitated forum 
using a London Protocol based analysis (Figure 6.2). The target is five  ‘Lessons Learnt’  sessions  for  
each cohort (Foundation Year 1, FY1 and Foundation Year 2, FY2) at each site (n=16 Foundation 
programmes) from January to July 2011.  
 
The first of these sessions was an introductory launch session led by trainee Leads and ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  faculty (trained senior doctors) to orient Foundation trainees to the programme and to 
provide core content knowledge about patient safety. This comprised a lecture  on  ‘patient  safety 
essentials’  (including key patient safety terminology and policy, the nature and scale of harm, person 
vs. systems approach to error, and  the  rationale  to  ‘Lessons  Learnt’), and a mock  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
session based on a real-life PSI for group discussion and analysis. (A copy of the local launch-pack is 
included in Appendix 6). 
9.2.3 Evaluation of learning outcomes  
Whilst  the  learning  outcomes  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’ programme related to Foundation  trainees’  
patient safety knowledge, skills and attitudes (Box 6.2), in consultation with patient safety 
researchers Sonal Arora (SA) and Nick Sevdalis (NS), we aimed to examine related outcomes across 
all  four  levels  of  Kirkpatrick’s  model  of  evaluation  pre-post intervention. As reported in Chapter 4, 
the four levels comprise: participants’  satisfaction (Level 1), learning (Levels 2a and 2b), behavioural 
change (Level 3) and wider organisational impact (Levels 4a and 4b) (BEME 2013). The approach to 
assessment of each is discussed in turn below. 
Participants’  reaction/ satisfaction (Level 1) 
All Foundation trainees, Leads, faculty, FPDs and FPAs were asked to complete a short 5-item 
satisfaction questionnaire post-intervention. Participants used 5-point Likert scales to rate 
satisfaction  with  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  (1=strongly  disagree  to 5=strongly agree). In addition, trainees 
were invited to provide free text feedback on the perceived strengths of the programme and 
suggested areas for improvement. 
Trainees’  learning  - knowledge, skills and attitudes (Levels 2a and 2b) 
This was assessed in Foundation trainees pre and post-intervention (in January and June/July 2011). 
As with the faculty course evaluation (reported in Chapter 7), with the support of SA and NS, I 
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devised multiple-choice questions mapped onto the learning outcomes to assess knowledge 
objectively. Patient safety attitudes and subjective patient safety knowledge were assessed using a 
modified questionnaire originally developed by Patey et al (Patey et al. 2007). In addition, we 
devised items to assess self-reported confidence in patient safety skills. Items included confidence in 
‘analysing  a  patient  safety  incident’  and  ‘identifying  actions  to  be  taken  to  prevent  future  PSIs’  
assessed on a 5-point Likert scale (1=very low confidence to 5=very high confidence).  
Trainees’  behavioural  change  (Level 3) 
Behavioural intentions regarding patient safety were assessed using a scale developed by Patey et al 
(Patey et al. 2007). In addition, in line with the stated learning outcomes, we devised a 5-item self-
report questionnaire (frequency scale) to explore trainees’ awareness, reflection, reporting, and 
disclosure of PSIs in the 6 months prior to and 6 months following introduction  of  the  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  programme. A copy  of  the  trainees’  evaluation  questionnaire, which incorporates 
knowledge, skill, attitudinal and behavioural items, is included in Appendix 15. 
Wider organisational impact (Level 4a) 
As reported in Chapter 8, as part of each  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session, trainees were required to propose 
actions/ recommendations for improvement, derived from each PSI analysis. Given the primary aim 
of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  is  learning,  and  in  recognition  of  the  yet  nascent  infrastructure  to  support  quality  
improvement (QI) work in the North Western Foundation School, trainees were not held to account 
for following through proposed QI projects. However, as a secondary outcome measure we wished 
to examine to what extent QI projects were followed through by trainees. Therefore, as part of the 
post-intervention evaluation, trainee Leads at each site were asked to  submit  a  ‘QI database’ by 
email: a brief document to highlight progress on QI projects proposed as a result of each  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  session. Due to resource constraints, we did not seek to evaluate Level 4b outcomes (patient 
benefit). 
 
With regards data collection, I devised one-page guidance to support Leads (in association with 
FPAs) to coordinate data collection at each site (Appendix 16). In  order  to  maximise  trainees’ 
response rate, trainees were provided with hard-copies of the evaluation forms to complete during 
scheduled  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions:  time to complete the pre-intervention evaluation was 
incorporated into the local launch session at each site in January 2011. Similarly, time to complete 
the post-intervention evaluation was incorporated into the final session at each site in June/ July 
2011 (dependent on local scheduling of Foundation teaching). Leads and FPAs were asked to 
produce back-up copies of the data and to post the originals to me. I sent non-responding Leads 
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weekly reminders by email until 4 weeks following the close of the academic year in July 2011. I 
organised the data for entry by Fizza Ahmed (medical secretary) and Stephenie Tiew (trainee).  
9.2.4 Evaluation of factors influencing implementation of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’ 
As reported in the systematic review of patient safety courses in Chapter 4, few studies have 
specifically evaluated factors influencing the implementation of patient safety education. As key 
stakeholders essential to the sustainable integration of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’,  I was keen to determine the 
views of local  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  teams  (i.e.  trainee Leads, FPDs and FPAs) on the barriers and enablers 
to implementation of the programme. (Note: barriers and enablers to implementation from the 
faculty  perspective  were  reported  in  Chapter  7  under  ‘engagement  in  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme’). 
 
Therefore, as part of the post-intervention  evaluation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’,  I  devised  an electronic 
questionnaire (using Survey Monkey software) to elicit the views of trainee Leads, FPDs and FPAs on 
the following:  
(i) The  feasibility  of  carrying  out  their  role  in  relation  to  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme.    Key  
responsibilities as communicated at the outset of programme implementation were stated 
(see Table 6.2) and responses were sought to determine the feasibility of carrying out each 
responsibility (5-point Likert scale: 1=not at all feasible to 5=very feasible).  
(ii) The  enablers  to  implementing  ‘Lessons  Learnt’.  Free text responses were invited in response 
to the question:  ‘What helped in implementing Lessons Learnt for Foundation trainees at 
your Trust?’  
(iii) The  challenges  to  implementing  ‘Lessons  Learnt’.  Free  text  responses  were  invited  in  
response to the question: ‘What were the challenges or barriers to running Lessons Learnt 
for  Foundation  trainees  at  your  Trust?’ 
 
Non-respondents were sent weekly email reminders to complete the questionnaire until 4 weeks 
following the close of the academic year in July 2011.  
9.2.5 Data analysis 
With regards quantitative data analysis, I used SPSS version 19.0 for all analyses. Descriptive 
statistics (mean and standard deviation) were reported for pre- and post-intervention scores relating 
to  trainees’  safety  knowledge,  skills,  attitudes  and  behaviours; satisfaction with  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  and 
feasibility of carrying out the Lead, FPD and FPA roles. Independent t-tests were used to compare 
statistically trainees’  safety knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours pre- and post intervention. 
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Cronbach’s  alpha was used to assess the internal consistency (scale reliability) of survey subscales 
(self-report safety knowledge, self-report skills and attitudes). For all statistical tests, p<0.05 was 
deemed to be statistically significant. 
 
With regards analysis of the free text data relating to strengths and weaknesses of the programme 
and barriers and enablers to its implementation, this was analysed independently by two 
researchers (myself and Stephenie Tiew) using thematic analysis (Pope et al. 2006). We firstly read 
and re-read all the data to identify an initial set of analytical categories inductively. We then each 
systematically searched the data to group it under these initial categories and created additional 
categories as necessary, to ensure a comprehensive analysis. Finally, we refined and reduced the 
categories to reach consensus on key themes, involving a third reviewer (Paul Baker) as necessary. 
For  analysis  of  the  ‘QI databases’,  both  reviewers  identified projects that were reported by trainee 
Leads to be in progress or complete and categorised these under three headings (mapped to the 
original  NHS  North  West  Dragon’s  Den  project themes): QI projects to improve (i) service delivery, 
(ii) trainees’  working conditions or (iii) trainees’  education and training. 
9.3 Results 
Overall, 81% of sites (13/16 Foundation Programmes) successfully held five  or  more  ‘Lessons Learnt’  
sessions for each cohort (FY1 and FY2) from January to July 2011. At the three sites that did not 
meet the target, it was the FY2 cohort that had struggled, running either 3 or 4 sessions only. 
Overall, 57  faculty  facilitated  a  total  of  165  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions between January and July 2011, 
an average of 3 sessions per faculty member (range 1 to 8). Findings relating to participants’ 
satisfaction,  trainees’  learning,  wider  organisational  impact  and  factors  influencing  implementation  
of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  are discussed in turn below. 
9.3.1 Participants’ satisfaction  
Response rates for the satisfaction questionnaire were 100% for FPDs (n=18/18), 100% for FPAs 
(n=18/18), 49% for faculty (n=28/57) and 40% for Foundation trainees (n=431/1076). All participants 
reported high levels of satisfaction  with  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  ( 
Figure 9.1).  They  agreed/strongly  agreed  that  ‘Lessons  Learnt’ promoted an open and learning safety 
culture and felt that the frequency and timing of sessions was appropriate. They supported the 
continuation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  locally  and  its wider adoption across Trusts beyond the North 
Western Foundation School.  
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Figure 9.1 Participants’ satisfaction with the 'Lessons Learnt' programme 
 
In addition, analysis of free text comments by Foundation trainees provided rich feedback on the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  in  relation  to  its perceived strengths and areas for improvement. 223 
Foundation trainees provided 279 free text comments relating to strengths of the programme. 139 
trainees provided 143 free text comments relating to areas for improvement. Key themes and their 
relative frequency are summarised together with illustrative quotes in Table 9.1. 
 
Consistent  with  the  aims  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme,  the most commonly reported strength 
of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  related  to  the  safe  learning  environment  created  by  the  programme  and  the  
opportunity to learn both with and from peers (48%). Trainees  also  valued  the  structure  of  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  sessions,  in  particular  the  systematic  approach  to  incident  analysis  and  the  facilitation  by  
senior  doctors  (16%).  Trainees  also  felt  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  was  relevant  (13%),  that  it  informed  future  
practice (11%) and raised awareness of patient safety (11%).  
 
With regards areas for improvement, trainees were in favour of increasing the frequency of sessions 
(27%), with some suggesting that all trainees should be required to present a case. Concerns 
regarding the structure and delivery of the programme related to unavailability of senior facilitators, 
rigid application of the PSI proforma, or issues with group size (too large/small) (27%). Trainees were 
keen for more feedback and follow-through of actions (19%) as well as more varied cases being 
brought for discussion (16%).  Contrary  to  the  majority  view  that  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  fostered  a  safe  
learning forum, a few respondents (6%) reported that sessions occasionally degenerated into a 
‘blame  game’.   
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Table 9.1 Trainees’  views  on  strengths of 'Lessons Learnt' and areas for improvement 
Strengths (n=279) Frequency Illustrative quotes 
Safe learning environment 
Open forum 
 
 
 
Peer support  
134 (48%) 
72 
 
 
 
62 
 
“...Lessons  Learnt fosters openness and is potentially 
encouraging a generation of doctors who are prepared to 
discuss  patient  safety  issues...”   
 
“…Able  to  get  input  from  colleagues.  Nice  to  see  we  are  all  
in  the  same  boat  and  share  a  lot  of  opinions…” 
 
Structure and delivery  
Systematic analysis 
 
Senior facilitation 
44 (16%) 
37 
 
7 
 
“…Elegant  way  of  presenting  and  analysing  cases…” 
 
“…Having  senior  staff  as  facilitators  also  gave  a  good  
perspective  on  the  issues  that  were  raised…” 
 
Relevant to trainees 36 (13%) “...Excellent sessions. I found them more valuable than 
some of the other teaching sessions...”   
 
Informs future practice 31 (11%) “...Lessons  Learnt  makes  you  feel  more  human  - we all 
make  mistakes.  It’s  a  chance  to  investigate  why  things  are  
done in a certain way and to make changes for the 
better...”   
 
Raises awareness of safety 30 (11%) “…Encourages  and  raises  awareness  of  patient  safety  and  
encourages  people  to  consider  this…” 
 
Other  4 (1%) “…Opportunity  to  present…” 
 
Improvements (n=143) Frequency Illustrative quotes 
Structure and delivery 
Availability of senior facilitators  
 
 
 
Proforma too prescriptive 
 
Group size too small / large 
38 (27%) 
17 
 
 
 
14 
 
7 
 
 
“…I  do  not  think  that  sessions  should  be  facilitated  by  the  
FY1 as it often feels as if opinions are dismissed if they do 
not  fit  with  his/her  views…” 
 
“…Discussion  should  be  facilitated  by  the  list  of  
contributing  factors  but  not  stick  rigidly  to  it…” 
Increase session frequency 38 (27%) “…Sessions  could  be  more  frequent…Should  be  mandatory  
for trainees  to  present…”  
 
Feedback and follow-up 27 (19%) “…More  help  with  implementation  of  action  plans…” 
 
Better case-mix 23 (16%) “…More  varied  cases  from  different  specialities…” 
 
Ensure safe learning environment  8 (6%) “…Sometimes  descends  into  a  blame  game…” 
 
Other  9 (6%) “…Please  make  feedback  forms  shorter…”   
“…Should  be  shared  with  other  medical  professionals  as  
well…” 
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9.3.2 Trainees’  patient safety knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours 
Foundation trainees’ response rate for the pre-intervention evaluation of patient safety knowledge, 
skills, attitudes and behaviours was 72% (775/1076). The response rate for the post-intervention 
evaluation was 43% (463/1076). Results relating to these domains are summarised in Table 9.2 and 
discussed in turn below. 
 
There was a significant improvement in objective scores of patient safety knowledge from 51.1% 
(SD=17.3%) pre-intervention to 57.6% (SD=20.1%) post-intervention, p<0.001. Similarly, there was 
also a significant improvement in self-reported scores for patient safety knowledge post-
intervention for each item and the mean score (Table 9.2).  
 
There was also a significant improvement in self-reported confidence in patient safety skills for each 
item assessed including the ability to identify a PSI, to analyse a PSI and identify actions to prevent 
PSIs (Table 9.2). With regards patient safety attitudes, only trainees’  perceived ‘personal  influence  
over  safety’ (perceived control) improved significantly pre/post-intervention. Trainees’  attitudes  
across  the  domains  of  ‘feelings about  making  errors’  and  ‘personal  beliefs about patient safety’  did  
not shift significantly (the full breakdown of these latter results is in Appendix 17). 
 
Although the mean score for behavioural intentions regarding patient safety did not show significant 
improvement, there were significant improvements across all self-reported measures of behavioural 
change, including increased reflection on PSIs  within  trainees’  portfolios;  discussion and disclosure of 
PSIs, and formal incident reporting (Table 9.2). 
 
Finally, with regards scale reliability, the internal consistency of the subjective knowledge scale was 
excellent (Cronbach alpha pre-intervention=0.862, Cronbach alpha post-intervention=0.910), as was 
the internal consistency for the self-reported confidence in skills scale (Cronbach alpha pre-
intervention=0.856, Cronbach alpha post-intervention=0.922). Internal consistency for the attitude 
and behavioural intention scales ranged from Cronbach alpha 0.660 to 0.905 (full break-down of 
results in Appendix 17).  
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Table 9.2 Patient safety knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours in trainees 
Domain assessed  
Pre-intervention Post-intervention  
Mean Standard deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation P-value 
Subjective knowledge* 
1. Different types of patient safety incident (PSI) 
2. Factors contributing to PSIs 
3. Factors influencing patient safety 
4. Ways of speaking up about PSIs 
5. What should happen if a PSI occurs 
6. How to report a PSI 
Average score 
2.50 
3.01 
3.09 
2.94 
3.08 
3.15 
2.96 
0.86 
0.82 
0.79 
0.87 
0.92 
0.96 
0.67 
3.36 
3.68 
3.71 
3.64 
3.70 
3.74 
3.64 
0.80 
0.70 
0.68 
0.76 
0.76 
0.75 
0.62 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Confidence in skills* 
1. Identify a PSI 
2. Identify situations which could lead to a PSI 
3. Analyse a PSI to identify contributory factors 
4. Generate learning from a PSI 
5. Identify actions to be taken to prevent future PSIs 
Average score 
3.76 
3.72 
3.49 
3.73 
3.75 
3.69 
0.62 
0.61 
0.74 
0.66 
0.64 
0.52 
4.00 
3.96 
3.92 
3.98 
3.98 
3.97 
0.58 
0.59 
0.60 
0.62 
0.60 
0.52 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Attitudes and behavioural intentions*  
1. Feelings about making errors (Ave score, 4 items) 
2. Personal attitudes to safety (Ave score, 6 items) 
3. Personal influence over safety (Ave score, 5 items)** 
4. Intentions regarding safety (Ave score, 7 items) 
4.00 
4.02 
3.30 
3.99 
0.61 
0.48 
0.55 
0.47 
3.93 
3.98 
3.45 
4.00 
0.62 
0.50 
0.55 
0.50 
0.073 
0.200 
<0.001 
0.951 
Behaviours 
1. How many PSIs are you aware of that have occurred in 
the past 6 months? 
2. How many PSIs have you reflected on in your portfolio 
in the past 6 months? 
3. How many PSIs have you discussed with your 
colleagues in the past 6 months? 
4. How many PSIs have you or your team disclosed to a 
patient in the past 6 months? 
5. How many PSIs have you reported via Incident 
Reporting Systems in the past 6 months? 
2.62 
 
0.88 
 
2.02 
 
1.16 
 
0.67 
1.75 
 
1.11 
 
1.61 
 
1.41 
 
1.11 
3.21 
 
1.72 
 
2.71 
 
1.68 
 
1.18 
1.61 
 
1.45 
 
1.68 
 
1.58 
 
1.46 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
* Rating scale: 1= very low/disagree strongly; 2= low/disagree; 3= average/neutral; 4= high/agree; 5= very high/strongly 
agree 
** Excludes one item due to poor internal consistency (please refer to Appendix 17)  
Across analyses, Pre N = 771-775, Post N = 426-446 
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9.3.3 Wider organisational impact 
‘QI  databases’  were  received  from  17  trainee  Leads  (50%).  Analysis  of these identified 30 quality 
improvement projects as being in various stages of implementation. Examples of these projects are 
listed in Box 9.1, under the three pre-defined categories: projects to improve (i) service delivery (ii) 
trainees’  working  conditions  and (iii)  trainees’  education  and  training.  Other notable outcomes 
reported by trainee Leads included trainees at one site being invited to join the Trust Patient Safety  
Board and the development of a ‘Junior Doctor Quality Improvement’ group at another site. 
 
Box 9.1 Examples of QI projects completed or in progress by Foundation trainees 
 
Projects to improve service delivery  
 Development of streamlined protocol for insulin sliding scale across the Trust  
 Development of protocol for crash call on psychiatric ward   
 Development of referral protocol to oncology for malignancy with unknown primary 
 Initiation of regular ortho-geriatric reviews on orthopaedic ward 
 Escalation protocol for junior doctors developed and disseminated in all wards 
 
Projects  to  improve  trainees’  working  conditions   
 Protected handover on Medical Assessment Unit  
 Larger desk provided in work space and overall more organised work area 
 Reduced number of patient beds on ward, higher nursing levels 
 Improved patient record management in Surgery  
 Improved access to confidential waste bins 
 
Projects to improve education and training  
 Advanced Life Support update incorporated into teaching programme 
 Induction to include tour of all areas covered by the crash team 
 Teaching on hyperkalaemia introduced  
 Teaching on insulin prescribing introduced 
 Teaching session on consent, confidentiality and chaperoning introduced 
 
 
9.3.4 Factors  influencing  implementation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’   
The response rates for questionnaire items exploring factors  influencing  implementation  of  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  were  100%  for FPDs (n=18/18), 100% for FPAs (n=18/18) and 91% for trainee Leads 
(n=31/34). The views of local teams regarding the feasibility of carrying out their roles and 
responsibilities are summarised in Table 9.3. As evident, in general, local teams felt that carrying out 
their  roles  and  responsibilities  in  relation  to  implementation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  was  feasible.  FPDs  in  
particular  felt  their  role  in  endorsing  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  locally  was  achievable  within their remit. 
Trainee Leads and FPAs rated the feasibility of organising the sessions as less feasible.  This included 
responsibilities such as recruiting trainee presenters (Leads) and securing faculty to facilitate each 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  session  (FPAs).  Coordinating  and  supporting  evaluation  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
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programme was deemed the least feasible amongst Leads and FPAs and likely reflects the additional 
burden posed by having to administer the evaluation and to chase trainees to complete it. 
 
Table 9.3 Perceived feasibility of carrying out 'Lessons Learnt' roles and responsibilities 
Local ‘Lessons  Learnt’  team responsibilities Mean (SD) 
Trainee Lead responsibilities   
Lead  the  local  ‘Lessons  Learnt’ launch  4.58 (0.77) 
Organise  and  chair  the  monthly  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions* 3.80 (1.03) 
Coordinate  local  evaluation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’**   3.77 (0.92) 
FPD responsibilities  
To lead (or at least endorse) the local launch together with trainee Lead(s) and faculty 4.28 (1.01) 
To encourage trainees to volunteer to present 4.26 (0.81) 
To  support  FPAs  to  build  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  into  the  teaching  programme 4.58 (0.51) 
FPA responsibilities  
To timetable one Lessons Learnt session per month from January to June 2011 3.94 (1.00) 
To liaise with trainee Leads and faculty to negotiate sessions 3.67 (0.77) 
To help administer the evaluation of the programme  3.35 (0.93) 
* includes securing slots, recruiting presenters and chairing sessions  
** includes submission of PSI proforma and faculty appraisal for  each  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session  and  coordination  of  trainees’  
pre (January 2011) and post (June/July 2011) evaluation of the programme  
 
Local teams also provided rich feedback regarding factors influencing implementation  of  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’.  Analysis  of  the  free  text  comments  revealed  several  key  themes  relating  to  barriers/  
challenges and enablers/ facilitators to implementation of the programme. These are summarised in 
Table 9.4. The most commonly reported enabler to implementation was trainee ownership of and 
engagement  with  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  (31%).    The  support  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty  and  FPAs  were  also  
frequently cited enablers to implementation (both 25%). Participants valued the support and 
resources  provided  by  the  central  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  team  (coordinated  by  myself  and  Paul  Baker,  
Foundation School Director) (12%) and the support of FPDs, some of whom stepped in to facilitate at 
short  notice  when  no  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty  were available. 
 
Not surprisingly, given that trainee engagement was considered a key enabler to implementation, 
difficulties in recruiting trainee presenters was the most frequently reported challenge to 
implementation (34%). Notably, there was concern that  the  ‘blame  culture’  persisted  and  as  a  result  
trainees favoured presenting cases involving the mistakes of others, rather than cases involving 
personal errors.  Engagement amongst FY2 trainees was felt to be poorer as compared with FY1 
trainees due to lack  of  incentive  for  ‘portfolio-building’  once  jobs  for  Core  training  had  been  secured.  
141  
This  may  explain  why  the  three  cohorts  that  struggled  to  meet  the  target  of  holding  five  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  sessions  were  FY2  cohorts.  Securing  faculty  to  facilitate  sessions around their clinical 
commitments  was  also  a  commonly  reported  challenge  to  implementing  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  (28%).  In  a  
similar vein, although less significant (6%) were competing commitments of trainee Leads precluding 
their role in organising and chairing  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions.   
 
Reconfiguration of services across one of the Trusts mid-year resulted in significant logistical 
challenges  in  organising  Foundation  teaching,  including  ‘Lessons  Learnt’.  Two  larger  sites  also  
struggled to secure sufficient rooms to facilitate group work. Hence logistical problems were also a 
frequently  cited  challenge  to  implementation  (17%).  Importantly,  echoing  trainees’  desire  for  more  
follow-through  of  actions  stemming  from  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions,  lack  of  follow-up was also 
reported by local teams as a challenge to implementation (6%). Finally, some Leads reported that 
encouraging their peers to complete evaluation forms proved challenging (9%). 
 
Table 9.4 Perceived barriers and enablers to implementation of 'Lessons Learnt' 
Enablers/ facilitators (n=100) Frequency Illustrative quotes 
Trainee leadership and 
engagement 
31 (31%) “…We  were  fortunate  to  have  enthusiastic  trainee  champions  who  
took  over  and  ran  many  sessions…” FPD 
Faculty support 25 (25%) “…The  facilitators  were  all  very  supportive  and  good  at  their  roles  if  
they  were  able  to  make  it…”  FY2  Lead 
FPA support 25 (25%) “…The  postgraduate  staff  were  accommodating  if  a  session  needed  
to be re-arranged…”  FY2  Lead 
Central support and resources 12 (12%) “…Instant  email  support  from  Lessons  Learnt  team  when  I  had  a  
query…”  FY1  Lead 
FPD support 7 (7%) “…The  FPD  was  great  in  standing  in  when  a  facilitator  dropped  out  
last  minute...”  FPA 
Barriers/ challenges (n=88) Frequency Illustrative quotes 
Recruiting trainee presenters 30 (34%) “…I  felt  we  had  some  excellent  presentations  but  that  people  were 
still a bit unwilling to present cases where they had personally made 
an error…”  FY1  Lead 
Securing faculty support  25 (28%) “…We  only  had  one  facilitator  who  attended  the  launch  that  
managed to attend more than one subsequent session…”  FPD 
Local logistical problems 15 (17%) “…The  Trust was undergoing re-configuration, which made the 
sessions difficult to organise as FY2s are spread over 4 sites....” FPA 
Burdensome evaluation 8 (9%) “…Long  questionnaires  meant  trainees  were  reluctant  to  complete  
them  with  their  full  attention  particularly  at  the  end….”  FY1  Lead 
Follow-through of actions 5 (6%) “…Was difficult to follow through with actions - initially trainees were 
very enthusiastic but as they became busy with day-to-day work, 
planned actions were forgotten…”  FY2  Lead 
Competing commitments of Leads  5 (6%) “…Can  be  difficult  if  you  are  doing  a  very  busy  job  to  have  time  to 
attend  the  teaching  sessions  and  prepare  adequately  …”  FY1  Lead 
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9.4 Discussion 
This  study  aimed  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  on  Foundation  trainees’  
learning, and to examine the barriers and enablers to implementation of the programme. ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  was  well received by all participants including Foundation trainees, ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty, 
programme directors and administrators. Objective and subjective scores of patient safety 
knowledge significantly improved amongst trainees. Whilst trainees’  perceived  influence  over  
patient safety significantly improved, average scores in other attitudinal domains did not shift 
significantly. Confidence in safety skills such as identifying and analysing PSIs significantly improved, 
as did self-reported safety behaviours such as incident reporting and disclosure. Although not the 
primary aim of ‘Lessons  Learnt’, the programme also resulted in wider organisational impact through 
trainees engaging in 30 quality improvement projects spanning the development of novel protocols, 
implementation of user-informed training and rota re-design. Implementation  of  the  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  programme  was  feasible.  The most commonly reported enablers to implementation were 
trainee ownership and engagement, and local support from Foundation teams. The most frequently 
perceived challenges were recruiting trainee presenters and securing faculty to  facilitate  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  sessions. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the largest study of a patient safety course in the UK. As noted 
in the systematic review reported in Chapter 4, and in Wong’s  earlier  review,  much of the evidence 
for courses teaching patient safety comes from the USA (Wong et al. 2010).  Previous studies 
targeting trainees have employed incident analysis as an effective means of engaging trainees and 
providing a foundation for educational interventions in patient safety.  However, these studies 
involved small numbers of participants (Bechtold et al. 2008, Cox et al. 2011), were specialty-specific 
(Jericho et al. 2010), failed to evaluate learning (Smith et al. 2012) or struggled to improve safety 
competencies in trainees (Coyle et al. 2005). Moreover, factors influencing implementation of the 
interventions were inadequately addressed.  
 
As found in this study, the majority of studies of patient safety courses demonstrate high participant 
satisfaction and significant improvements in knowledge scores (Chapter 4). Patient safety attitudes 
amongst trainees in this study showed variable change (see Appendix 17), with significant 
improvement  in  one  domain  only:  ‘personal  influence  over  safety’. As found in previous studies, this 
may be due to the generally positive attitude scores prior to the intervention, leaving minimal room 
for improvement (Patey et al. 2007, Wong et al. 2010, Arora et al. 2012). However, this may also 
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reflect  the  impact  of  the  ‘hidden  curriculum’  including  the  wider  organisational  culture  
counteracting the intended influence of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  on  trainees’  attitudes  (Hafferty 1998). 
Importantly however, I found that whilst behavioural intentions did not significantly improve post-
intervention, there was a significant  improvement  in  Foundation  trainees’  self-reported safety 
behaviours, with trainees discussing, disclosing and reporting more incidents in the 6 months 
following the introduction of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme. Moreover, trainees went on to 
engage in quality improvement work within their hospitals as a result of cases discussed. 
9.4.1 Limitations of the implementation  of  ‘Lessons Learnt’ 
As described in Chapter 6, the approach to implementation of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme 
aimed to address the well-documented barriers to implementation of patient safety education (Table 
6.1). This approach comprised two key facets: stakeholder engagement and faculty development. 
However,  although  the  majority  of  sites  (81%)  successfully  held  the  target  of  five  or  more  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  sessions,  there were a number of factors that challenged implementation of the programme.  
 
With  trainees’  PSIs  forming the core learning material for the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme,  the 
successful  implementation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  was  critically  dependent  on  trainee  engagement.  It is 
therefore not surprising that difficulty in recruiting presenters was the most commonly cited 
challenge to implementation of the programme. The study of reflective entries in Chapter 5 found 
that Foundation trainees commonly reflect on PSIs encountered in practice, it therefore seems 
unlikely that lack of experiencing a PSI would be a reason for non-participation by trainees. Indeed, 
trainees  themselves  supported  increasing  the  frequency  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  to  allow  all  
trainees the opportunity to present; some even endorsed a mandatory requirement for trainees to 
present a case. Clearly, the barriers and motivators to trainee engagement in the programme 
warrant further exploration. However, the findings do suggest a number of possible reasons for the 
difficulties in recruitment:  
(i) The challenge of peer leadership: whilst  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  aimed  to  promote trainee 
ownership and indeed local teams identified trainee leadership as a key enabler to 
implementation of the programme, some Leads reported difficulty in encouraging their 
peers to present a case and to complete evaluation forms. Moreover, competing 
commitments of trainee Leads meant that it was not always possible for them to attend 
every  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session to engage their peers. 
(ii) Lack of incentive to present: this is exemplified by the fact that participation amongst FY2s 
was noted to be poorer as compared to FY1 trainees. Although trainee engagement was 
incentivised through the offer of a certificate of presentation, there was less incentive to 
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‘portfolio-build’  by FY2s once subsequent jobs for Core Training (the next tier of training) 
had been secured (typically by February/ March).  
(iii) The pervasive blame culture: some Leads found that trainees favoured presenting cases that 
involved the mistakes of others, rather than incidents involving personal error. So, despite 
the majority of trainees believing  that  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  provides a safe learning environment 
to discuss and learn from PSIs, trainees were still reluctant  to  ‘expose’  themselves to their 
peers.  
 
Effective facilitation by a more senior doctor is necessary to ensure a safe forum to engage trainees 
and to prevent  discussions  from  degenerating  into  a  ‘blame  game’.  In line with this, participants 
identified faculty support as a key strength and enabler to delivery of the programme. Conversely, 
difficulties securing faculty was considered a challenge to implementation, and an area for 
improvement by trainees. As reported in Chapter 7, faculty unavailability was most commonly due 
to competing clinical commitments.  
 
Consistent  with  the  aim  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  in  being  centrally-supported but locally-led, the support 
of Foundation Programme Directors and Administrators was also considered a key enabler to 
implementation. Whilst trainees valued the systematic approach to incident analysis, some 
expressed concern that the PSI proforma was applied too rigidly. Again, effective facilitation by 
faculty and trainee Leads is necessary to ensure that the proforma facilitates rather than hinders 
discussion. Finally, although  the  primary  aim  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  was to promote learning from PSIs, 
both trainees and local teams expressed a desire for more support in following through proposed 
actions/ recommendations for improvement. As noted in previous studies (Cox et al. 2011, Smith et 
al. 2012), this is an area that requires further development to ensure the continued engagement of 
participants in the programme. 
9.4.2 Limitations of the evaluation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’     
There were also a number of limitations to evaluation of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’ programme. The main 
limitation of this study pertained to its pre-post intervention design, which does not allow control 
for extraneous variables. In addition, evaluation of patient safety attitudes, skills and behaviours 
relied on self-report, which is prone to recall and also self-presentation biases. Moreover, the study 
lacked a comparator group. However, I was bound by the original funding from NHS North West to 
implement ‘Lessons  Learnt’  across all Foundation Programmes in the North Western Foundation 
School. This meant that there was insufficient resource to conduct a comparative analysis with, for 
example, Foundation Programmes external to the School. However, the multi-institutional nature of 
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the study, the large sample size and the significant results within a six-month period gives me 
confidence in the results and their transferability to other settings. 
 
Given the scale of the intervention, it was not possible to determine the participation rate of the 
1076 Foundation trainees across the School.  However,  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  was  included  as  a  
compulsory component of Foundation teaching across the School and so extrapolating this, the 
attendance rate was at least equivalent to that of other teaching – approximately 70%. However, 
trainees’  response rate for the patient safety knowledge, attitudes, skills and behaviours 
questionnaire at post-intervention was only 43%. As reflected in trainees’  feedback, the length of 
the questionnaire likely negatively affected the response rate and this reflects a necessary trade-off 
in aiming for as comprehensive evaluation as possible given the time and resource constraints. 
Moreover, I attribute the poor response rate to logistical problems, rather than selection bias, 
whereby a combination of competing demands on trainees towards the end of the study, which 
coincided with the end of the academic year (before rotating to their next placement) and the 
challenge of administering evaluation across a Foundation School, impacted on post-intervention 
data collection. Notably, post-intervention questionnaires were received from all but one site. This 
site had also struggled to implement the programme due to unavailability of trained faculty and 
poor trainee engagement by FY2s in particular (whose teaching was scheduled for a Friday 
afternoon). Clearly, it would be beneficial to have been able to compare results between this site 
and the remaining sites to examine for any differences.  
 
Further research is required to assess the long-term  sustainability  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  
and  the  retention  of  Foundation  trainees’  safety  knowledge,  skills  and  behaviours.  More  research  is  
also  needed  to  explore  the  relationship  between  trainees’  patient  safety  attitudes,  behavioural 
intentions and subsequent behavioural change and the impact of the organisational culture as part 
of  the  ‘hidden  curriculum’. 
9.4.3 Sustainability and spread 
Despite  the  challenges  and  limitations  to  implementation  and  evaluation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’,  the  
programme has been successfully incorporated as part of routine Foundation teaching across the 
North Western Foundation School. In October 2011, I was successfully awarded a £5000 grant from 
the Greater Manchester Health Innovation and Education Cluster (HIEC) (‘Excellence  in  Innovation  
Award’)  to  support  rollout of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  in the 2010-2011 year. I continued to manage the 
programme centrally and organised a second round of faculty development (see Chapter 7) resulting 
in over 120 faculty supporting delivery for the subsequent cohort of 1000+ Foundation trainees.  In 
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June 2012, the team were awarded a further £29,500 funding from the HIEC to support continued 
project management, a third round of faculty development, as well as the development of materials 
to  support  further  spread  (currently  in  progress).  The  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  is  now  currently 
in its third year of roll-out in the 2012-2013 academic year, with 148 trained faculty supporting 
delivery across the North Western Foundation School. Moreover, the team were also invited to 
implement  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  within Foundation Programmes across Imperial College Healthcare NHS 
Trust (on-going since January 2011) and we have also received interest from other Foundation 
Schools, as well as national interest from the UK Foundation Programme Office (discussed further in 
the main discussion of the thesis, Chapter 12).  
 
Drawing on the feedback from participants, together with the team, I have introduced a number of 
changes  to  the  delivery  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  and  made  recommendations  for  local  teams  to  improve  
implementation of the programme and enhance its sustainability. These are summarised in Table 9.5. 
 
Table 9.5 Modifications to the 'Lessons Learnt' programme based on participant feedback 
Challenge/ area for improvement Changes and recommendations made by  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  team 
Difficulty recruiting presenters/ poor 
trainee engagement 
‘Back-up’  cases  provided  for use in sessions for which trainees fail to bring a 
case.  
Notice to clinical and educational supervisors to improve awareness of the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme and  encourage  trainees’  participation. 
Recommendation: trainee Leads and faculty should ‘lead  by  example’  and  
present a PSI experienced by them as an opening case. 
Recommendation: commence ‘Lessons  Learnt’  earlier  for  the  FY2  cohort  (e.g.  
October/ November) to incentivise participation ahead of job applications. 
Lack of support in follow-through on 
proposed actions/ recommendations 
Incorporated  ‘progress’  box  into  PSI  proforma  to prompt follow-up of 
actions. 
Incorporated  ‘An  Introduction  to  Quality  Improvement’  into  trainee  Lead  and 
faculty training as part of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’ programme. 
Notice to Medical Directors across the North Western Deanery to support 
trainees’  engagement  in  QI  and  align  with  Trust  safety  and  quality  agendas. 
Recommendation: Foundation programmes should increase the time-slot of 
sessions to 1.5 hours and/or dedicate  at  least  one  or  alternate  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  sessions  to  formulating  action  plans  to  follow-through QI projects.  
Peer leadership/ competing commitments 
of trainee Leads  
Appointed a minimum of two trainee Leads per cohort per site to enable 
mutual support in the Lead role. 
Faculty unavailability  Expanded pool of faculty via two further rounds of faculty recruitment and 
training in 2012 and 2013. 
Burden of evaluation  Streamlined submission of PSI proformas and faculty appraisals via the 
Foundation School’s  online portfolio provider (HORUS). 
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9.4.4 Summary and implications for further research  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the largest multi-centre study of a patient safety course in the 
UK, demonstrating significant improvements in the patient safety knowledge, skills, and behaviours 
of Foundation trainees – and  also  positive  wider  organisational  impact.  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  is  well-
accepted by trainees, programme directors and administrators, and presents a feasible means of 
delivering core patient safety education to Foundation trainees. With the support of the central and 
local teams, I have successfully embedded systematic and clinically relevant patient safety education 
across a Foundation School, engaging a large cohort of both senior and junior doctors in patient 
safety.  
 
In summary, in this Section of the thesis, I have reported the development, implementation and 
evaluation of a novel patient safety educational programme to promote learning from PSIs amongst 
Foundation trainees across the North Western Foundation School. The approach to the 
development and implementation of the programme deliberately aimed to address the well-
documented barriers to the sustainable integration of patient safety education (Chapter 6). A 
significant cohort of senior medical faculty were successfully recruited and retained to support 
delivery of the programme (Chapter 7). Evaluation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  has  demonstrated  that  
Foundation trainees yield valuable learning from group reflection on PSIs - as assessed qualitatively 
(Chapter 8) and quantitatively (Chapter 9). Moreover, although not a primary aim of the 
programme, trainees have gone on to engage in wider safety improvement efforts.  
 
The broader implications of this Section with regards to policy impact and areas for further research 
will be reported in the main discussion of the thesis (Chapter 12). Next however, I turn my attention 
to the development and evaluation of an intervention to improve learning from routine practice - 
specifically, through improving feedback and debriefing as a core non-technical skill in Surgery. This 
is the subject of Section Four of my thesis (Chapters 10 and 11).   
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SECTION FOUR: Operation Debrief: Improving Feedback in Surgery 
 
The previous two Sections of my thesis have focussed on the development and delivery of an 
educational intervention to teach core concepts of patient safety. In this Section I turn my attention 
to the second broad category of patient safety education – that of non-technical skills (NTS) training.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Surgery is one of the riskiest aspects of healthcare (Baines et al. 2013), 
with failures in NTS such as teamwork and communication recognised as a significant contributor to 
surgical adverse events (Gawande et al. 2003, Vincent 2010b). Subsequently, there has been a 
plethora of interventions to improve patient safety and NTS in Surgery. One of the most notable 
interventions  is  the  World  Health  Organisation’s  (WHO)  Surgical Safety Checklist to improve 
teamwork  and  communication,  as  part  of  the  WHO’s  global  campaign:  ‘Safe  Surgery  Saves  Lives’  
(World Health Organisation 2008). Importantly, a surgical NTS that has received relatively little 
attention is feedback-giving and seeking (Hull et al. 2012b). As highlighted in Chapter 3, through 
helping to identify performance gaps, feedback can enhance learning from routine practice and 
therefore promote patient safety at the frontline. 
 
In this Section of the thesis, I report ‘Operation  Debrief:  Improving  Feedback  in  Surgery’:  a 
programme of research to develop and evaluate an evidence-based, user-informed educational 
intervention to improve feedback in surgical training. In Chapter 10, I report a tri-continental 
interview study of surgical teams to gain a user perspective on the current state of feedback in 
Surgery; the core components of an effective feedback, and barriers and enablers to feedback in 
practice. Then, drawing on these findings, in Chapter 11 I describe the  development  of  the  ‘SHARP  5-
Step  Feedback  Tool  for  Surgery’  and  report a pre-post intervention study to evaluate its impact in 
the real-theatre setting.  
 
In order to reflect current literature, for the purpose of this Section of my thesis, the term 
‘debriefing’  will  be  used  to  encompass  both  ‘post-experience  analysis’  (Lederman 1983) and 
feedback,  where  feedback  is  defined  as  ‘specific  information  about  the  comparison  between  a  
trainee’s  observed  performance  and  a  standard,  given  with  the  intent  to  improve  the  trainee’s  
performance’  (van de Ridder et al. 2008).  In  addition,  I  will  use  the  term  ‘feedback’  when  specifically  
referring to intra-operative feedback only, although I  am  aware  that  ‘in-simulation  debriefing’  may  
take place in the simulated setting, where the simulation is temporarily suspended to allow 
instruction and reflection during the simulation experience (Van Heukelom et al. 2010). 
149  
10 What Makes an Effective Debrief in Surgery? The User 
Perspective 
10.1 Introduction 
In line with efforts to improve patient safety in Surgery, surgical training has seen significant changes 
over recent years towards a more structured system with heightened regulation and standards 
(Tooke 2008). However, restrictions in working hours aiming in part to reduce errors due to fatigue 
and over-work (Temple 2010), and increasing  ethical  concerns  with  exposing  patients  to  trainees’  
learning curves are resulting in fewer opportunities for surgical trainees to hone their skills through 
repeated, deliberate practice in theatre (Aggarwal et al. 2006). Against this back-drop, there has 
been a commensurate increase in the use of simulation-based medical education (SBME) to allow 
trainees to develop technical and non-technical skills (NTS) within a safe, controlled environment 
(Sachdeva et al. 2008). However, whilst SBME may counter the decline in experiential learning to an 
extent, simulation technologies are not widely accessible, are expensive, and require significant 
faculty input – factors difficult to contend with in the current financial climate (Savoldelli et al. 
2005). It is therefore essential that surgical trainees and trainers maximise learning from the 
available opportunities that do exist in practice, in order to ‘make  every  moment  count’  (Temple 
2010).  
 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, by providing guided reflection (Fanning et al. 2007), debriefing is an 
essential means of optimising reflective practice and experiential learning in postgraduate medical 
education. Studies conducted in the surgical setting demonstrate that feedback and debriefing 
improve technical performance (Rogers et al. 2000), reduce technical errors (Hamad et al. 2007) and 
ensure clinically-relevant learning (Mahmood et al. 2004). However, disappointingly, despite the 
evidence for debriefing in improving performance in both real and simulated surgical settings, 
debriefing is not as prevalent as it ought to be in practice (Sender Liberman et al. 2005).  
 
Moreover, there is little empirical research regarding how to conduct a debrief or indeed what the 
key components of an educationally effective debrief are within Surgery (Fanning et al. 2007). 
Importantly, whilst the literature describes several different models and approaches to debriefing, it 
is rarely informed by the opinion of the individuals who are best placed to define what works and 
why: the actual participants of debriefing (i.e. the trainers and trainees).  
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10.1.1 Study Aims 
The aims of this study were to explore the user perspective on the current state of debriefing in 
Surgery; the core components of an effective debrief in Surgery and barriers and enablers to 
debriefing in practice. 
10.2 Methods 
10.2.1 Study design and setting 
This was a tri-continental interview study to explore the key issues surrounding surgical debriefing. I 
felt that this methodology would permit a detailed understanding and a richer exploration of 
participants’  experiences, which would not be revealed via simple surveys. The study was conducted 
across surgical departments in the UK (St  Mary’s  Hospital,  Paddington),  the USA (Louisiana State 
University Health Sciences Center) and Australia (Gippsland Medical School).  
10.2.2 Study procedure 
With the support of patient safety researchers Sonal Arora (SA) and Nick Sevdalis (NS) I developed 
an interview schedule and piloted this before distilling it into a topic guide (Appendix 18). This 
explored the views of participants on the following topics: (i) the purpose of debriefing (ii) the 
current practice of debriefing (iii) components of an effective debrief (iv) barriers to debriefing in 
practice and (v) strategies to improve the quality of debriefing.  
 
I conducted semi-structured individual interviews with a purposive sample of surgeons, 
anaesthetists and operating theatre nurses in the UK, with colleagues conducting similar interviews 
in the USA (John Paige, consultant general surgeon) and Australia (Debra Nestel, medical educator). 
All members of the surgical team, including trainers and trainees, were interviewed so as to obtain a 
comprehensive inter-professional perspective of debriefing in Surgery. Each interview took place in 
the participants’ work setting, lasted 30 to 45 minutes and was audiotaped and transcribed 
verbatim. Participation was voluntary and informed consent was obtained. Anonymity was ensured 
throughout the study. Ethical approval was obtained for the study across all the institutions 
involved.   
10.2.3 Data analysis 
All interview transcripts were cross-checked with the original recordings by each interviewer (MA, JP 
and DN) to ensure accuracy. After an initial period of familiarisation, in which I read and re-read the 
transcripts to ensure full immersion in the data, I analysed all the interviews using thematic analysis 
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(as described in Chapters 8 and 9). All interviews were also analysed by a second researcher with a 
background in patient safety and surgical education (SA) to ensure reliability of theme extraction 
through cross-checking. Once all interviews had been analysed, the emergent themes were 
reviewed by both researchers (MA and SA) to finalise key themes, with disagreements resolved 
through consensus, involving a third reviewer (NS) as necessary. 
10.3 Results 
10.3.1 Participants 
A total of 33 participants (18 surgeons, 8 anaesthetists and 7 operating theatre nurses) completed 
the study (Table 10.1). Trainers and trainees from each professional group were interviewed to 
obtain a detailed understanding from both perspectives. Interviews continued until thematic 
saturation was reached (i.e. no new content emerged from new participants). The differing numbers 
of participants in each professional group reflect the sample size required to reach saturation 
respectively.    
 
Table 10.1 Study participants 
 UK USA Australia Total 
Surgeons 
Trainers 
Trainees 
4 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
10 
4 
6 
18 
8 
10 
Anaesthetists 
Trainers 
Trainees 
4 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
8 
4 
4 
Operating theatre nurses 
Trainers 
Trainees 
4 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
7 
4 
3 
 
In the following sections, the key themes identified through analysis of the interviews are 
summarised in relation to each of the interview topics. Verbatim quotations are used to illustrate 
the key themes. 
10.3.2 The purpose of debriefing 
The most common purpose of debriefing reported by all participants is to identify what went well or 
not so well [Surgeons =15, Anaesthetists =6, Operating theatre nurses =5]: “…Just to give the trainee 
feedback on how their performance was.  Things that they did well and things that they could do 
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better.”  Senior operating theatre nurse 2 (UK). A key goal of debriefing is also to enhance future 
practice [Surgeons =13, Anaesthetists =6, Operating theatre nurses =6]  “…So it increases that 
person's awareness of their own practice and what needs to be done to improve it...”  Senior  
anaesthetist 2 (UK).  A  third  of  all  respondents  specifically  reported  ‘providing  positive  
reinforcement’  as  a  goal  of  debriefing  [Surgeons =8, Anaesthetists =2, Operating theatre nurses =1]. 
This function, however, was reported most commonly amongst trainers (n=8, 50% of all trainers) as 
opposed to trainees (n=3, 18% of all trainees).  
10.3.3 The current practice of debriefing 
Participants were asked whether they routinely provide (i.e., trainers) or receive (trainees) 
debriefing in theatre:  13  responded  ‘yes’ (Trainers =9, Trainees =4),  7  responded  ‘no’  (Trainers =1, 
Trainees =6) and the remainder reported that the picture was variable. Of note, trainers had a more 
favourable view regarding the current practice of debriefing as compared to trainees. This disparity 
of views is discussed further in the discussion and is important, particularly as the lack of feedback 
can be distressing to trainees: “...the  consultant  just  will  not  say  very  much  and  you  don’t  get  any 
feedback  and  you’re  unsure  as  to  whether  they’re  just  short  on  time,  can’t  be  bothered  - you’re  
unsure then where you  go  from  there...”  Trainee  surgeon 1 (UK).  
 
Moreover, both trainees and trainers reported that debriefing is more often conducted when things 
go  ‘wrong’.  For  example:  “...the debriefing is usually something that I did wrong and I need to 
improve,  like  something  minor,  I  did  it  the  wrong  way...”  Junior  operating theatre nurse 1 (USA) and 
“...we  tend  to  focus on  negative  things...”  Senior  surgeon 3 (Australia). Worryingly, the manner and 
environment  in  which  this  ‘negative  feedback’  is  provided  is  also  noted to be sub-optimal, 
particularly amongst surgical staff:“...Some  surgery  staff  don’t  even  take  the  slightest  effort  to  avoid  
hurting their  trainee’s  feelings...it’s  embarrassing  to  be  corrected  in  front  of  other  people...”  Senior  
anaesthetist 1 (USA). Interestingly, all anaesthetists (both trainers and trainees) reported that they 
do routine engage in debriefing, perhaps reflecting a sound debriefing culture within the anaesthetic 
specialty. 
10.3.4 The components of an effective debrief 
Five main themes emerged from the interviews regarding the components of an effective debrief. 
These were the approach and timing of debriefing, establishing the learning environment, describing 
the experience, analysing performance and applying lessons learnt to clinical practice (Table 10.2).  
Each of these themes is discussed in detail below. 
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Approach and timing  
The immediacy of debriefing was considered important by the majority of respondents. Most 
participants felt that debriefing at the end of the case or at the end of the day was appropriate: “…I 
prefer it after the case, like five minutes just going over, hey, I like what you did here,  I  didn’t  like  
what  you  did  here...”  Junior operating theatre nurse 1 (USA). A smaller number, however, reported 
that  feedback  is  best  delivered  during  the  case,  the  majority  of  whom  were  trainers:    “...I think to 
wait until the end of the case is a mistake. Because feedback is always best given immediately, so if 
there’s  a  particular  salient  point  of  the  case  that  needs  to  be  discussed,  it  should  be  discussed  as  soon  
as  it  happens  in  the  case…There’s  no  sense  waiting  three  hours  in  a  longer  case  until  the end to do 
it…”  Senior surgeon 1 (USA). Two participants (both surgical trainers) identified that feedback can be 
given  both  during  and  after  a  case  in  order  to  reinforce  learning:  “...I tend to feed back during the 
actual case.  In addition, I will spend a few moments at the end of the case going back over things 
that the resident could have done better or not, or things they did well just  to  reinforce  that...”  Senior  
surgeon 2 (USA). 
 
Debriefing in a non-judgmental yet honest and open manner was also commonly reported as a key 
feature of effective debriefing, particularly amongst trainers (11 trainers vs. 4 trainees): “...I  think  
you need to be honest. You also need to make it very clear that this is my impression. It might not be 
that  person’s  impression of it because we all have a different way of interpreting  things...”  Senior  
surgeon 1 (Australia). Providing specific, objective feedback was also commonly reported, 
particularly amongst surgeons: “...especially  with  negative  feedback,  if  you’re  trying  to get this 
person to improve, being really specific and giving it in very plain language is probably very 
important...”  Senior  surgeon 1 (Australia). 
Establishing the learning environment 
Less than half of all respondents - the majority of whom were trainers - identified a need to conduct 
the debrief in a private setting, preferably away from the theatre. Trainers identified the importance 
of engaging the learner, encouraging the trainee to lead their own feedback: “...Listening  to  them,  
asking the non direct  questions  so  that  they  can  lead...”  Senior  anaesthetist 1 (UK). Some trainers 
also highlighted the value of two-way debriefing, enabling trainers to learn from trainees: “...they  
can educate you on things, and that again gives them that encouragement to be even better, 
because  they  feel  that  they’ve  contributed  to  your  education...”  Senior  surgeon  4  (Australia).  Only a 
few participants also identified setting learning objectives at the outset of a case as a key 
component of effective debriefing: “...We  talked about it beforehand - we actually discussed which 
aspects we wanted to focus on before  the  case  started...”  Senior  surgeon 1 (USA). 
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Describing the experience 
Over half of all participants identified a need to describe the event as a crucial component of 
debriefing: “...Talking  through  the  procedure  and  talking  about  things  that  can  arise  or  did  arise  and  
how  they  dealt  with  it...”  Senior  operating theatre nurse 1 (UK) Only a few respondents explicitly 
used  the  term  ‘reflection’:“...I  think  getting  the person to reflect first, it would be useful to actually 
get  them  to  prompt  feedback  and  allow  for  criticism  or  improvement  to  be  discussed...”  Trainee  
anaesthetist 1 (UK). Exploring  trainees’  reactions  to  the  case  and  managing  those  who  were  unhappy  
was reported by a few trainers to be an important part of the debriefing process: “...if  I  think  they’ve  
done a terrible job at something, then rather than being too blunt about it and saying that was 
absolutely  hopeless,  I’ll  say  how  did  you  feel about the case...”  Senior  surgeon 3 (Australia). 
Analysing performance 
Almost all respondents reported identifying both positive and negative aspects of performance as 
key to an effective debrief: “...I would want to review the case right then and there, what I did right, 
what I did wrong...”Junior operating theatre nurse 1 (USA). Feedback on both technical/procedural 
skills and non-technical skills (NTS e.g. communication and teamwork) were identified as equally 
important by both trainees and trainers: “...feedback  is an essential component of the whole learning 
process both in terms of their technical skills and their  non  technical  skills...”  Senior  surgeon 1 (UK). 
Moreover, the majority of respondents emphasised that debriefing should not only entail a 
discussion of what went well or not so well but clearly highlight which aspects of performance need 
to be improved upon: “...giving  them  a  kind  of  prescription  of  how  or  what  points  they  have  to  work  
on, what points they  have  to  improve...”  Senior  surgeon 2 (UK). 
Application of learning and follow-up  
Understanding how to apply lessons learnt to clinical practice, with formulation of a specific action 
plan, was commonly reported as key to an effective debrief “...obviously  having  an  area,  a  plan  of  
what  we’re  going  to  do next  and  if  there’s  areas  to  go  off  and  read  about  or  other  such...”  Senior  
anaesthetist 1 (UK). Trainers and anaesthetists in particular reported continual, cyclical feedback as 
essential to effective debriefing: “...So  a  debrief,  I  think,  is  a  continuous process...you do another 
case, you debrief again, and with every debrief you should see improvements...”  Senior  surgeon 1 
(UK).  
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Table 10.2 Components of an effective debrief: Key themes identified by participants 
Component of effective 
debrief 
Surgeons 
(n=18) 
Anaesthetists 
(n=8) 
Nurses  
(n=7) 
Trainers 
(n=16) 
Trainees 
(n=17) 
Approach and timing of 
feedback  
 
Appropriate timing  
- End of case / day 
 
- During the case 
 
Open and honest 
 
Specific/ objective 
 
 
 
 
12 (67%) 
 
5 (28%) 
 
8 (44%) 
 
11 (61%) 
 
 
 
 
5 (63%) 
 
2 (25%) 
 
3 (38%) 
 
2 (25%) 
 
 
 
 
6 (86%) 
 
0 
 
4 (57%) 
 
2 (29%) 
 
 
 
 
 
9 (56%) 
 
6 (38%) 
 
11 (69%) 
 
8 (50%) 
 
 
 
 
14 (82%) 
 
1 (6%) 
 
4 (24%) 
 
7 (41%) 
Establishing the learning 
environment 
 
Private setting/ away from 
theatre 
 
Set learning objectives 
 
Engage the learner  
 
 
 
9 (50%) 
 
 
5 (28%) 
 
10 (56%) 
 
 
 
3 (38%) 
 
 
4 (50%) 
 
3 (38%) 
 
 
 
2 (29%) 
 
 
0 
 
1 (14%) 
 
 
 
9 (56%) 
 
 
5 (31%) 
 
7 (44%) 
 
 
 
5 (29%) 
 
 
4 (24%) 
 
7 (41%) 
 
Describing the experience 
 
Event description 
 
Explore reaction 
 
 
9 (50%) 
 
3 (17%) 
 
 
5 (63%) 
 
2 (25%) 
 
 
3 (43%) 
 
1 (14%) 
 
 
10 (63%) 
 
6 (38%) 
 
 
 
7 (41%) 
 
0 
Analysing performance 
 
Identify positive and negative 
aspects 
 
Feedback on technical skills 
 
Feedback on non-technical 
skills (NTS) 
 
Identify areas for 
improvement 
 
 
 
17 (94%) 
 
 
13 (72%) 
 
12 (67%) 
 
 
17 (94%) 
 
 
 
7 (88%) 
 
 
8 (100%) 
 
7 (88%) 
 
 
7 (88%) 
 
 
 
7 (100%) 
 
 
6 (86%) 
 
5 (71%) 
 
 
7 (100%) 
 
 
 
15 (94%) 
 
 
12 (75%) 
 
10 (63%) 
 
 
14 (88%) 
 
 
 
16 (94%) 
 
 
15 (88%) 
 
14 (82%) 
 
 
17 (100%) 
 
Application of learning and 
follow-up 
 
Identify strategy/plan for 
improvement 
 
Cyclical feedback to 
determine progress 
 
 
 
 
13 (72%) 
 
 
6 (33%) 
 
 
 
5 (63%) 
 
 
7 (88%) 
 
 
 
2 (29%) 
 
 
3 (43%) 
 
 
 
9 (56%) 
 
 
10 (63%) 
 
 
 
11 (65%) 
 
 
6 (35%) 
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10.3.5 Barriers to effective debriefing 
Participants identified a number of barriers to effective debriefing (Table 10.3). The commonest 
barrier reported was time constraints: “...Yeah,  there’s  just  no  time  to,  the  way  you’d  like  to  do  it...” 
Senior anaesthetist 2 (USA). However, it was recognised that lack of time was simply an excuse and 
that giving and receiving feedback was a joint responsibility: “…There’s  always  time,  and  what  I  think  
is it’s  something  that  has  to  be  seen  from  both  sides,  it  is  the  responsibility  of  the  trainer,  but  also  the  
responsibility of the trainee  to  get  feedback…”  Senior  surgeon 2 (UK). Poor trainee-trainer rapport 
was the next most commonly cited barrier to effective debriefing, recognising the importance of a 
trusting relationship to promote open communication: “…Well  approachability,  yeah,  being  able  to  
ask questions even though maybe the question may be considered dumb in some standards.  But 
knowing that you can talk to that attending (=consultant) would be the most important thing for 
me...” Trainee surgeon 1 (USA).  In  particular,  it  was  noted  that  high  emotions  on  the  trainer’s  part  
could lead to ineffective debriefing: “...Possibly  on  the  times  that  I’ve  got  cross  with  somebody,  so  it’s  
not necessarily...So  it  hasn’t  been  that  effective...”  Senior operating theatre nurse 1 (UK).  
 
In addition to time constraints, specifically, competing clinical commitments were commonly 
reported as a barrier, particularly amongst trainees: “...Because  you’ve  got  so  many  other  things  to  
do at the end of a case, such as write the op notes, do the histology form, maybe consent the next 
patient...”  Trainee surgeon 2 (UK). None of the anaesthetists highlighted this as a barrier, in part 
reflecting the nature of their work, affording a more conducive environment for debriefing: “…It’s  
easy for us to develop a system, especially because we don’t  go  off  and  do clinics etc. we are with 
them  (trainers)  for  a  set  period…”  Trainee  anaesthetist 2 (UK). 
 
Lack  of  insight  on  the  trainee’s  part  was  reported  exclusively  by  trainers  as  a  barrier  to  effective  
debriefing: “...I  call  it  Churchill  syndrome...I’m  always  ready to  learn  but  I’ve  never  much  liked  being  
taught. Some people take any information or feedback as a sign of, akin to dominance, which they 
resist...”  Senior  anaesthetist 2 (USA). Finally, although a significant number of respondents positively 
identified a need for a private setting as essential for effective debriefing, only a minority reported 
lack of a suitable environment as a barrier: “...because  so  much  is  going  on  and  finding  somewhere  
to  take  somebody  if  things  aren’t  going  well,  you  don’t  want  to  be talking in the middle of the 
theatre...”  Senior operating theatre nurse 1 (UK). 
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Table 10.3 Barriers to effective debriefing: Key themes identified by participants 
Barrier to debriefing Surgeons 
(n=18) 
Anaesthetists 
(n=8) 
Nurses  
(n=7) 
Trainers 
(n=16) 
Trainees 
(n=17) 
Time constraints 
 
7 (39%) 5 (63%) 5 (71%) 10 (63%) 7 (41%) 
Poor trainee-trainer rapport  
 
5 (28%) 5 (63%) 5 (71%) 9 (56%) 6 (35%) 
Competing clinical 
commitments 
 
8 (44%) 0  3 (43%) 4 (25%) 7 (41%) 
Lack of insight/ unreceptive 
trainee 
 
2 (11%) 4 (50%) 1 (14%) 7 (44%) 0 
Lack of suitable environment 
 
0 3 (38%) 2 (29%) 4 (25%) 1 (6%) 
 
10.3.6 Strategies to improve the quality of debriefing 
In line with time constraints and poor trainee-trainer rapport being the most commonly cited 
barriers to debriefing in practice, the most popular strategy to improve debriefing was to embed a 
‘culture  of  debriefing’,  whereby  trainees  and  trainers  work  together  to  create  time  to  debrief  
[Surgeons = 10, Anaesthetists = 2, Operating theatre nurses = 6]. Whilst both surgeons and theatre 
nurses identified a need to develop such a culture, the anaesthetists referred to the already-present 
positive culture of debriefing within their specialty: “…I  don’t  know  of  any  other  specialty  where  you  
get  such  a  long  time  of  mentorship  or  feedback…I  think  possibly  we  have  a  culture  that  says that you 
can  actually  say  negative  as  well  as  positive  things…just  to  keep  openness  and  allow  for meaningful 
feedback…”  Trainee  anaesthetist 2 (UK). Some participants went so far as to support changes in 
educational policy: “…And  maybe  the  only  way  to  get there is to have some sort of higher authority 
that is forcing  you  to  do  it…”  Senior  surgeon 2 (UK). Closely related to this was a recognition of the 
need for protected time to conduct debriefing [Surgeons = 5, Anaesthetists = 6, Operating theatre 
nurses = 3]: “…Because  people  go  off  in  different  directions,  you  need  a  ring-fence, a certain amount 
of time when you can do a debrief. It's not ring-fenced, it's not considered  to  be  a  priority...”  Senior  
surgeon 1 (UK).  
 
Formalising the structure of debriefing was also commonly reported as a solution to improving its 
effectiveness [Surgeons = 10, Anaesthetists = 4, Operating theatre nurses = 1]. Whilst some 
supported the creation of a proforma: “...I  think  if  that  was  actually  written  down  a  little  bit  more  
formally and categorised such as a proforma I think that would  probably  help...”  Senior  anaesthetist 
2 (UK), a few others warned against reducing what was viewed as a complex process of debriefing 
into a simple set of rules: “…if you actually probably tried to write an algorithm for how to 
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communicate with a resident (=trainee) perfectly it would be 10,000 steps...I  think  it’s  useful  to  
analyse  the  issues  but  I  doubt  you  could  make  a  simple  formula…”  Senior  surgeon 2, (USA). A 
minority of respondents suggested written feedback as a means of improving the quality of 
debriefing [Surgeons = 1, Anaesthetists = 4, Operating theatre nurses = 0]. However, there were 
concerns that this would risk increasing the workload of trainees and trainers unless it was fully 
integrated into existing structures/ mechanisms of assessment and feedback. 
10.4 Discussion 
Promoting regular effective debriefing is important to maximise learning from every clinical and 
simulated encounter (Fanning et al. 2007, Ivers et al. 2012). I aimed to gain an insight into the 
current state of debriefing in Surgery alongside a comprehensive, user-driven perspective to identify 
core components of an effective debrief, and the barriers and enablers to effective debriefing in 
practice.  
 
With regards to current practice, whilst the majority of participants appreciate the value of 
debriefing in reviewing performance in order to improve future practice, there are mixed views 
regarding the state of debriefing in Surgery. In particular, trainers report a more favourable view of 
current practice as compared to trainees, consistent with previous research in junior and senior 
surgeons (Sender Liberman et al. 2005). This disparity of views may indicate that (i) debriefing does 
not take place routinely and trainers lack insight into the problem and/or (ii) debriefing does occur 
but  trainees  do  not  recognise  it  in  the  form  that  it  is  given  (i.e.,  it  is  ‘lost  in  translation’).  Moreover,  
whilst the majority of participants note that a key purpose of debriefing is to discuss want went well 
and  not  so  well,  both  trainers  and  trainees  report  that  feedback  is  most  often  given  ‘when  things  go  
wrong’,  indicating  a  less  constructive,  punitive  approach to debriefing in practice. Notably, all 
anaesthetists reported that they do routinely give/receive debriefing, offering support to views of 
the anaesthetic specialty as a more safety-conscious discipline (Gaba 2000). 
10.4.1 Best practice in debriefing: Comparison with existing evidence  
Trainees and trainers successfully identified several key features of an effective debrief, which are in 
line with existing evidence and adult learning theory. An open and honest approach to debriefing 
(Lederman 1992, Salas et al. 2008, Dieckmann et al. 2009) in a manner which is highly specific and 
based on observable behaviours has been previously reported as essential to an effective debrief 
(Salas et al. 2008, van de Ridder et al. 2008). In common with my findings, several authors have 
described the importance of the learning environment in debriefing, emphasising the need for a 
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separate, private room (Fanning et al. 2007, Salas et al. 2008, McGaghie et al. 2010). Learner 
engagement has also been emphasised within the literature (Fanning et al. 2007, Dieckmann et al. 
2009, Dreifuerst 2009, McGaghie et al. 2010), encouraging trainers to  engage  in  ‘active  listening’  and  
to  ‘ask  the  right  questions  rather  than  provide  the  right  answers’  so  as  to  facilitate  a  two-way 
process between trainer and trainee (Molloy 2009).  
 
Reflecting on the experience is core to debriefing (Fanning et al. 2007, Rudolph et al. 2008). Most 
participants referred to such a reflective/descriptive component but the explicit use of the term 
‘reflection’  was  seldom  used,  perhaps  highlighting  lack  of  awareness  of  educational  terminology  
rather than an absence of its practice. Following on from this, the findings also fit with the literature 
describing  various  phases  of  an  effective  debrief:    an  ‘analysis’  phase (Fanning et al. 2007, Rudolph 
et al. 2008),  a  ‘diagnosis’  phase to establish areas for improvement (Lederman 1983, Steinwachs 
1992), and finally an ‘application’ phase, where learners discuss how they will apply the learning to 
future practice (Steinwachs 1992, Fanning et al. 2007, Dreifuerst 2009). 
 
There are additional components of effective debriefing described in the literature that were less 
salient in this study. Less than a third of participants identified a need to set specific learning 
objectives for the debriefing, despite existing evidence emphasising the importance of tailoring the 
debriefing to well-defined objectives (Pearson et al. 1986, Fanning et al. 2007, Rudolph et al. 2007).  
Moreover, few respondents (all of whom were trainers) identified exploring learner reactions as a 
core component of effective debriefing. Consistent with models of reflective learning (Boud et al. 
1985), establishing the emotional impact of the event is an integral  part  of  the  ‘descriptive’  phase  of  
debriefing (Rudolph et al. 2008).  Only  after  trainees  have  ‘let  off  steam’  can  they  attempt  to  
understand what the event(s) meant for them, allowing them to move on to the analysis phase 
(Pearson et al. 1986, Dreifuerst 2009). Again, this finding may partly reflect the current culture, 
wherein clinicians find it inappropriate to discuss their feelings, particularly regarding stressful 
situations (Arora et al. 2009). 
 
This study also uncovered notable differences in the views of effective debriefing between trainers 
and trainees and across disciplines. Whilst the majority of trainees in this study defined effective 
debriefing  as  occurring  at  the  end  of  a  case  ‘to  reinforce  learning’,  consistent with evidence 
(Lederman 1983), a significant proportion of trainers felt that the most effective feedback was that 
given during a case, to  ensure  ‘salient’  points  are  not  missed.  Amongst theatre nursing staff, 
although  all  nurses  recognised  ‘identifying  areas  for  improvement’  as  a  key  feature  of  debriefing,  
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rather  few  of  them  reported  ‘identifying  strategies  for  improvement’.  These  findings  may  hint  
towards  a  more  ‘service-focused’  versus  ‘learner-centred’  approach  to  debriefing  practice  amongst  
theatre nursing personnel. 
 
Regarding barriers and enablers to effective debriefing in practice, the most commonly cited barriers 
were time constraints, poor trainee-trainer rapport and competing clinical commitments. However, 
participants also recognised that lack of time may simply be an excuse and that trainees and trainers 
should ensure joint responsibility for debriefing. To this end, participants identified a need to 
improve the culture of debriefing in Surgery, whereby protected time is created for debriefing. 
Moreover, many participants felt that formalising the structure of debriefing was key to improving 
the quality of debriefing in practice.  
10.4.2 Limitations of this study 
With regards to limitations, this study was conducted on a sample of 33 operating theatre team 
members.  Consequently, its generalisability to a wider population could be questioned. However, 
participants were interviewed in depth to ensure robustness of emerging explanations, and data 
were collected from participants across three different continents to gauge a broad range of views. 
The interviews however required participants to make immediate suggestions regarding the core 
components of an effective debrief, and the barriers and enablers to debriefing, rather than inviting 
a considered response after reflection. Nevertheless, the fact that thematic saturation was achieved 
in the areas of interest, and that these emergent themes mapped well to the existing literature gives 
me confidence that the key points were captured.  
10.4.3 Summary and implications for further research 
In  summary,  this  study  shows  that  participants’  views  regarding  the  components  of  an  effective  
debrief map well to the existing evidence base. However, certain features of an effective debrief are 
less well appreciated by the surgical community, such as the importance of setting learning 
objectives and of the need to explore trainees’  reactions  to  the experience/event. Moreover, with 
an evident mismatch between the current practice of debriefing and the perceived ideal, the surgical 
community appreciate the need to foster a culture of debriefing in practice. To this end, participants 
would welcome an intervention to facilitate structured debriefing in the workplace. However, before 
proceeding to develop such an intervention, it is necessary to  examine  to  what  extent  participants’  
views regarding the state of debriefing correlate with observed debriefing in practice. 
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I have explored this in a parallel two-part qualitative study comprising an interview phase and an 
observational phase to explore the debriefing practice of surgeons in the real-theatre setting 
(Ahmed et al. 2013). This study confirms a disparity between what surgeons view as effective 
debriefing and actual debriefing in practice. For example, whilst 65% of participants (n=13/20) stated 
that debriefing is routinely provided/ received in practice, debriefing was observed to take place in 
only 46% of cases (n=16/35). Notably, it appears that time itself may not be the main barrier to 
debriefing in practice, but rather the culture within Surgery, wherein trainers and trainees fail to 
create opportunities to debrief. Time does appear to be available towards the end of a case, when 
the trainee is typically closing up and this could be the target for an educational intervention to 
improve debriefing in Surgery. (A summary table of the  comparison  between  participants’  
perceptions and observed debriefing practice is reported in Appendix 19). 
 
Drawing on findings from these two studies, in the following Chapter, I report a pre-post 
intervention study to develop and evaluate an evidence-based, user-informed educational 
intervention to improve debriefing amongst surgeons in the real-theatre setting.   
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11 Development  and  Evaluation  of  a  ‘SHARP’  Intervention  to  
Improve Debriefing in Surgery 
11.1 Introduction 
The study in Chapter 10 and my previously published study (Ahmed et al. 2013) reveal that whilst 
surgical trainers and trainees agree that debriefing is important to optimise learning and improve 
clinical performance, debriefing in practice is far from ideal. Trainees in particular would value a 
structured debrief at the end of the case to reinforce learning and next steps, however the 
opportunity to engage in debriefing is rarely taken up towards the end of the case, when time is 
available.  
 
Whilst research activity to improve debriefing in the simulated setting is growing (Salas et al. 2008, 
Kolbe et al. 2013), there is a comparable lack of such activity to improve debriefing in the real 
theatre setting. Previous studies have evaluated video-debriefing (Hamad et al. 2007) and computer-
assisted learning to provide individualised external feedback on technical skills (Rogers et al. 2000). 
However, the use of such modalities may not be practical in daily surgical practice. More recently, 
one case-study described the  ‘Briefing,  Intraoperative Teaching,  Debriefing  (BID)’  model  for  teaching  
in the theatre, however its evaluation was limited to anecdotal observations (Roberts et al. 2009). 
 
Workplace-based  assessments  such  as  those  advocated  by  the  UK’s  Intercollegiate  Surgical 
Curriculum Project (ISCP) are now embedded as part of surgical training (Norcini et al. 2007, McKee 
2008). However, whilst these are intended for formative learning, their use often degenerates into a 
‘tick-box  exercise’  and  they  are  viewed  as  an  administrative  burden  by  trainees  and  trainers  alike 
(Pereira et al. 2009, Pereira et al. 2013). What is required is a practical educational intervention that 
allows every surgical case to be an active learning encounter and which encourages feedback as a 
core non-technical skill (NTS) in Surgery (Yule et al. 2006).  
11.1.1 Study aims 
Drawing on research reported in Chapter 10 and my previously published study (Ahmed et al. 2013), 
the aim of this study was to develop an evidence-based, user-informed educational intervention to 
improve debriefing in Surgery (‘SHARP:  5-Step Feedback Tool  for  Surgery’)  and evaluate its impact 
on debriefing in the real-theatre setting.  
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11.2 Development  of  the  ‘SHARP:  5-Step  Feedback  Tool  for  Surgery’ 
In aiming to develop an evidence-based, user-informed intervention to facilitate a structured 
approach to debriefing in the real-theatre setting, I needed to ensure that the intervention was both 
content valid and practical. Drawing on my previous findings, I worked with colleagues with a 
background in surgical education (Sonal Arora, SA) and patient safety (Nick Sevdalis, NS) to develop 
the  ‘SHARP:  5-Step Feedback Tool for Surgery’  (henceforth  abridged  to  the  ‘SHARP’  tool). The 
‘SHARP’ tool is displayed in Figure 11.1 and the rationale for its content and design is discussed in 
detail below.  
 
Figure 11.1 The SHARP 5-Step Feedback Tool for Surgery 
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11.2.1 Content  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool 
The  content  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  was  informed  by  (i)  best  debriefing  practice  (according  to  users’  
views and the evidence discussed in Chapter 10) and (ii) the observed gaps between actual practice 
of debriefing in Surgery and best practice (identified in my previously published study (Ahmed et al. 
2013)). Working with SA and NS, we reached consensus regarding core content for inclusion to help 
guide trainers and trainees to engage in a structured debrief. To maximise practicality, we limited 
the  content  of  the  tool  to  five  key  prompts,  arranged  under  the  memorable  acronym  ‘SHARP’.  The  
rationale for each prompt is discussed in turn below: 
(i) ‘Set  learning  objectives’ ensures that debriefing is tailored to well-defined objectives set at 
the start of each case. This is in line with existing evidence (Fanning et al. 2007, Rudolph et 
al. 2007), but as noted in the previous chapters, is not widely appreciated by the surgical 
community as being key to an effective debrief (Chapter 10) and is often neglected in 
practice (Ahmed et al. 2013).  
(ii) ‘How  did  it  go?’ encourages trainee engagement and reflection on performance – both core 
features of an effective debrief, well-documented in the literature (Dismukes et al. 2006, 
Fanning et al. 2007, Dieckmann et al. 2009).  The  associated  prompt  ‘What  went  well’  
encourages trainee and trainer to first reflect on the positive aspects of performance prior 
to moving on to the negative aspects, and helps to facilitate balanced feedback, which is 
often lacking in practice, as found via interview (Chapter 10) and observation of surgeons 
(Ahmed et al. 2013). 
(iii) ‘Address  concerns’ intends to prompt trainers to enquire into the  trainee’s  reactions  to  the  
experience, another core element of debriefing (Rudolph et al. 2008), which is again not 
widely appreciated by the surgical community (Chapter 10) and is often neglected in practice 
(Ahmed et al. 2013).  
(iv) ‘Review  learning  points’ and its associated prompts ensure that debriefing is tailored to the 
learning objectives set at the outset of each case and that both technical and non-technical 
aspects of performance are considered (Dreifuerst 2009). As noted in my observations in 
theatre (Ahmed et al. 2013), feedback (when provided) invariably only relates to technical 
skills.  We  used  ‘teamwork  skills’  synonymously  with  ‘non-technical  skills’  as  we  appreciated  
that the latter term may not be widely used or understood amongst surgeons in practice.  
(v) ‘Plan  ahead’ and its associated prompt encourages trainer and trainee to consider how to 
translate learning to improved future practice, a core feature of effective debriefing, which 
helps  to  close  the  feedback  ‘loop’  (Rudolph et al. 2008). 
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11.2.2 Design of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool 
Although  the  aim  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  was  to  promote  debriefing  in  its  true  sense  as  a  ‘post-
experience  analysis’  (Lederman 1983) encompassing feedback, we chose to name the intervention a 
‘feedback’  tool  as  we  considered  that  this  term  would  be  more  accessible  to  surgeons  in  practice  
rather  than  the  term  ‘debrief’,  which  is  typically  used  to  refer  to  longer  post-event analyses 
occurring in the simulated setting. The first prompt  ‘Set  learning  objectives’  was  to  be  addressed  
before the case commences, with the remaining four prompts to be discussed after the case.  
 
With the assistance of Ana Wheelock (researcher with design expertise), we designed the ‘SHARP’  
tool as a 5 x 3 inch card to fit  into  a  surgeon’s  scrub  pocket, thereby encouraging its use in a busy 
surgical setting. I deliberately avoided including any tick-boxes to encourage free exchange of verbal 
feedback, as endorsed by operating theatre team members interviewed in Chapter 10 and to avoid 
any negative connotations associated with written workplace-based assessment tools (Pereira et al. 
2013). 
11.3 Evaluation  of  the  ‘SHARP:  5-Step  Feedback  Tool  for  Surgery’ 
11.3.1 Study design and setting  
I employed a prospective pre and post intervention study comprising real-time observations in the 
operating  theatre  to  evaluate  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  in  practice.  I felt that this approach would permit a 
detailed  exploration  of  the  impact  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  on  debriefing.  Given  the  intervention  was  
novel, it was not possible to conduct a power analysis to determine how many surgical cases would 
need to be observed to determine a statistically significant difference. In order to gain a 
comprehensive  view  of  the  impact  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool, based on our collective experience (SA and 
NS), we chose a sample size of 100 surgical cases (50 cases pre-intervention and 50 cases post-
intervention) across a range of surgical specialties including General Surgery, Breast Surgery, 
Vascular Surgery, Orthopaedics, and Urology. The study setting was the surgical department at a 
large university teaching hospital. 
 
The criteria for inclusion in the study were surgical cases involving a trainer and a trainee during 
which the trainee served as primary operator for at least part of the case (to ensure there was 
opportunity for debriefing to occur).  Other inclusion criteria pertained to cases performed under 
general anaesthetic and in an elective setting so as to minimise bias from an awake patient or an 
emergency scenario precluding debriefing.  
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In line with best practice in observational research,  I  aimed  for  the  study  to  be  ‘naturalistic’,  that  is  
to ensure I conducted the study with as little interference as possible (Pope et al. 2006). I introduced 
myself to the lead surgeon and trainee surgeon(s) before each case and explained that I was 
conducting a study of feedback in surgery and that this required observation and note-taking in 
theatre. I assured them that participation was voluntary and that anonymity would be maintained 
throughout the study.  
11.3.2 Study procedure 
Pre-intervention phase 
Over a 3-month period, I observed 50 cases in real-time for feedback or debriefing provided to the 
trainee by the trainer either during or after the case (including up to the end of the completion of 
the list that day). I used both observations and quantitative methodologies to assess the quality of 
debriefing  (see  ‘Outcome  measures’).  To ensure clarity of observation, I noted any targeted 
comment  made  by  the  trainer  in  response  to  a  specific  aspect  of  the  trainee’s  performance  (e.g.  
when  dissecting  around  Calot’s  triangle,  the  consultant  comments  ‘this is a nice view of the 
structures, makes you confident you know  what  you’ll  clip’). I documented verbatim quotes with a 
description of the context in which they were said and jotted my own reflections on events 
observed. These notes served to inform my quantitative assessment of debriefing quality (see 
‘Outcome  measures’).  Twenty percent of the cases were observed by a second calibrated researcher 
with a background in behavioural science (Stephanie Russ, SR) to test inter-rater reliability. 
Post-intervention phase 
When considering how best to deliver the ‘SHARP’ tool, it was logistically challenging to convene all 
surgical trainers and trainees in the department together to introduce the ‘SHARP’ tool. Moreover, 
in the first instance we wanted to maximise implementation of the ‘SHARP’ tool to evaluate its 
effectiveness. Following consultation with SA and NS we therefore chose to use a structured 
approach to deliver the intervention in real-time to surgeons.  
 
In order to ensure joint responsibility for debriefing, I provided a short introduction to the  ‘SHARP’  
tool to both trainers and trainees (5 minutes) at the beginning of each observed list. I highlighted the 
findings of the pre-intervention phase together with findings from the study in Chapter 10, which 
showed that feedback is generally provided only during the case and is often rushed and 
unstructured. Surgical trainees would value a structured feedback (debrief) at the end of every case 
to  reinforce  learning  and  next  steps.  I  described  each  of  the  five  ‘prompts’  of  the  ‘SHARP’ tool in turn 
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and explained the rationale for each item. Finally, I provided a copy of the ‘SHARP’  tool to both 
trainer and trainee. Trainers were asked to ‘Please  work  through  these  steps  in  order  to  provide  
feedback  to  your  trainee’;  trainees  were  asked  to  ‘Please  prompt your trainer to request feedback 
along  the  steps  outlined’  – at the end of every case. Both were advised to complete the four post-
case prompts upon case completion or at the latest by the end of the list, to ensure immediacy of 
debriefing, in line with best practice.  
 
Following  introduction  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  at  the  beginning  of  each  observed  list,  I  observed  a  
further 50 cases over a 3-month period using the same protocol as in the pre-intervention phase, 
with another 20% of cases observed by a second researcher (SR). The same researchers were used 
as in the pre-intervention phase of the study to minimise observer bias in scoring across the study 
phases. Once the ‘SHARP’ tool had been administered, we did not prompt participants to use it.  
11.3.3 Outcome measures  
The quantitative outcome measures evaluated were the quality of debriefing assessed using the 
OSAD  tool;  trainees’  assessment  of  debriefing, and  user  satisfaction  with  the  ‘SHARP’  tool.  These  are  
discussed in turn below: 
(i) Quality of debriefing  
I used my observations to inform the quantitative assessment of debriefing using the validated 
Objective Structured Assessment of Debriefing (OSAD) tool (Appendix 20) (Arora et al. 2012b). The 
OSAD tool was developed by our research group through a critical literature review, a user needs 
analysis and an expert panel consensus and has demonstrated feasibility and reliability in assessing 
debriefing in the simulated surgical setting. The tool comprises eight categories relating to the core 
components of an effective debrief: Approach, Environment, Engagement, Reaction, Reflection, 
Analysis, Diagnosis, and Application.  Each category is rated on a scale of 1 (minimum) to 5 
(maximum) regarding how well that element of the debriefing is conducted by the trainer. 
Descriptive anchors at the lowest (1), mid-point (3) and highest (5) point of the scale are used to 
guide ratings. The total score for OSAD therefore ranges from a minimum of 8 to a maximum of 40, 
with higher scores indicating higher quality debriefing.  
(ii) Trainees’  assessment  of  debriefing  quality   
I developed a short  questionnaire  to  elicit  trainees’  views  regarding  any  feedback  received.    The  
questionnaire specifically asked whether they had received any feedback either during or after the 
case (yes/no) and also whether learning objectives had been set prior to the case (yes/no). The 
remaining questionnaire items mapped onto the OSAD categories and responses were based on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) (Appendix 21). Trainees 
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were asked to complete the questionnaire at the end of every case to evaluate the feedback 
received either during or after the case. 
(iii) User  satisfaction  with  the  ‘SHARP’  tool 
In the post-intervention phase, I asked both trainees and trainers to complete a short questionnaire 
at the end of every operating theatre  list  to  evaluate  satisfaction  with  the  ‘SHARP’  tool.  Users  were  
asked to rate its usefulness, comprehensiveness, and feasibility of use in practice, overall satisfaction 
and the likelihood of future use. Responses were based on a 5-point Likert scale (1= strongly 
disagree to 5= strongly agree). In addition, I recorded free-text, qualitative comments from both 
trainees and trainers to capture further reactions to the tool.  
11.3.4 Data analysis  
I used SPSS version 18.0 for all analyses. I calculated descriptive statistics (median and range) for the 
quality of debriefing, assessed objectively by me as primary observer using OSAD, and subjectively 
by  trainees’  scores.    I  used  the  non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test to test for differences in the 
quality of  debriefing  pre  and  post  intervention  (for  both  OSAD  scores  and  trainees’  scores).  The  Chi-
square  test  was  used  to  test  for  differences  in  the  dichotomous  variables  assessed  via  the  trainees’  
questionnaire (feedback occurred: yes/no and learning objectives set: yes/no). Correlations between 
trainees’  assessment  of  debriefing  and  OSAD  scores  were  assessed  using  Spearman’s  rho  coefficient.  
Inter-rater reliability of OSAD was assessed using intra-class correlation coefficients. Finally, 
Cronbach’s  alpha  was  used to determine the internal consistency of OSAD (based on my data as the 
primary observer). For all statistical tests, p<0.05 was deemed to be statistically significant. 
 
With regards qualitative data analysis, I transcribed my field notes into a word processing document 
and this data were analysed in a manner similar to the interviews in Chapter 10. I firstly read and re-
read the notes to ensure full immersion in the data. I then identified emergent themes; these were 
subsequently reviewed by two other researchers (SA, NS) and consensus reached regarding key 
themes. 
11.4 Results 
I observed a total of 100 cases involving 22 trainers (consultants and senior specialty trainees) and 
30 trainees (males = 19, females = 11) across the study. The characteristics of the trainees and cases 
observed across the two phases of the study are summarised in Table 11.1. The specialty mix of cases 
observed is broadly representative of the volume and frequency of elective surgical cases performed 
within the hospital. 
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Table 11.1 Characteristics of observed trainees and cases 
Characteristic Pre-intervention phase Post-intervention phase 
Trainees’  gender (male : female) 4 : 1 3 : 2  
Trainees’  experience  (years since graduation, 
median and range) 
9 (3 – 12) 7 (3 – 11) 
Case duration (minutes, median and range) 60 (30-275) 78 (30-300) 
Case specialty: 
General Surgery 
Breast Surgery 
Vascular Surgery 
Urology 
Orthopaedics 
 
32 (64%) 
9 (18%) 
5 (10%) 
2 (4%) 
2 (4%) 
 
23 (46%) 
13 (26%) 
6 (12%) 
5 (10%) 
3 (6%) 
 
11.4.1 Psychometric properties of OSAD 
OSAD was a feasible tool to assess debriefing in theatre, taking only 5 minutes to complete per case.  
The inter-rater reliabilities (intra-class correlations) between the two independent assessors were 
excellent for all domains of OSAD: Approach (0.967), Environment (0.991), Engagement (0.950), 
Reaction (0.980), Reflection (0.892), Analysis (0.921), Diagnosis (0.957), Application (0.983) as well as 
for the total score (0.994). The internal consistency of OSAD was high pre-intervention (Cronbach 
alpha = 0.898) and in the post-intervention phase (Cronbach alpha = 0.721). Taken together, these 
analyses demonstrate that OSAD produces reliable assessments both between different assessors 
(inter-rater agreement), but also across the 8 different dimensions of debriefing that it captures 
(internally consistent scoring).   
11.4.2 Debriefing pre and post ‘SHARP’ intervention 
Overall,  drawing  on  both  objective  and  trainees’  assessment,  I  found  that  debriefing was provided to 
the  trainee  in  a  significantly  higher  number  of  cases  following  implementation  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  
(pre=36/50 (72%) cases, post=50/50 (100%) cases, p<0.001). In addition, the number of cases where 
learning objectives were set prior to the case significantly increased following introduction of the 
‘SHARP’  intervention  (pre=12/50  (24%)  cases,  post=43/50  (86%),  p<0.001).    Specifically,  I  found  that  
there was a significant improvement in OSAD scores – both in terms of overall score but also for 
each domain of the tool (Table 11.2). This means that following implementation of ‘SHARP’, 
debriefing was more common and of an objectively higher standard.  
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Table 11.2 OSAD scores pre and post intervention 
Domain Pre-intervention 
median (range) 
Post-intervention 
median (range) 
P value 
Approach 4 (1-5) 5 (4-5) <0.001 
Environment 1 (1-2) 4 (2-5) <0.001 
Engagement 3 (1-5) 4 (3-5) <0.001 
Reaction 1 (1-3) 3 (2-5) <0.001 
Reflection 2 (1-4) 4 (3-5) <0.001 
Analysis 2.5 (1-4) 4 (3-5) <0.001 
Diagnosis 3 (1-4) 4 (2-5) <0.001 
Application 2 (1-4) 4 (3-5) <0.001 
Total OSAD score  19 (8-31) 33 (26-40) <0.001 
 
Regarding the more subjective assessment of debriefing as rated by the trainee, these also 
significantly improved when the ‘SHARP’ tool was utilised in the post-intervention phase of the study 
(Table 11.3). The median score significantly improved and the range narrowed for each questionnaire 
item, indicating greater consistency in the quality of debriefing. 
 
Table 11.3 Trainees' assessment of debriefing 
Questionnaire item Pre-intervention 
median (range) 
Post-intervention 
median (range) 
P value 
1. The feedback was delivered in a non-threatening 
but honest way 
4 (1-5) 5 (4-5) <0.001 
2. I contributed to the discussion of my performance 4 (1-5) 4 (3-5) <0.001 
3. My reaction and views on my performance were 
acknowledged/ discussed 
3 (1-5) 4 (3-5) <0.01 
4. I was encouraged to reflect upon how I performed 
during the case 
3 (1-5) 4 (3-5) <0.001 
5. The feedback helped me to understand the 
consequences of how I performed 
4 (1-5) 4 (3-5) <0.001 
6. The feedback gave me a clear idea of what I did well 4 (1-5) 4 (3-5) <0.001 
7. The feedback gave me a clear idea of what I did not 
do well 
3 (1-5) 4 (2-5) <0.001 
8. The feedback provided me with strategies to 
improve my future practice 
4 (1-5) 5 (3-5) <0.001 
9. Overall, I am satisfied with the feedback on my 
technical skills 
4 (1-5) 5 (3-5) <0.001 
10. Overall, I am satisfied with the feedback on my 
team-working skills 
3 (1-5) 4 (2-5) <0.01 
 
Significant correlations were also obtained between objective scores of debriefing (OSAD) and 
trainees’  subjective  assessments  (Table 11.4), indicating that the trainees have insight into the quality 
of feedback they receive.  
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Table 11.4 Correlation between OSAD and trainees’ assessment scores 
OSAD domain Trainee questionnaire item 
 
Spearman’s 
Approach 1 0.683* 
Engagement 2 0.561* 
Reaction 3 0.365* 
Reflection 4 0.601* 
Analysis 5,6 & 7 (mean) 0.525* 
Diagnosis 9 & 10 (mean) 0.566* 
Application 8 0.700* 
Total OSAD score** Sum of all items 0.717* 
*P<0.01; **Excludes  ‘Environment’  component of the OSAD score  
 
11.4.3 Qualitative observations 
The improvement in debriefing as noted by enhanced OSAD scores was also reflected qualitatively in 
the ethnographic observations. These are described below.   
Pre-intervention observations 
Prior to the intervention, the findings reinforced those reported in my previously published study 
(Ahmed et al. 2013). When debriefing was provided it was often rushed, unstructured and non-
specific for example: ‘...Yes that went well...’ (Trainer,  General  Surgery).  What  actually  ‘went  well’  
was not defined. Feedback was often unbalanced and more often corrective or negative rather than 
constructive and positive: ‘...No you need to tie the suture higher up...’  (Trainer, Vascular Surgery).  
Debriefing was commonly unidirectional with trainees rarely encouraged to contribute to the 
discussion of their performance: ‘...So  what  you  should  do  next  time  is...’ (Trainer, General Surgery). 
In the majority of cases trainers de-scrubbed at the time of skin closure stage, leaving the trainee to 
finish the case alone – hence missing the perfect opportunity for debriefing to take place – and 
consequently ‘actions  plans’  for  improvement  were  rarely  set.  Although  feedback  was  sometimes  
provided as the case progressed, this often focussed on the most immediate task at hand, for 
example in a laparoscopic cholecystectomy, one consultant mentioned: ‘...Put the suture in first, that 
way when you come to closing the port, you just have to tie it...’ No specific discussion took place 
either during or after the case regarding what the trainee did well or could have done better next 
time. The point about port insertion and closure was also not reinforced at the end of the case.  
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Post-intervention observations 
Following the intervention, as found in the quantitative assessments, learning objectives were set 
more often by trainees and trainers before the case commenced  (the  ‘S’  of  ‘SHARP’):  ‘...So what do 
you want to take away from this case?...’ (Trainer, General Surgery) ‘I  want  to  perform  an  umbilical  
hernia repair independently, particularly focussing on how to select and size the mesh 
appropriately...’ (Trainee, General Surgery). This was mostly done whilst scrubbing or in the coffee-
room, before the case commenced. In the 7 cases where learning objectives were not set, this was 
due to the trainer not being present at the start of the case – he/she joined the case later and was 
prompted to use the ‘SHARP’ tool by the trainee. That said, debriefing  using  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  was  
initiated by the trainer (as opposed to the trainee) in the majority of cases observed and took place 
in the theatre after the operation notes had been written and histology forms completed. In a 
minority of cases, debriefing was provided in the coffee-room. Irrespective of location, the 
intervention led to a debrief taking place, typically lasting between 3 to 7 minutes, and within 30 
minutes of case completion - effectively ensuring that the trainer either remained in the theatre 
until case completion or arranged to meet with the trainee to debrief in the coffee-room after the 
case. 
 
Specifically, I observed that debriefing was more structured and balanced in terms of addressing 
both positive and negative aspects of performance: ‘...I think you did very well here, it was a complex 
case and the mesh was tricky to place. Make sure you make best use of your assistant in ensuring a 
good field of view...’ (Trainer, General Surgery). Trainers took time to explain the rationale for 
certain steps and the questioning characteristic of the prompts encouraged trainees to contribute to 
the discussion. For example: ‘...I  don’t  think  I  used  enough  tension...’ (Trainee, General Surgery); 
‘...Yes, remember tension is your friend. You need to pull it tight otherwise you will undo all the good 
work  you’ve  done...’ (Trainer, General Surgery).  
 
With regards case complexity, I noted that in more complex cases, training took less priority over 
patient care and trainee participation as primary operator was less in such cases. Consequently 
there was less feedback offered to trainees during the case. After such cases trainer-trainee dialogue 
typically comprised a discussion of the approach used and its rationale rather than feedback on 
trainee performance per se. In the post-intervention phase, I found that despite the lower level of 
trainee participation in complex cases, ‘SHARP’ was helpful in structuring the post-case discussion 
whereby  trainers  reflected  on  their  own  and  their  trainee’s  performance to promote mutual 
learning.  
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11.4.4 User satisfaction with the  ‘SHARP’ tool 
38 participants completed the user satisfaction questionnaire in the post-intervention phase of the 
study. Quantitatively, both trainers and trainees reported high levels of satisfaction with the ‘SHARP’ 
tool in terms of usefulness, comprehensiveness, feasibility, likelihood of future use and overall 
satisfaction (median score 4, range 3-5 for all items). With regards free text comments recorded 
through observations, participants provided rich feedback regarding the ‘SHARP’  tool.  With regards 
usefulness, participants accepted that using ‘SHARP’ created time to debrief: “...it  forces  you  to  sit  
down and talk…'make every moment count’...” (Trainer, Orthopaedics). They valued its simplicity: 
“...what  I  like  about  it  is  it's  so  f***ing  simple!  It can be targeted to everyone...I know I was taking 
the  mick  but  we  actually  ended  up  having  a  really  nice  conversation...” (Trainer, Vascular Surgery). 
Users appreciated its brevity: “...What  I like  about  it  is  it's  quite  short.  It’s  better  than  the  other  
things  that  are  out  there...” (Trainee, General Surgery). The  ‘SHARP’  tool  was  also  felt  to  be  
comprehensive: “...It’s  a  good prompter and well-structured. It does cover the main components of 
feedback...” (Trainer, Vascular Surgery).  
 
With regards feasibility and likelihood of future use, participants’ reactions were more varied. Some 
thought that the ‘SHARP’ tool could be readily adopted in practice: “...I  think  it  could  be  
implemented  into  routine  practice  like  at  the  end  of  the  case  'Have  you  done  your  SHARP?'...” 
(Trainer, Vascular Surgery) and one trainee suggested: “…You  should  blow  them  up  and  stick  them  
up on the walls  in  theatres...” (Trainee, Breast Surgery).  However, whilst trainers claimed they 
would use it in future: “...I  think  it's  good.  I  would  definitely  use  it  again  in  future...” (Trainer, Breast 
Surgery), trainees were more pessimistic: “...If  I  can  persuade my trainer to do it I would definitely 
use  it  again  in  future...” (Trainee, General Surgery), with some noting the observer effect: “...See  I  
would love to use it but I don't think it would be feasible. I don't think trainers would do it without 
you (observer) here...”  (Trainee, Vascular Surgery). 
 
Despite  the  brevity  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool,  time constraints were still noted as a barrier to its future 
use: “...I  would  not  not  use  it  because  it's  not  good,  I  would  not  use  it  because  of  time...” (Trainer, 
General Surgery). Some users proposed that its use should be mandatory: “...This  is  great.  I  think  it  
should be made mandatory. It should be given to trainers...”  (Trainee, Orthopaedics). Trainees felt 
that the more senior trainers were  in  need  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool but that these very individuals would 
most likely resist it: “…I  think  the  old  school  guys  will  resist  it  but  they  need  that  structure...” (Senior 
trainee, General Surgery) and “…We  need  to  get  the  consultants  to  use  it,  registrars  are  great  at  
giving feedback…” (Trainee, Orthopaedics). 
174  
11.5 Discussion 
This study aimed to describe the development of an evidence-based, user-informed educational 
intervention to improve debriefing in Surgery and to evaluate its use in the real-theatre setting. 
Informed by existing  evidence  and  user  perspectives  of  best  practice,  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  introduces  a  
structured approach to debriefing and ensures that key components of an effective debrief are 
covered in the dialogue between trainee and trainer. Evaluation shows that implementation of the 
‘SHARP’  tool  led  to  significant  improvements  in  the  quality  of  debriefing  and  in  setting  learning  
objectives as assessed qualitatively  (through  observation)  and  quantitatively  (OSAD  and  trainees’  
scores).  In  addition,  use  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool also reduced the variability of debriefing practice, by 
enabling the delivery of consistently higher quality debriefing, as assessed objectively using the 
OSAD  tool  and  by  trainees’  assessment.  Objective  scores  and  trainees’  own  perceptions  of  debriefing 
correlated well across domains. However, whilst users reported high levels of satisfaction with the 
‘SHARP’  tool  as  assessed  via  questionnaire,  they  expressed  mixed  views  regarding  its  feasibility,  
citing cultural resistance and time constraints as barriers to future use. 
 
Few studies have systematically evaluated the effectiveness of interventions to improve feedback 
and debriefing in the real-theatre setting (Rogers et al. 2000, Hamad et al. 2007) and even so, the 
practicality of implementing such interventions into routine surgical practice is questionable. One 
study  describes  a  practical  approach  for  teaching  in  the  theatre:  the  ‘Briefing,  Intra-operative 
Teaching,  Debriefing  (BID)’  model  but  although  reporting positive reactions from surgeons, its effect 
upon actual debriefing practice remains to be empirically tested (Roberts et al. 2009). Another study 
examining the effectiveness of debriefing within the simulated theatre setting found that effective 
debriefing can occur even when time and space are limited, offering support to the findings in this 
study (Gururaja et al. 2008), and emphasising that more often than not, it is cultural resistance 
rather than lack of time which poses the most significant barrier to debriefing in practice.  
 
Importantly, despite aiming  for  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  to promote joint responsibility for debriefing, I 
found that in the majority of cases, debriefing was initiated by the trainer, as opposed to the trainee. 
This reflects the still hesitance amongst trainees in requesting feedback, which may be a product of 
the punitive culture of feedback within Surgery, as identified in the study reported in Chapter 10 and 
my previously published study (Ahmed et al. 2013). However, research conducted in other medical 
specialties including General Practice (Pelgrim et al. 2012) and Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
(Teunissen et al. 2009) also reveal that various personal and interpersonal factors influence 
feedback-seeking behaviour in trainees, such as the relationship between trainee and trainer (as 
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found in Chapter 10) and concerns for self-image. Seeking feedback therefore often involves a 
deliberate weighing up of the pros and cons of doing so (Pelgrim et al. 2013). Nonetheless, further 
work should explore whether differences exist in feedback-seeking behaviours between trainees in 
different specialties. 
11.5.1 Limitations of this study 
In common with other interventional studies in Surgery, the main limitation of this study relates to 
the inability to blind observers to the intervention, thus risking observer bias. However, a second 
observer rated the debriefings in 20% of cases and demonstrated excellent inter-rater reliabilities. 
Furthermore, the improved trainee ratings post-intervention correlated with the improved objective 
ratings, further increasing confidence in the findings. In addition, the presence of observers in both 
the pre- and post intervention phase would minimise any potential Hawthorne effect. Another key 
limitation of this study is that the  approach  to  implementing  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  in  the  post-
intervention phase was resource-intensive. Whilst this study demonstrates the effectiveness of the 
‘SHARP’  tool  in  improving  debriefing  in  the  study  setting,  further research is required to determine 
the sustainability of the ‘SHARP’ tool in improving debriefing in routine surgical practice.  
 
With regards study population, this study was conducted on a sample of 100 cases within a single 
institution so the generalisability of findings to a wider population could be questioned. However, 
the study was conducted across a number of different surgical specialties involving trainees and 
trainers of varying experience, thus enabling a comprehensive assessment of the validity and 
feasibility  of  ‘SHARP’  as  a  means  of  improving  the  quality  of  debriefing in Surgery. Finally, the 
outcome measures in this study related to the quality and quantity of debriefing. Further research 
should examine whether the use of ‘SHARP’ as an educational tool to improve debriefing actually 
translates to improved clinical performance in practice. Extrapolating from the increasing evidence 
for feedback in improving clinical performance (Ivers et al. 2012), this may certainly be implied.  
11.5.2 Summary and implications for further research 
This is one of the few empirical studies to evaluate an intervention to improve debriefing in the real-
theatre  setting.  The  ‘SHARP’  tool  presents  an  inexpensive,  practical, and evidence-based means to 
facilitate debriefing as a core NTS in Surgery. Through creating an opportunity to engage in 
structured trainee-trainer  dialogue,  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  can  optimise  learning  in  Surgery;  however,  its  
sustainability in routine surgical training should be further assessed. I will discuss wider implications 
of this study and areas for further research in the main discussion of the thesis (Chapter 12). 
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In Summary, in this Section of the thesis, I have reported the development and evaluation of a novel 
educational intervention to improve debriefing as a core NTS in Surgery. I found that the surgical 
community agree that debriefing is important to improve future performance, however debriefing in 
practice is far from ideal. Drawing on existing evidence and user perspectives regarding the key 
components of an effective debrief,  I  developed  the  ‘SHARP  5-Step  Feedback  Tool  for  Surgery’.  
Whilst initial evaluation of the tool looks promising, further research is required into the 
sustainability  of  ‘SHARP’  in  routine  surgical  practice. 
 
Next, in the final Chapter (Chapter 12) I summarise the findings of my research overall, its strengths 
and limitations, areas for further research and implications for educational policy and practice. 
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SECTION FIVE: Discussion and Conclusions 
In this final Section of my thesis, I summarise the findings of my research, discuss its limitations, 
outline areas for further research and consider the wider implications of my research for educational 
policy and for improving healthcare. I conclude with recommendations to accelerate the integration 
of patient safety education into PGME. 
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12 Discussion  
Although patient safety has emerged as a science in its own right, routine postgraduate medical 
education  (PGME)  continues  to  be  dominated  by  the  traditional  ‘biomedical’  focus, whereby the 
attainment of clinical knowledge and skills takes precedence. However, if we are to progress efforts 
to improve the safety of healthcare, we must equip and enable trainees to promote patient safety at 
the frontline, and also engage them in wider efforts to improve the system. 
 
In this thesis, I aimed to build on the evidence base for patient safety education in PGME. Following 
an introductory section to set the context for my thesis (Section One), specific objectives were 
achieved through three core programmes of research. The first involved initial exploratory research 
into patient safety education for trainees (Section Two). Subsequently, the remaining two 
programmes of research (Sections Three and Four) aimed to develop and evaluate educational 
interventions in patient safety - informed by users, the evidence base and educational theory. In 
what follows, I summarise the findings of my research, discuss its limitations, highlight areas for 
further work and reflect on the wider implications of my research. 
12.1 Summary of Findings  
I begin by summarising key findings from the three core programmes of my research in turn. 
12.1.1 Trainees and Patient Safety Education: An Initial Exploration 
Section Two of my thesis reported exploratory research to develop a course to teach core concepts 
of patient safety to Foundation trainees - junior doctors at the very start of their careers. I began by 
conducting a systematic review to examine the latest evidence for courses teaching patient safety 
for medical students and trainees (Chapter 4). This study revealed that there continues to be a 
proliferation of published studies evaluating courses in patient safety and that the UK continues to 
lag behind international efforts. Whilst the courses covered a broad range of patient safety content, 
few utilised the experiences of learners themselves as a basis for the intervention. Moreover, 
barriers to the sustainable integration of patient safety education persist and were frequently 
inadequately addressed in published studies.  
 
In Chapter 5 (Ahmed et al. 2012), I sought to determine the feasibility of using patient safety 
incidents (PSI) experienced by trainees as the basis for a patient safety course. My retrospective 
analysis  of  Foundation  trainees’  reflective  portfolio  entries  revealed  that  Foundation  trainees  
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commonly reflect on PSIs encountered in practice, and that these experiences could serve as a 
valuable resource for learning about patient safety.  
12.1.2 Lessons Learnt: Building a Safer Foundation  
Drawing on the findings in Section Two of the thesis, in Section Three I reported the development 
and  evaluation  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt:  Building  a  Safer  Foundation’  programme  to  formalise  the  
opportunity for Foundation trainees across the North Western Foundation School (n=1076) to learn 
from PSIs experienced in practice. In Chapter 6 (Ahmed et al. 2012b), I described the development of 
the programme, building on pilot work to introduce monthly 60-minute sessions into the Foundation 
teaching programme wherein Foundation trainees discuss and analyse PSIs within a safe, facilitated 
forum using a London Protocol-based analysis. I outlined key steps in my approach to delivery of the 
programme, which comprised two core facets to promote its sustainable implementation: 
stakeholder engagement and capacity-building. 
 
In Chapter 7 (Ahmed et al. 2013b), I described the capacity-building arm in detail to report a pre-
post  intervention  study  to  develop  and  evaluate  a  course  to  create  senior  faculty  for  the  ‘Lessons 
Learnt’  programme.  The  course  was  over-subscribed by senior doctors wishing to participate for two 
consecutive years, demonstrating a considerable appetite for senior doctors to engage as both 
teachers and learners of patient safety. The course was well received by participants and resulted in 
significant improvement in patient safety knowledge, skills and attitudes, which were sustained at 8 
months post-course.  Over  the  first  two  years  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  roll-out, 122 faculty were 
appointed, of which 72% went  on  to  facilitate  213  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  between  January  2011  
to July 2012. 
 
In Chapter 8, I examined the core process of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme, and its impact on 
trainees’  learning  qualitatively, by analysing a sample of PSI proformas submitted by trainees as part 
of the programme. These preliminary findings revealed that trainees bring a diverse range of PSIs for 
discussion. Trainees identified multiple contributing factors to the PSIs, suggesting that group 
reflection combined with a structured approach to incident analysis yields a richer analysis than that 
achieved through individual reflection alone. Relevant actions/ recommendations for improvement 
were proposed, which involved improving individual and team practice. as well as wider systems and 
processes. Lessons drawn from the case discussions mostly related to improving individual and team 
effectiveness in the face of imperfect systems – suggesting that trainees exhibit a strong sense of 
personal accountability for maintaining and improving patient safety. 
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Finally in Chapter 9 (Ahmed et al. under review),  I  evaluated  the  impact  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme  on  trainees’  learning  quantitatively  by  means  of  a  pre-post evaluation. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the largest UK study to evaluate patient safety education for trainees. Results 
revealed a significant improvement in trainees’  patient  safety  knowledge,  perceived  skills,  and  
behavioural change – in terms of discussing, disclosing and reporting more incidents in the 6 months 
following introduction of the programme. Moreover, trainees went on to engage in quality 
improvement projects stemming from case discussions. This included the development of novel 
protocols, rota redesign and implementation of teaching sessions to address gaps in training. The 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  was  well received by trainees and Foundation teams, and was 
considered feasible to deliver. Despite limitations relating to the implementation and evaluation of 
‘Lessons  Learnt’,  the  programme  is  now  in its third year of rollout, and forms a regular part of 
Foundation teaching across the North Western Foundation School. 
12.1.3 Operation Debrief: Improving Feedback in Surgery 
In Section Four of the thesis, I turned my attention to non-technical skills (NTS) training for more 
advanced trainees; specifically the development and evaluation of an educational intervention to 
improve debriefing as a core NTS in Surgery. In Chapter I0, (Ahmed et al. 2012c) I reported a tri-
continental interview study of 33 surgical team members to explore their views on the current state 
of debriefing in Surgery, the core concepts of an effective debrief, and barriers and enablers to 
debriefing in practice. Results revealed that whilst the surgical community agrees that debriefing is 
important in improving performance, debriefing in practice is far from ideal. Participants identified 
key components of an effective debrief in line with existing evidence and adult learning theory, but 
reported time constraints and cultural resistance as the main barriers to debriefing in practice. They 
appreciated the need to foster a culture of debriefing in Surgery and expressed support for an 
intervention to facilitate structured debriefing.  
 
Drawing on these findings, in Chapter 11 (Ahmed et al. 2013c) I reported the development and 
evaluation  of  the  ‘SHARP  5-Step  Feedback  Tool  for  Surgery’  (‘SHARP’  tool)  – an evidence-based, 
user-informed educational intervention to improve debriefing in Surgery. Together with colleagues 
experienced in surgical education and patient safety, I developed an accessible tool, which 
comprised five key prompts for effective debriefing, arranged under the memorable acronym 
‘SHARP’.  Evaluation  involved  a  mix-method pre-post intervention study comprising 100 observations 
in the real-theatre setting. Results revealed a significant improvement in the quality of debriefing 
post-intervention,  both  qualitatively  (based  on  observations)  and  quantitatively  (based  on  trainees’  
scores and objective  scores  using  the  validated  ‘OSAD’  scale).  Users  reported  high  levels  of  
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satisfaction  with  the  ‘SHARP’  tool,  however  they  expressed  mixed  views  regarding  its  feasibility  of  
use in routine practice. Nonetheless, as one of few empirical studies to improve debriefing in 
Surgery, these early results are promising. Further research should explore the sustainability of the 
‘SHARP’  tool  and  its  impact  on  learning  (discussed  further  below). 
12.2 Limitations of the Research  
My research employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Specific 
methodological limitations of each study have been discussed within the respective chapters. Here I 
summarise the key limitations of my research overall. 
12.2.1 Study design and sample size 
Due to resource constraints, all three interventional studies (reported in Chapters 7, 9 and 11) 
employed a before and after design with no external comparison group (i.e. they lacked control 
groups). This study design is limited in failing to allow control for extraneous variables. However, this 
is reflective of the state of medical education research in general, whereby a combination of lack of 
investment in educational research, and logistical and ethical issues concerning randomising trainees 
to receive or to not receive an intervention limits the ability to conduct more rigorous studies, such 
as randomised controlled trials (Reed et al. 2005).  
 
The sample sizes of the qualitative studies (reported in Chapters 5, 8 and 10) were small, ranging 
from 30 to 33 units of analysis. Therefore the generalisability of the findings could be questioned. 
However, qualitative research is of this nature and aims for in-depth analysis of the data concerned 
(Pope et al. 2006).  As  preliminary  studies,  the  qualitative  analyses  of  trainees’  portfolio  entries 
(reported in Chapter 5) and of PSI proformas (reported in Chapter 8) provide invaluable insight into 
the value of reflection on PSIs and can inform further research on larger samples of data. Moreover, 
the interview study of operating theatre teams (reported in Chapter 10) involved participants across 
three different continents, thus gaining insight into debriefing practice across different institutions 
and enhancing the generalisability of the findings.  
12.2.2 Outcome measures and follow-up 
Some of the outcome measures  assessed  as  part  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  research  (reported  in  
Chapters 7 and 9) such as patient safety skills, attitudes and behavioural change relied on self-
report, risking recall and self-presentation biases. Objective measures of these domains would be 
desirable in future studies, for example in the case of incident reporting, this could be assessed via 
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liaison with Trust risk managers. Similarly, whilst the study in Chapter 11 determined the impact of 
the  ‘SHARP’  tool  on  the  quality  and  quantity  of debriefing, future research could build on this work 
to  examine  the  impact  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  on  trainees’  learning  outcomes  (as  defined  jointly  by  
trainee and trainer).  
 
Moreover, the follow-up periods for the interventions studied were relatively short. In the case of 
evaluation  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool,  this  was  conducted  immediately  post-intervention (Chapter 11). The 
follow-up  for  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  intervention  in  trainees  was  only  6  months  (Chapter  9),  that  of  the  
faculty development course was 8 months  (Chapter  7)  and  in  both  studies  participants’  response  
rates at follow-up were low (43% and 51% respectively). Further research could examine the longer-
term impact of these interventions on the respective outcomes assessed.  
12.2.3 Implementation and sustainability of the interventions 
Implementation  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  was  very  resource-intensive and involved my introducing the 
intervention to surgical trainees and trainers at the beginning of each surgical list. Importantly, 
despite  rooting  the  ‘SHARP’  tool in evidence and user opinions, participants suggested that 
ultimately  cultural  resistance  and  time  constraints  would  serve  as  a  barrier  to  the  use  of  ‘SHARP’  in  
practice.  Therefore,  future  research  should  explore  the  sustainability  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  outside my 
study setting.  
 
In  contrast,  given  the  scale  of  the  intervention,  the  approach  to  implementation  of  the  ‘Lessons  
Learnt’  programme  was  designed  with  sustainability  in  mind.  However,  this  ‘centrally-supported, 
locally-led’  approach,  which  utilised  local Foundation teams to coordinate delivery of the 
intervention at their respective site meant that other than providing standardised tools, resources 
and guidance, I had little control over the actual delivery of the intervention at each site. Moreover, 
given  that  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  is  critically  dependent  on  trainees  bringing  forward  PSIs  
to present to their peers, it would be useful to further examine the barriers and motivators to 
trainee  engagement  in  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  in  order to secure its sustainability and 
ensure its relevance to future cohorts of trainees. For instance, interviews or focus groups with 
trainees could provide in-depth views regarding factors influencing their engagement. In addition, 
real-time observations of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  could  examine  the  process  of  group  reflection  in  
detail, and identify ways to optimise learning.  
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12.2.4 Theoretical underpinning of the research 
I chose the theories of reflective practice and experiential learning to underpin my interventions, as 
these theoretical approaches are well validated within medical education. However, over recent 
years, the limitations of these theories is being recognised (Swanwick 2005). This mainly relates to 
the fact that these theories primarily focus on learners as individuals and neglect the importance of 
interactions and social context for both individual and collective learning (Yardley et al. 2012b). This 
is of particular relevance when considering the impact  of  the  ‘hidden  curriculum’  including  the  
institutional culture and context on learning about patient safety. It may be that sociocultural 
theories  such  as  Engestrom’s  ‘Activity  Theory’  (Engestrom 2001) and  Lave  and  Wenger’s  
‘Communities  of  Practice’  theory  (Lave et al. 1991) offer more insight into the best means of 
developing and delivering patient safety education. Working in collaboration with experts in 
educational theory will help.  
12.3 Future Directions for the Research   
As well as addressing the limitations of my research described above, further research could build on 
my work in a number of different ways. These possibilities are discussed below.  
12.3.1 Facilitating quality improvement  
As  reported  in  Chapter  9,  whilst  the  main  aim  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  is  to  promote  
learning from PSIs, both trainees and Foundation teams expressed a desire for more support in 
undertaking quality improvement (QI) work prompted by the case discussions. It is important that 
this  desire  is  addressed  in  order  to  maintain  trainees’  engagement  in  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme.  I  believe  that  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  presents  a  strong  basis  from  which  to  
build upon.  As an initial step, I have introduced basic teaching on QI concepts as part of faculty and 
trainee  ‘Lead’  courses  and  have  also  recommended  that  local  Foundation  teams  dedicate  a  
proportion  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  sessions  to  drawing  up  action  plans  for improvement.  
 
Elsewhere in the UK, published reports of QI courses are emerging, however these describe small-
scale interventions (Vaux et al. 2012) or lack comprehensive evaluation (Bethune et al. 2013). 
Further research should compare the relative effectiveness of these interventions on learning 
outcomes and also examine the barriers and enablers to their implementation. 
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12.3.2 Exploring multidisciplinary learning 
The House of Commons Health Committee Inquiry into Patient Safety called for more 
interdisciplinary training in  patient  safety  and  argued  that  ‘those  who  work  together  should  train  
together’  (House of Commons 2009). As well as promoting dialogue between members of the 
healthcare team, a multi-professional model of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  may  enable more  ‘holistic’  incident  
analysis and prompt multidisciplinary safety improvement  efforts.  Similarly,  the  utility  of  the  ‘SHARP’  
tool in team debriefing could also be evaluated using a similar observational study design as 
reported in Chapter 11. However, as reported in previous studies of team-based patient safety 
educational interventions (Cox et al. 2009, Slater et al. 2012), logistical issues will invariably pose the 
greatest barrier to implementing these interventions in practice.  Given these factors, initial research 
should be conducted on a relatively small-scale to determine the feasibility of delivering 
interventions  on  a  team  basis.  For  example,  piloting  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  by  capitalising  on  existing  
forums where the different professional groups come together (e.g. multidisciplinary team meetings 
or audit days) may be a fruitful approach.  
12.3.3 Exploring wider transferability  
Transferability to other specialties 
The  transferability  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  to  core  training  and  specialty  training  
programmes should be explored. The Foundation Programme  is  a  relatively  neatly  ‘packaged’  
programme of training with a strong infrastructure and governance arrangements to support its 
delivery. Therefore, it should be relatively straightforward to introduce novel educational 
interventions as part of Foundation training. As trainees progress into core and specialty training 
programmes, achievement of clinical competencies seems to take precedence. Moreover, support 
and governance structures are often more fragmented to cater for the smaller cohorts of trainees. 
Introducing  interventions  such  as  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  as  part  of  compulsory  teaching  in  post-Foundation 
medical training may therefore not be feasible, and other means of delivering patient safety 
education may need to be explored. One way could be through promoting better use of morbidity 
and mortality meetings and grand rounds to promote learning from things that go wrong, as 
reported by others (Bechtold et al. 2008).  
 
The  applicability  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  to  other  craft  specialties  such  as  Anaesthetics  also  requires  
further exploration. Findings in my interview study reported in Chapter 10 suggest that anaesthetists 
perceive their specialty as having a more positive debriefing culture than that in Surgery. Further 
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research involving real-time observations of anaesthetists could be conducted before and after 
implementation  of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  to  examine for any inter-specialty differences. 
 
Finally, further research could explore the transferability of both interventions to the primary care 
setting. In particular, exploratory research by our team (Ahmed et al. in press) suggests that the 
concept  of  ‘non-technical  skills’  may  need  modifying  for  use  in  primary  care,  where  skills  such  as  
communication and decision-making are arguably considered core technical (as opposed to non-
technical) skills for safe practice. Initial research should involve gathering stakeholder views 
regarding  the  key  ‘safety  skills’  in  primary  care,  before  collaborating  with  primary  care  educators  to  
develop interventions to help achieve these competencies.  
Transferability to undergraduate medical education  
I agree with others that safety-consciousness must be inculcated into learners at undergraduate 
level (Aron et al. 2002, Flin et al. 2009). The feasibility of adopting  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  approach  for  
medical students should be explored as medical students may not be exposed to or be aware of PSIs 
experienced while on clinical placements. For example, interviewing medical students or conducting 
a similar study of reflective entries of medical students would determine whether they appreciate 
the  concept  of  ‘patient  safety  incident’  and  the frequency with which they encounter PSIs in 
practice. Depending on these findings, further research could evaluate learning outcomes resulting 
from discussing either real-life PSIs or utilising examples of cases discussed as part of the Foundation 
arm of the ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme.  
12.3.4 Integrating technology-enhanced learning  
The potential uptake and transferability of the interventions developed as part of my research could 
be improved through the use of technology-enhanced learning modalities. Recently, a workforce at 
the Department of Health developed  a  ‘Framework  for  Technology  Enhanced Learning’  (Department 
of Health 2011). This framework highlights the potential impact that innovative technologies such as 
simulation, e-learning and smartphones can have on supporting the development and maintenance 
of essential competencies in healthcare professionals. It recommended that education 
commissioners and providers work together to integrate technology-enhanced learning into health 
education as part of managed learning processes.  
 
As  my  review  in  Chapter  4  and  Wong’s  earlier  review  shows  (Wong et al. 2010), patient safety 
courses infrequently use web-based learning modalities, and where these are employed, they often 
elicit mixed views amongst learners. Using web-based modalities as an adjunct to face-face learning 
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would allow more efficient delivery of patient safety education to a larger population. Pressure on 
limited faculty could be reduced, and the accessibility to learning materials enhanced. Moreover, 
engaging users in its development would promote uptake. As a first step, with the support of Tony 
Gu (trainee with expertise in web development), I have developed a dedicated website for the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme to provide users with the key resources required to deliver the 
programme. In future, I plan to develop podcasts of related patient safety resources and I am 
currently building a repository of example cases of PSIs to develop into e-learning cases, which will 
allow trainees improved flexibility in learning. A more resource-intensive way of integrating 
technology-enhanced modalities into  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  would be to recreate the PSIs 
that trainees bring for discussion into scenarios for simulation. This could enhance the interactivity 
of the programme, through enabling trainees to practise root cause analysis through immersion in 
an unfolding scenario of a PSI.  
 
With  regards  the  ‘SHARP’  tool,  I am currently exploring the development of  the  ‘SHARP  Feedback  
App’  for smartphones. This will enhance the accessibility of  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  for busy surgeons, and 
could be integrated into the Royal  College  of  Surgeon’s  Intercollegiate  Surgical  Curriculum  Project  
(ISCP) to encourage its use in surgical training. Using technology-enhanced learning modalities also 
has the added benefit of facilitating the evaluation of such approaches; so for example, the 
feasibility of using the ‘SHARP’ tool in routine practice (i.e. without observer presence) could be 
evaluated through the capture and analysis of real-time data via trainees’  smartphones.   
12.4 Wider Implications of my Research 
Despite the limitations of my research, I believe it has a number of implications for educational 
policy and for improving the quality of healthcare. I discuss these in turn below, and conclude with 
recommendations for accelerating the integration of patient safety education into PGME. 
12.4.1 Implications for educational policy 
As described in Chapter 2, the impetus for developing and implementing patient safety education is 
rapidly growing. This includes increasing calls for medical leadership in safety and quality 
improvement, and the professional requirements to demonstrate a commitment to patient safety 
and QI as part of revalidation with the General Medical Council (GMC) (General Medical Council 
2012c). However, although patient safety competencies are now included in many PGME curricula, 
in practice there are limited opportunities for trainees to achieve these competencies.  
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Through  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme, I have demonstrated that it is feasible to implement 
patient safety education for trainees on a wide scale through engaging key stakeholders, developing 
faculty and capitalising on the existing training infrastructure to support delivery. Importantly, the 
latest iteration of the UK Foundation Programme curriculum stipulates additional patient safety and 
QI competencies for Foundation trainees including ‘discussion of safety issues in the framework of 
case-based  discussions’  (UK Foundation Programme Office 2012).  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  potentially  offers  
an ‘off-the-shelf’  solution  for  Foundation  training  commissioners to deliver patient safety education 
to their trainees, and indeed to develop it further to incorporate QI competencies as well. In January 
2013,  I  was  invited  to  present  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  at  the  UK  Foundation  Programme  
Office  (UKFPO)  Foundation  School  Directors’  Forum  and  following  much  interest  I  am  currently  
developing  a  ‘how-to’  kit  to  support  the  wider  implementation  of  ‘Lessons  Learnt’. 
 
Moreover, through my research I have also demonstrated that it is feasible to conduct a 
comprehensive evaluation in parallel to implementation of a large-scale educational intervention. 
Such practice should be encouraged more widely, including as part of the ‘Better  Training  Better  
Care’  initiative which aims to identify and share best practice in medical education (NHS Medical 
Education England 2012). Close attention to evaluating outcomes is essential to promote the wider 
adoption of successful educational interventions that have the potential for significant impact on 
PGME, and ultimately the quality of healthcare.  
 
My research also has implications for the continuing medical education of senior doctors. As my 
systematic review shows, capacity-building is critical to the delivery of patient safety education. 
Similar faculty development efforts to those described in Chapter 7 must continue on a national 
scale if we are to develop the requisite faculty to support patient safety education for all trainees. 
However, the provision of training for senior doctors is not enough. As this same study 
demonstrates, the main  barrier  to  the  participation  of  trained  faculty  in  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  
programme was competing clinical commitments. There must be protected time for doctors to 
engage and lead in such activities, and adequate recognition and reward for them to do so, as others 
too have proposed (Pronovost et al. 2009, Wong et al. 2012).  
 
Looking more broadly, a potentially powerful way to promote awareness of key patient safety 
principles amongst doctors on a large scale could be to leverage appraisal and revalidation 
requirements.  For  example,  reflection  on  'significant  events’  (defined  as  a  PSI  by  the  GMC)  is  
required by all doctors as part of appraisal and revalidation with the GMC (General Medical Council 
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2012c). As my studies reported in Chapters 5 and 8 indicate, the provision of a framework to 
structure these reflections (based on the London Protocol) could support doctors to consider the 
breadth of individual and systems factors that may contribute to these 'significant events'. In this 
way, an understanding of the basic principles of root cause analysis could be enhanced amongst all 
doctors. 
 
Finally, my research also raises the question as to where patient safety education may best fit within 
the wider educational landscape. Recently, there has been growing interest in leadership and 
management for all doctors (General Medical Council 2012d). Aligning patient safety education with 
(the  arguably  more  appealing)  ‘leadership  training’  would  be  a  fruitful  avenue  to explore. So for 
instance,  to  be  an  effective  leader  one  needs  to  recognise  one’s  own  strengths  and  weaknesses  - 
seeking feedback is critical to enable accurate self-appraisal. Similarly, if one is to lead a health 
system effectively, one needs to understand the system and appreciate how and why things may go 
wrong in that system - ‘Lessons  Learnt’  enables  trainees  as  future  healthcare  leaders  to  learn  this  
early on. Moreover, sharing errors and adverse events experienced in practice with others requires 
courage, and  encouraging  one’s  peers  to  do  so  in  the  role  of  trainee  ‘Lead’  offers  experiential  
learning in leadership. Importantly, Robert Francis in his report into the failings at Mid-Staffordshire 
recommends that patient safety be emphasised within the ‘Leadership  Framework’  (House of 
Commons 2013) and extrapolating this, patient safety competencies should also be made explicit 
within  its  derivative  ‘Medical  Leadership  Competency  Framework’  for  doctors and medical students 
(NHS III 2010b). This is critical to ensure that the purpose of leadership (i.e. to improve the safety 
and quality of healthcare) is not lost in the current leadership movement. 
12.4.2 Implications for improving healthcare  
As well as the potential benefits to healthcare through engaging trainees in quality improvement, 
the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  may  also  contribute  to  improving  healthcare  in  other  ways. Francis 
in his report into the failings at Mid-Staffordshire  stated  that  ‘trainees  are  invaluable  eyes  and  ears  
in  a  hospital  setting’ and recommended that the means of obtaining patient safety concerns raised 
by trainees should be maximised (House of Commons 2013). Notably for the first time in 2012, the 
GMC’s  National  Training  Survey  included  items  enquiring  into  trainees’  concerns  about  patient  
safety (General Medical Council 2012e). However, whilst this is an important first step, such an 
approach  can  only  provide  a  ‘snap-shot’  of  trainees’  views  regarding  safety  concerns  on  an  annual  
basis. Moreover, there is a risk of the GMC being inundated by national data and arguably, follow-up 
of these concerns should be led locally by the relevant authorities, to encourage local ownership and 
action. 
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Encouraging  wider  adoption  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  would  enable  the  retrieval  of  regular  
‘intelligence’  from  trainees  to  feedback  into  local  regulatory  and  quality  assurance  systems.  As  
reported in Chapter 8, preliminary analysis of the PSI proformas submitted by trainees as part of the 
‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  has  uncovered a wealth of information regarding the contributors to 
PSIs commonly experienced by Foundation trainees. As noted by others (Battles et al. 2001), this 
data could  be  invaluable  to  education  commissioners  and  providers  in  ensuring  that  trainees’  
workplaces are conducive to learning and that they feel adequately supported in delivering care. 
Moreover, given the link between postgraduate medical education and the delivery of healthcare, 
such information could prove a powerful addition to the armamentarium of identifying institutions 
at which training, and therefore care may be falling below acceptably safe standards (House of 
Commons 2013).  
 
In  2000,  ‘An  Organisation  with  a  Memory’  identified the blame culture as a significant barrier to 
learning from error and adverse events (Department of Health 2000). Thirteen years on and Francis 
has  reiterated  the  need  for  ‘fundamental  culture  change’  in  the  NHS  to  ‘ensure  openness,  
transparency and candour throughout the system about  matters  of  concern’  (House of Commons 
2013).  Whilst  the  impact  of  the  ‘Lessons Learnt’  programme  and  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  on  patient  safety  
culture  was  not  formally  assessed,  both  interventions  may  promote  an  ‘open  and  learning’  safety  
culture. Through formalising the opportunity for group reflection on PSIs within a safe, structured 
forum, ‘Lessons  Learnt’  legitimises  open  discussion  regarding  the  contributors  to  adverse  events, 
and emphasises the role of trainees as advocates for patient safety.  
 
Moreover, through creating an opportunity to engage in structured trainee-trainer dialogue, the 
‘SHARP’  tool  could  effectively  ensure  ‘time-out’  for  debriefing.  This  need  not  be  onerous  and  could  
be  accommodated  within  the  time  allotted  to  the  ‘Sign-out’  of  the  WHO Surgical Safety Checklist, 
which surgical teams in the UK and internationally are expected to complete (World Health 
Organisation 2008). Initiatives such  as  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  and  the  WHO  Checklist are potentially 
powerful means by which to foster wider cultural change amongst the surgical community, whereby 
debriefing for individual trainees as well as the entire surgical team becomes commonplace, as part 
of on-going efforts to improve performance and patient safety in Surgery, as one of the riskiest 
aspects of healthcare. 
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12.4.3 Recommendations for accelerating the integration of patient safety education into PGME 
Reflecting on my research and the existing literature, I have drawn a list of recommendations for 
accelerating the integration of patient safety education into PGME. Box 12.1 lists my ‘top  ten’  
recommendations, citing a brief rationale for each; although these recommendations have been 
drawn with the UK context in mind, I feel they could also be useful in other settings.  
12.5 Concluding Remarks 
The research presented in this thesis aimed to build on the evidence base for patient safety 
education for trainees and so accelerate its integration into routine postgraduate medical education. 
 
My research has demonstrated that it is feasible to embed systematic and clinically relevant patient 
safety education for trainees across a Foundation School, and to engage a significant cohort of 
senior doctors to support its delivery. Through formalising the opportunity to learn from patient 
safety  incidents,  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme  improves  Foundation  trainees’  patient  safety  
knowledge and skills, highlights their role as advocates for patient safety, and engages them in 
efforts to improve the healthcare system. Moreover, I have also begun to demonstrate how a simple 
tool may improve debriefing in Surgery and so optimise learning from routine clinical practice. 
Through encouraging trainee-trainer reflection  and  dialogue,  the  ‘SHARP’  tool  can  promote  the  
continual improvement of practice and performance at the frontline.  
 
Although my research is not without its limitations, I believe it has a number of implications for 
educational policy and ultimately for improving healthcare. Efforts to develop and deliver effective 
patient safety education have the potential for a huge return on investment. Medical educators, 
policy-makers and safety experts should capitalise on renewed calls for medical engagement in 
safety and collaborate to embed patient safety as a critical component of the education and training 
of our future medical leaders.  
 
Finally on a personal level, I have gained invaluable skills and experience in carrying out my research, 
and I hope that through my work I have demonstrated that with adequate support, trainees can 
make a significant contribution to advancing safety improvement efforts. I feel honoured that my 
research has been recognised with a number of prestigious accolades, and I look forward to taking it 
further in the future.  
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Box 12.1 Recommendations for accelerating the integration of patient safety education into PGME 
The Basics 
1. Promote patient safety as a science 
Just as the biomedical sciences are emphasised within Medical Education, patient safety too should be promoted as a 
science in its own right, and therefore made ‘worthy’  of  dedicated  curricular  time. 
2. Foster collaborative working  
While it is encouraging to see growing enthusiasm for developing and delivering patient safety education, confusion 
exists regarding key patient safety concepts. Collaborating with patient safety experts will help to ensure a robust 
approach and at the very basic level help agree a common terminology for patient safety education. Similarly, many 
published studies of educational interventions in patient safety make no reference to their theoretical underpinning. 
Collaborating with medical educationalists is essential to ensure that proposed interventions are theoretically sound. 
 
Create incentives  
3. Enhance the visibility of patient safety within professional standards and curricula 
In the USA, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) cites standards for  ‘practice-based 
learning  and  improvement’  and  ‘systems-based  practice’  for  trainees,  which  fit  well  with  patient  safety  and  QI  
competencies. Subsequently, these standards are frequently cited as the rationale for US-based studies of patient 
safety education. Within UK PGME, whilst the GMC does cite standards relating to patient safety and QI within its 
‘Good Medical Practice’  guidance,  there is a relative lack of clarity and subsequent heterogeneity within the curricula 
of the various specialties (which are based on GMC standards). Adopting the ACGME terminology could boost the 
visibility of safety and QI competencies and so encourage efforts to help doctors to achieve them. Moreover, explicitly 
citing patient safety within the ‘Medical Leadership Competency Framework’ would help to ensure that the purpose of 
leadership (i.e. to improve the safety and quality of care) is not lost amidst the current interest in ‘leadership  training’.   
4. Recognise and reward teaching and learning about patient safety  
The introduction of revalidation for doctors in the UK is a valuable step to encouraging medical engagement in patient 
safety and QI. Leveraging the appraisal and revalidation process further to recognise and reward teaching in patient 
safety would help senior doctors in particular to secure time to support its delivery. 
 
Build capacity and capability 
5. Develop patient safety faculty  
Developing a critical mass of patient safety faculty is essential to support and sustain the delivery of patient safety 
education. Recruiting senior doctors as faculty is a feasible means of building capacity. 
6. Utilise technology-enhanced learning  
Using technologies such as e-learning would reduce the burden on available faculty and improve learner accessibility to 
patient safety education. 
 
Engage stakeholders to promote sustainability  
7. Engage end-users in development and delivery  
Engaging users in the development and delivery of patient safety education would encourage learner buy-in and 
ownership of the proposed intervention(s).  
8. Improve links between healthcare service and education providers  
This is particularly important to facilitate QI activity prompted by patient safety education. Aligning proposed QI 
projects with Trust clinical governance agendas would help to secure high-level support and resources for carrying 
them out. Moreover, board-level engagement in medical education in general would reinforce the importance of 
education and training in ensuring the delivery of safe, effective healthcare.  
 
Research and disseminate  
9. Invest in high-quality educational research  
Investment in educational research is poor in comparison to clinical research and is most likely due to the benefits of 
medical education not being immediately apparent. Investing in high-quality research into patient safety education is 
essential if we are to advance progress in this rapidly emerging field.  
10. Share good practice 
The  USA’s  Agency  for  Healthcare  Research  and  Quality  (AHRQ)  recently  published  a  ‘Patient  Safety  Education  and  
Training  Catalog’  listing  over 300 patient safety courses available in the USA (AHRQ 2013). Similar moves are required 
in the UK to boost the visibility of patient safety education and increase its wider uptake. 
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Appendix 1:  ‘Reflective  Practice’  data  analysis  proforma   
 
A. DOES THIS CASE RELATE TO A PATIENT SAFETY INCIDENT?  
i.e. any unintended or unexpected incident(s) that could have or did lead to harm for one or more 
persons receiving NHS-funded healthcare. If YES please continue 
[1] Yes  [2] No   
 
B. WHAT TYPE OF PATIENT SAFETY INCIDENT DOES THIS CASE RELATE TO? 
Please select the most appropriate Main heading AND Sub-heading 
Main Heading  Sub-heading  
[1] Access, admission, 
transfer (including missing 
patient)  
 
 [1.1] Delay or failure to access care  
[1.2] Unexpected re-admission  
[1.3] Difficulty in obtaining clinical assistance  
[1.4] Delay or failure to discharge  
[2] Clinical Assessment 
(including diagnosis, scans, 
tests, assessments) 
 [2.1] Wrong diagnosis  
[2.2] Failure to receive test results  
[2.3] Missing test results  
[3] Consent, communication, 
confidentiality 
 
 [3.1]Breach of confidentiality  
[3.2] Failure to communicate outside of team  
[3.3] Patient incorrectly identified  
[4] Disruptive, aggressive 
behaviour 
 [4.1] Physical  
[4.2] Verbal  
[5] Documentation (including 
records, identification) 
 
 [5.1] Delay in obtaining healthcare record/card  
[5.2] Missing healthcare record  
[5.3] Missing scans  
[6] Implementation of care & 
Ongoing monitoring/ review 
 [6.1] Delay in recognising a complication of treatment  
[6.2] Extended stay/episode of care  
[7] Infection control incident 
 
 [7.1] Failure of sterilisation/contamination of equipment  
[7.2] Cross-infection  
[8] Infrastructure inc staffing, 
facilities, environment 
 [8.1] Exposure to cold/heat  
[8.2] Lack of suitably qualified staff  
[8.3] Inadequate equipment  
[8.4] Lack of beds  
[9] Medical device/ equipment 
 
 [9.1] Failure of device  
[9.2] Unavailability of device  
[10] Medication  [10.1] Wrong drug  
[10.2] Overdose of drug  
[11] Patient abuse (by staff/ 
third party) 
 [11.1] Physical  
[11.2] Verbal   
[12] Patient accident  [12.1] Contact with sharps  
[12.2] Slips, trips and falls  
[13] Self-harming behaviour  [13.1]Suicide  
[14] Treatment, procedure  [14.1] Failure to discontinue treatment  
[14.2] Inappropriate use of control and restraint  
[14.3] Theatre list details incorrect  
[14.4] Delay or failure to monitor  
[14.5] Illegible healthcare record  
 
 
 
C. WHAT WAS THE INCIDENT OUTCOME?  
[1] Death: Any PSI that directly resulted in the death of one or more persons receiving NHS 
funded care. 
 
[2] Severe: Any PSI that appears to have resulted in permanent harm to one or more persons 
receiving NHS-funded care. 
 
[3] Moderate: Any PSI that resulted in a moderate increase in treatment & which caused 
significant but not permanent harm, to one or more persons receiving NHS-funded care. 
 
[4] Low: Any PSI that required extra observation or minor treatment and caused minimal harm, to 
one or more persons receiving NHS-funded care. 
 
[5] No harm: Impact not prevented – Any PSI that ran to completion but no harm occurred to 
people receiving NHS-funded care. Impact prevented – Any PSI that had the potential to cause 
harm but was prevented, resulting in no harm to people receiving NHS-funded care. 
 
[6] Not stated / unable to ascertain   
 
D. WHAT WERE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR(S)?  
[1] Patient factors these are unique to the patient(s) involved in the incident, such as the 
complexity of their condition or factors such as their age or language. 
 
[2] Individual 
factors 
these are unique to the individual(s) involved in the incident. They include 
psychological factors, home factors, and work relationships. 
 
[3] Task factors these include aids that support the delivery of patient care, such as policies, 
guidelines and procedural documents. They need to be up to date, available, 
understandable, useable, relevant and correct. 
 
[4]Communication 
factors 
these include communication in all forms: written, verbal and non-verbal. 
Communication can contribute to an incident if it is inadequate, ineffective, 
confusing, or if it is too late. These factors are relevant between individuals, 
within and between teams, and within and between organisations. 
 
[5] Team and 
social factors 
these factors can adversely affect the cohesiveness of a team. They involve: 
communication within a team, management style, traditional hierarchical 
structures, lack of respect for less senior members of the team and 
perception of roles. 
 
[6] Education and 
training factors 
the availability and quality of training programmes for staff can directly affect 
their ability to perform their job or to respond to difficult or emergency 
circumstances. The effectiveness of training as a method of safety 
improvement is influenced by content, delivery style, understanding & 
assessment of skill acquisition, monitoring & updates. 
 
[7] Equipment and 
resources factors 
equipment factors include whether the equipment is fit for purpose, whether 
staff know how to use the equipment, where it is stored & how often it is 
maintained. Resource factors include the capacity to deliver the care 
required, budget allocation, staffing allocation & skill mix. 
 
[8] Working 
conditions & 
environmental  
these factors affect ability to function at optimum levels in the workplace and 
include distractions, interruptions, uncomfortable heat, poor lighting, noise 
and lack of or inappropriate use of space. 
 
[9] Other  Please state:  
 
E. WAS THE PATIENT SAFETY INCIDENT FORMALLY REPORTED THROUGH NRLS?  
 
[1] Yes  [2] No   
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Appendix 2:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  PSI  Proforma 
 
This form should be completed for every Lessons Learnt session by the Trainee Lead in 
consultation with the session facilitator. Sections C to F should be completed based on 
group consensus. Completed forms to be sent electronically to lessonslearntnw@gmail.com  
 
SECTION A: Session details. Please complete the following details: 
Trust  
Hospital  
Date of session  
Number of attendees  
Facilitator name & Specialty   
Lead name & Grade (FY1 / FY2)  
Presenter Grade  
                  Gender 
                  Specialty 
 
 
 
 
SECTION B: What happened? Please provide a brief description of the incident below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION C: What was the incident outcome? Please select one option 
Death: Any PSI that directly resulted in the death of one or more persons   
Severe: Any PSI that appears to have resulted in permanent harm to one or more persons   
Moderate: Any PSI that resulted in a moderate increase in treatment & which caused significant but not 
permanent harm, to one or more persons 
 
Low: Any PSI that required extra observation or minor treatment and caused minimal harm  
No harm includes • Impact not prevented – Any PSI that ran to completion but no harm occurred to 
people • Impact prevented – Any PSI that had the potential to cause harm but was prevented, resulting in 
no harm to people  
 
 
SECTION D: Why did it happen? Following the group discussion, please identify which of the 
factors listed below contributed to the incident. Please provide a brief statement to explain 
each factor identified.  
Contributory factor Details 
Patient factors  
Patient’s  condition  (complexity  and  
seriousness); language & communication; 
personality & social factors  
 
 
 
 
Task & Technology factors 
Task design & clarity of structure; availability & 
use of protocols/ guidelines; availability & 
accuracy of test results; decision making aids  
 
 
 
 
Individual staff factors  
Knowledge & skills; competence; physical & 
mental health  
 
 
 
 
Team factors  
Verbal & written communication; supervision & 
seeking help; team structure (congruence, 
consistency, leadership, etc.)  
 
 
 
 
Work environment factors  
Staffing levels & skills mix; workload & shift 
patterns; design, availability & maintenance of 
equipment; administrative & managerial 
support; work environment & physical factors   
 
 
 
 
Organisational & Management factors  
Financial resources & constraints; 
organisational structure; policy, standards & 
goals; safety culture and priorities 
 
 
 
 
Wider institutional context factors   
Economic & regulatory context; NHS 
Executive; links with external organisations 
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SECTION E: What can we do to prevent similar incidents from occurring? For each contributing factor identified, please consider what actions for learning and improvement are 
recommended.  Please note that the actions can be aspirational. However, where the trainee(s) feel able to take forward the recommended actions, their contact details should be noted to 
determine progress (if any) at the end of the programme in July 2011. Individual trainees will NOT be held to account for this – the primary aim is formative learning.   
Contributory factor Actions for learning or improvement 
(E.g. disseminate relevant guidance / literature; conduct audit; work with rota-master to redesign rota) 
Person (s) actioning 
Name(s) and email contact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
SECTION F: What are the Lessons Learnt? Following the group discussion, please summarise at least 3 key learning points. Use direct (anonymised) quotes from trainees wherever possible.  
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Appendix 3:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty guidance for escalating concerns 
 
From our experience with Lessons Learnt over the past years, we anticipate that the majority of patient safety 
incidents brought forward for discussion by trainees will result in little or no harm to the patient(s) involved. 
Nevertheless, such cases can help to identify and increase awareness of contributing factors, which may be 
addressed by the group and/or brought to the attention of relevant authorities for action.  
 
Foundation Programme teams, Foundation trainees and Lessons Learnt facilitators should familiarise themselves with 
the following guidance for running Lessons Learnt sessions and for escalating concerns.  
 
Basic Ground Rules 
 
1. Lessons Learnt sessions should be held under Chatham House Rule in order to encourage openness and sharing 
of information: "When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the 
information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed". 
 
2. When sharing any information arising from the sessions e.g. summarising discussions and/or recommendations 
with a third party, individual trainees should not be identified  i.e.  one  may  conclude  that  ‘The  Foundation  trainee  
cohort found that etc.’  unless the trainee(s) explicitly agrees to be identified and/or wishes to work with the third party 
to action any recommendations (e.g. through a quality improvement project).   
 
3. Presenting trainees should report the patient safety incident discussed at the Lessons Learnt session via their local 
Incident Reporting System. Note that this applies to all patient safety incidents including those where no apparent 
patient harm resulted  e.g.  ‘near  misses’.   
 
Escalating concerns   
 
Lessons Learnt facilitators are expected to use their judgement and experience to ensure that any concerns arising 
following discussion of a patient safety incident are escalated appropriately.  
 
4. Where a case highlights that patient safety is or may be seriously compromised by inadequate premises, 
equipment, or other resources, policies or systems you should raise the issue with the relevant Medical / Clinical 
Director to take action.   
 
5. Where a case highlights that Foundation trainee safety is or may be seriously compromised you should raise the 
issue with the Foundation Programme Director (FPD) in the first instance.   
 
6. Where the fitness to practise of a colleague involved in the case discussed is called into question, you should raise 
your concerns with the appropriate person. In the case of Foundation trainees, you should discuss your concerns with 
the FPD. The FPD will be best placed to investigate this further in consultation with the trainee and the relevant 
clinical/ educational supervisor(s).  
 
Notes 
This  guidance  is  based  on  the  GMC’s  guide  to  Good Medical Practice. In particular: 
 
“If  you  have  good   reason   to   think   that  patient  safety   is  or  may  be  seriously  compromised  by   inadequate  premises, 
equipment, or other resources, policies or systems, you should put the matter right if that is possible. In all other cases 
you should draw the matter to the attention of your employing or contracting body. If they do not take adequate action, 
you should take independent advice on how to take the matter further. You must record your concerns and the steps 
you  have  taken  to  try  to  resolve  them.” (Paragraph 6) 
 
“You  must  protect  patients  from  risk  of  harm  posed  by  another  colleague’s  conduct,  performance or health. The safety 
of patients must come first at all times. If you have concerns that a colleague may not be fit to practise, you must take 
appropriate steps without delay, so that the concerns are investigated and patients protected where necessary. This 
means you must give an honest explanation of your concerns to an appropriate person from your employing or 
contracting  body,  and  follow  their  procedures.”  (Paragraph 43) 
 
This guidance is not comprehensive and has been developed specifically for the ‘Lessons  Learnt’   programme  and  
approved by the Foundation School Director.  For further guidance on raising concerns about patient safety, please 
refer  to  the  GMC  document  ‘Raising  and  acting  on  concerns  about  patient  safety’  (2012).   
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Appendix 4:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Lead  recruitment  flyer 
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Appendix 5: ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Launch  Conference satisfaction results 
 
The ‘Lessons  Learnt’  Launch  Conference  was very well received. 111 delegates attended and 83 (75%) completed the 
evaluation form.  Results are summarised in the table below. 
 
Satisfaction questionnaire item % Agreed or strongly agreed* 
This event improved my understanding of patient safety and human factors 
This event was well-delivered and engaging 
The information was provided in a way that was easy to understand 
Following this event, I feel excited about implementing Lessons Learnt locally 
Following this event, I feel more prepared to implement Lessons Learnt locally 
80% 
87% 
86% 
82% 
72% 
Free text strengths of the event 
“...The  strength  of  the  Launch conference was in preparing ALL members involved in North Western deanery whether clinician or 
not,  for  going  on  to  lead  with  Lessons  Learnt...”  Foundation Programme Administrator 
 
“...Very  well  organised.  Extremely  motivating.  Prof  Jim  Reason  was  an  impressive name and all speakers were very well 
prepared...” Foundation Programme Director 
 
 “...Finally  we  will  be  turning  reflection  into  action  to  encourage  all-round learning – filling in incident forms is simply not 
enough!  I  can’t  wait  to  start  as  Lessons  Learnt  F2  Lead...” Prospective Lead 
Free text suggestions for improvement 
“...A  mock  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session  would  be  useful  to  see  how  the  session  should  run...”  Prospective Lead 
“...More  time  to  discuss  possible  barriers  to  trainees  presenting  a  case  &  how  to  address  this...”  Prospective faculty  
* Score 4 (agree) or 5 (strongly agree) on 5-point Likert scale 
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Appendix 6:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  local  launch-pack 
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Appendix 7:  How  to  run  a  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  session 
 
 LEAD FACILITATOR GROUP / SUB-GROUP* TRAINEE PRESENTER 
 
Session 
introduction & 
preparation  
(5 minutes) 
- Introduce trainee presenter & 
facilitator 
- Recap session structure & 
Chatham House Rule  
- Provide contributory factors 
form to each sub-group Lead or 
share between 2-3 trainees 
- Ensure facilitator has a copy of the 
PSI proforma to guide discussion 
- If group is larger than 10, split into sub-groups* 
of max. 10 trainees 
- Ask each sub-group to appoint a Lead to 
feedback on discussion points below 
- Optional: Appoint scribe for group as whole  
 
 
- Divide into sub-groups as 
necessary 
 
- Provide facilitator with a 
presentation appraisal form  
(if you wish to be assessed) 
Case presentation 
(10 minutes) 
- Complete sections A & B of PSI 
proforma 
 
  - Present anonymised case 
Group discussion 
(25 minutes) 
- Complete sections C, D & E of 
PSI proforma based on group 
consensus  
- Remember to contribute to 
discussions too!  
 
- Invite group to clarify  aspects  of  case  ‘story’ 
- Using the PSI proforma as a guide, ensure the 
discussion covers the following: 
1. What was the outcome for the patient? 
The trainee? The team? 
2. What were the contributory factors?  
3. What actions would prevent this from 
happening again?  
TIPS: 
- Ask group(s) to discuss each point in turn 
- Involve the presenter in discussions 
- Encourage group members to reflect on their 
own experiences & share your own 
- Don’t  allow  group  to  get  hung  up  on  which  
contributory factors fit under which heading – 
they often overlap – choose most appropriate 
 
- Seek clarification on the case 
‘story’  as  required 
- Discuss and feedback on each 
point in turn 
- Optional: Group scribe notes down 
contributory factors to case and 
any proposed actions for each 
factor 
  
- Provide additional info 
regarding  case  ‘story’  as  
required / where possible 
- Contribute to discussion  
Summarise 
Lessons Learnt  
& Next Steps  
(15 minutes) 
 
- Complete sections E & F of PSI 
proforma based on group 
consensus  
- Encourage agreement on practical 
next steps 
- Ask presenter what were the Lessons Learnt? 
- Ask group what were the Lessons Learnt?   
- Agree next steps with group – any actions 
they want to take forward?  
- Recap ground rules & encourage presenter to 
complete HIRs form and reflect in portfolio 
- Offer support as necessary  
 
Share your views on Lessons Learnt and any actions to take forward 
 
Feedback & Close  
(5 minutes) 
- Check PSI proforma with facilitator 
- Close the session and give thanks 
- Complete facilitator assessment 
 
- Ask group what went well and ways to improve 
future sessions 
- Review PSI proforma (completed by Lead) 
- Complete trainee presenter appraisal (if asked) 
- Escalate any concerns as per guidance 
Feedback on how session went & 
ways to improve future sessions 
- Feedback on how session went 
& ways to improve future sessions 
- Retrieve presentation appraisal 
from facilitator (if requested) 
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Appendix 8:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  contributing  factors  form 
 
1. Why did it happen? Consider which of the factors listed below contributed to the incident.  Provide a brief explanation  for  each.  Don’t  get  too  bogged  down  with  which  heading  it  falls  under! 
2. What can we do to prevent similar incidents from occurring?  Actions can be aspirational but try to think of practical next steps. 
 
CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR 1. What were the contributory factors? 2. What actions would address the factor(s) involved? 
Patient factors  
Patient’s  condition  (complexity  and  
seriousness); language & communication; 
personality & social factors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task & Technology factors 
Task design & clarity of structure; availability & 
use of protocols/ guidelines; availability & 
accuracy of test results; decision making aids  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual staff factors  
Knowledge & skills; competence; physical & 
mental health  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team factors  
Verbal & written communication; supervision & 
seeking help; team structure (congruence, 
consistency, leadership, etc.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Work environment factors  
Staffing levels & skills mix; workload & shift 
patterns; design, availability & maintenance of 
equipment; administrative & managerial 
support; work environment & physical factors   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisational & Management factors  
Financial resources & constraints; 
organisational structure; policy, standards & 
goals; safety culture and priorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wider institutional context factors   
Economic & regulatory context; NHS 
Executive; links with external organisations 
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Appendix 9:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  presenters’  guide 
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Appendix 10:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  presenters’  certificate  template 
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Appendix 11:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty  recruitment  flyer 
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Appendix 12:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty  course  pre-post evaluation questionnaire 
 
 
Please complete this evaluation independently. Please remember to include your name and position at the top of this 
page in order to enable a comparison of responses pre and post-course. Where reported, all results will be presented 
in an anonymised, aggregate form. We are happy to provide personalised feedback on request at a later date. 
 
 
PART 1: PATIENT SAFETY KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
A: Please circle one answer for each question below: 
 
1. Approximately what proportion of inpatients suffer a 
patient safety incident (PSI) during their care? 
a) 0.1% 
b) 1% 
c) 10% 
d) 30% 
e) 50% 
 
2. Which UK organisation was developed in 2001 to support 
reporting and learning from error? 
a) The Health Foundation  
b) The Care Quality Commission 
c) Monitor 
d) The National Patient Safety Agency 
e) The Centre for Patient Safety and Service Quality   
 
3. Which statement best describes a patient safety incident?   
a) An incident that could have or did lead to patient 
harm 
b) An incident reported to a risk management system 
by a risk manager 
c) Clinician error which led to patient harm 
d) Systems error which led to patient harm 
e) An incident which enhanced patient safety  
 
4. The London protocol is based on what model? 
a) The System model 
b) The Process model 
c) The Surgical model 
d) The Person model 
e) The Outcome model 
 
5. Which of these is NOT a non-technical skill? 
a) Leadership 
b) Communication 
c) Teamwork 
d) Examining a patient  
e) Coping with pressure 
 
 
6. Initial estimates of the scale of inpatient PSIs were based 
on what methodology? 
a) Cohort studies 
b) Case record review 
c) Crossover trials 
d) Observational studies 
e) Randomised controlled trials 
 
7. Which of the following statements are true? 
a) Most PSIs are the result of staff carelessness 
b) Most PSIs are unavoidable 
c) Most PSIs are the result of system failures 
d) Most PSIs are voluntarily reported to relevant risk 
management systems 
e) All of the above 
 
8. What type of tool is the London Protocol? 
a) Interview protocol 
b) Root cause analysis tool 
c) Observational tool 
d) Failure modes and effects analysis tool 
e) Questionnaire tool 
 
9. Which one of the following documents by the UK 
Department of Health first established Patient Safety as a 
priority? 
a) To Err is Human 
b) Crossing the Quality chasm 
c) Lessons from High-risk Industry 
d) Seven steps to Patient Safety 
e) An Organisation with a Memory  
 
10. Which of the below does NOT describe the role of a 
facilitator? 
a) Bring difficult issues to the surface 
b) Create a safe, open environment for discussion 
c) Maintain focus on the task at hand 
d) Act as team leader 
e) Listen more, speak less 
 
 
B: Please circle the number that best describes your level of knowledge for each item: 
What is your level of knowledge regarding: Low    High 
1. Different types of patient safety incident 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Factors contributing to patient safety incidents 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Factors influencing patient safety 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Ways of speaking up about patient safety incidents 1 2 3 4 5 
5. What should happen if a patient safety incident occurs 1 2 3 4 5 
6. How to report a patient safety incident 1 2 3 4 5 
7. The role of NHS Trusts in incident reporting 1 2 3 4 5 
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PART 2: PATIENT SAFETY ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS 
 
A: Please circle the number that best describes your feelings for each statement: 
      
Telling others about an error I made would be:  Difficult 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Easy 
5 
 Worthless 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Worthwhile 
5 
 Unacceptable 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Acceptable 
5 
 Unhelpful 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Helpful 
5 
 
 
B: Thinking about your personal beliefs with regard to patient safety, please circle the number that best describes your 
own view for each statement: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
By concentrating on the causes of patient safety incidents (PSIs) I can 
contribute to patient safety.  
1 2 3 4 5 
If I keep learning from my mistakes, I can prevent PSIs. 1 2 3 4 5 
Acknowledging and dealing with my errors is an important part of my job. 1 2 3 4 5 
It is appropriate to challenge well-established practices even if they 
compromise patient safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being open and honest about the mistakes I make is acceptable at my place 
of work. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Admitting an error I had made would lead to just and fair treatment by 
management. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
C: Thinking about your own ability to influence patient safety, please circle the number that best describes your personal 
view for each statement: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
It is easier to find someone to blame rather than focus on the causes of error. 1 2 3 4 5 
I am confident about speaking to someone who is showing a lack of concern 
for  a  patient’s  safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I know how to talk to people who have made an error. 1 2 3 4 5 
I am always able to ensure that patient safety is not compromised. 1 2 3 4 5 
I believe that filling in reporting forms will help to improve patient safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
I am able to talk about my own errors. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
D: Thinking about your intentions regarding patient safety issues in the next 6 months, please circle the number that best 
describes your personal view for each statement: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
I will report any errors I make at my place of work. 1 2 3 4 5 
I intend to challenge any complacency I notice with regard to patient safety 
issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I intend to clearly communicate my safety expectations to members of my 
healthcare team(s). 
1 2 3 4 5 
I will support any members of my team who are involved in a PSI. 1 2 3 4 5 
I plan to inform my colleagues about the errors they make. 1 2 3 4 5 
I will intervene whenever I think a patient may be exposed to harm. 1 2 3 4 5 
I plan to make a point of learning from the mistakes of others. 1 2 3 4 5 
I plan to support trainees to learn from their own/ their team mistakes.  1 2 3 4 5 
I plan to support trainees to engage in quality improvement initiatives.   1 2 3 4 5 
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PART 3: FACILITATION PREPAREDNESS 
 
Please circle the number that best describes your confidence for each item: 
 
How confident do you feel regarding:  Low    High 
Identifying a patient safety incident 1 2 3 4 5 
Analysing a patient safety incident  1 2 3 4 5 
Facilitating group reflection on patient safety incidents  1 2 3 4 5 
Generating learning from an incident 1 2 3 4 5 
Identifying actions to be taken to prevent future incidents 1 2 3 4 5 
Supporting  trainees  to  learn  from  their  own/  team’s  mistakes   1 2 3 4 5 
Supporting and advising trainees on how to respond to a PSI 1 2 3 4 5 
Supporting trainees to engage in quality improvement initiatives 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
PART 4: COURSE SATISFACTION 
 
Course content 
This training course: Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
Improved my understanding of patient safety 1 2 3 4 5 
Improved my understanding of how to analyse a patient safety incident 1 2 3 4 5 
Refreshed my knowledge regarding the principles of effective group facilitation 1 2 3 4 5 
Course delivery  
This course was well-delivered and engaging 1 2 3 4 5 
The information was provided in a way which was easy to understand 1 2 3 4 5 
The teaching and learning materials were of appropriate quality 1 2 3 4 5 
The learning objectives were met 1 2 3 4 5 
Course satisfaction 
Overall, I am satisfied with this course 1 2 3 4 5 
I would recommend this course to a colleague 1 2 3 4 5 
Following this course, I feel excited about facilitating Lessons Learnt locally  1 2 3 4 5 
Following this course, I feel more prepared to facilitate Lessons Learnt locally 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Strengths of this course 
 
 
 
Suggestions for improvement 
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Appendix 13:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty  appraisal  form 
 
This form should be completed by the Trainee Lead at the end of every Lessons Learnt session. Please submit completed forms via HORUS  
 
Trust  
Hospital  
Date of session  
Number of attendees (excl. Lead & facilitator)  
Facilitator name & Specialty   
Lead name & Grade (FY1 / FY2)  
With regards to the current Lessons Learnt session, please rate the performance of the facilitator below: Strongly disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
General approach      
1. The facilitator nurtured a safe and supportive learning environment 1 2 3 4 5 
2. The facilitator encouraged the participation of all trainees in the discussion, not just the presenter 1 2 3 4 5 
3. The  facilitator  explored  the  group’s  reactions  to  the  case,  dealing  appropriately  with  trainees  who  were  unhappy  /  confused 1 2 3 4 5 
Discussion & analysis of incident      
4. The facilitator encouraged discussion on what happened, including the outcome of the incident 1 2 3 4 5 
5. The facilitator encouraged discussion on the contributory factors to the incident 1 2 3 4 5 
6. The facilitator encouraged discussion on actions to address the contributory factors 1 2 3 4 5 
7. The facilitator encouraged the group to reflect and share their experiences of similar incidents 1 2 3 4 5 
Summary & next steps      
8. The facilitator reinforced key learning points from the case and how to apply this learning to future practice 1 2 3 4 5 
9. The facilitator encouraged the presenter to complete an incident form 1 2 3 4 5 
10. The facilitator encouraged the group to engage in quality improvement project(s) 1 2 3 4 5 
11. At the end of the session, the facilitator encouraged constructive feedback on how the session went  1 2 3 4 5 
Overall view      
12. The facilitator encouraged the group to think critically about Patient Safety 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Overall, I am satisfied with how the session was facilitated  1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 14: ‘Lessons  Learnt’ faculty evaluation: additional results  
 
This Appendix  contains  additional  results  relating  to  the  evaluation  of  the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  faculty  course.  This  
includes the following: 
(i) Full break-down of patient safety knowledge, skills, attitudes and behavioural intention scores pre and 
post-course for both faculty cohorts (2010-2011 and 2011-2012 academic years)  
(ii) Full break-down of patient safety knowledge, skills, attitudes and behavioural intention scores 
immediately post and 8-months post-course for the first faculty cohort (2010-2011 year)  
(iii) Internal consistency of the patient safety attitudes scales 
 
(i) Patient safety knowledge, skills, attitudes and behavioural intentions: Both faculty cohorts (pre- and immediately post-
course) 
Domains 
Pre-course Post-course  
Median Range Median Range P-value 
Subjective knowledge* 
1. Different types of patient safety incident 
2. Factors contributing to patient safety incidents 
3. Factors influencing patient safety 
4. Ways of speaking up about patient safety incidents 
5. What should happen if a patient safety incident occurs 
6. How to report a patient safety incident 
7. The role of NHS Trusts in incident reporting 
 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.00 
1.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Confidence in skills* 
1. Identifying a patient safety incident (PSI) 
2. Analysing a PSI  
3. Facilitating group reflection on PSIs 
4. Generating learning from a PSI 
5. Identifying actions to be taken to prevent future PSIs 
6. Supporting  trainees  to  learn  from  their  own/teams’  mistakes 
7. Supporting and advising trainees on how to respond to a PSI 
8. Supporting trainees to engage in quality improvement initiatives  
 
4.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
3.00 
3.00 
2.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Attitudes*       
Feelings about making errors 
Telling others about an error I made would be: 
1. Difficult (1) to Easy (5) 
2. Worthless (1) to Worthwhile (5) 
3. Unacceptable (1) to Acceptable (5) 
4. Unhelpful (1) to Helpful (5) 
 
Personal attitudes to patient safety 
1. By concentrating on the causes of PSIs I can contribute to patient 
safety. 
2. If I keep learning from my mistakes, I can prevent PSIs. 
3. Acknowledging and dealing with my errors is an important part of my 
job. 
4. It is appropriate to challenge well-established practices even if they 
compromise patient safety. 
5. Being open and honest about the mistakes I make is acceptable at my 
place of work. 
6. Admitting an error I had made would lead to just and fair treatment by 
management. 
 
 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
5.00 
 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
5.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
3.00 
 
 
 
1.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
 
 
3.00-5.00 
 
1.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
 
 
4.00 
5.00 
4.00 
5.00 
 
 
5.00 
 
4.00 
5.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
 
 
1.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
 
 
<0.001 
0.024 
0.534 
0.069 
 
 
0.273 
 
0.031 
0.364 
 
0.214 
 
0.226 
 
<0.001 
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Personal influence over patient safety  
1. It is easier to find someone to blame rather than focus on the causes of 
error. 
2. I am confident about speaking to someone who is showing a lack of 
concern  for  a  patient’s  safety. 
3. I know how to talk to people who have made an error. 
4. I am always able to ensure that patient safety is not compromised. 
5. I believe that filling in reporting forms will help to improve patient 
safety. 
6. I am able to talk about my own errors. 
 
 
 
3.00 
 
4.00 
 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
 
3.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
 
0.636 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
0.028 
Behavioural intentions*       
 
Intentions regarding patient safety in next 6 months 
1. I will report any errors I make at my place of work. 
2. I intend to challenge any complacency I notice with regard to patient 
safety issues. 
3. I intend to clearly communicate my safety expectations to members of 
my healthcare team(s). 
4. I will support any members of my team who are involved in a PSI. 
5. I plan to inform my colleagues about the errors they make. 
6. I will intervene whenever I think a patient may be exposed to harm. 
7. I plan to make a point of learning from the mistakes of others. 
8. I plan to support trainees to learn from their own/ their team mistakes. 
9. I plan to support trainees to engage in quality improvement initiatives.  
 
 
 
4.00 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
4.00 
5.00 
4.00 
5.00 
4.00 
 
 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
3.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
 
4.00 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
5.00 
4.00 
5.00 
4.00 
5.00 
5.00 
 
 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
3.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
4.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
4.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
0.002 
 
0.061 
<0.001 
0.353 
1.000 
0.835 
0.106 
* Rating scale: 1= very low/disagree strongly; 2= low/disagree; 3= average/neutral; 4= high/agree; 5= very high/strongly agree 
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(ii) Patient safety knowledge, skills, attitudes and behavioural intentions: first faculty cohort (immediately post and 8-months 
post-course) 
 
Domains 
Post-course 8 months post-course 
Median Range Median Range P-value 
Subjective knowledge* 
1. Different types of patient safety incident 
2. Factors contributing to patient safety incidents 
3. Factors influencing patient safety 
4. Ways of speaking up about patient safety incidents 
5. What should happen if a patient safety incident occurs 
6. How to report a patient safety incident 
7. The role of NHS Trusts in incident reporting 
 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
4.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
2.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
0.012 
0.096 
0.021 
0.414 
0.527 
1.000 
0.317 
Confidence in skills* 
1. Identifying a patient safety incident (PSI) 
2. Analysing a PSI  
3. Facilitating group reflection on PSIs 
4. Generating learning from a PSI 
5. Identifying actions to be taken to prevent future PSIs 
6. Supporting trainees to  learn  from  their  own/teams’  mistakes 
7. Supporting and advising trainees on how to respond to a PSI 
8. Supporting trainees to engage in quality improvement initiatives  
 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
0.109 
0.285 
0.796 
0.366 
0.218 
0.257 
0.480 
0.206 
Attitudes*      
 
Feelings about making errors 
Telling others about an error I made would be: 
1. Difficult (1) to Easy (5) 
2. Worthless (1) to Worthwhile (5) 
3. Unacceptable (1) to Acceptable (5) 
4. Unhelpful (1) to Helpful (5) 
 
Personal attitudes to patient safety 
1. By concentrating on the causes of PSIs I can contribute to patient 
safety. 
2. If I keep learning from my mistakes, I can prevent PSIs. 
3. Acknowledging and dealing with my errors is an important part of my 
job. 
4. It is appropriate to challenge well-established practices even if they 
compromise patient safety. 
5. Being open and honest about the mistakes I make is acceptable at my 
place of work. 
6. Admitting an error I had made would lead to just and fair treatment by 
management. 
 
Personal influence over patient safety  
1. It is easier to find someone to blame rather than focus on the causes of 
error. 
2. I am confident about speaking to someone who is showing a lack of 
concern  for  a  patient’s  safety. 
3. I know how to talk to people who have made an error. 
4. I am always able to ensure that patient safety is not compromised. 
5. I believe that filling in reporting forms will help to improve patient 
safety. 
6. I am able to talk about my own errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
3.00 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
 
 
1.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
 
3.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
1.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
 
 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.50 
 
 
5.00 
 
4.00 
5.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
3.00 
 
 
 
3.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.00 
3.00 
3.00 
 
4.00 
 
 
 
1.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
4.00-5.00 
 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
3.00-5.00 
4.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
2.00-5.00 
 
1.00-5.00 
 
 
 
1.00-4.00 
 
3.00-5.00 
 
2.00-4.00 
2.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
 
3.00-4.00 
 
 
 
0.171 
0.763 
0.448 
0.132 
 
 
0.739 
 
0.317 
0.059 
 
0.822 
 
0.768 
 
0.199 
 
 
 
0.935 
 
0.564 
 
0.782 
0.227 
0.123 
 
0.655 
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Behavioural intentions*      
 
Intentions regarding patient safety in next 6 months 
1. I will report any errors I make at my place of work. 
2. I intend to challenge any complacency I notice with regard to patient 
safety issues. 
3. I intend to clearly communicate my safety expectations to members of 
my healthcare team(s). 
4. I will support any members of my team who are involved in a PSI. 
5. I plan to inform my colleagues about the errors they make. 
6. I will intervene whenever I think a patient may be exposed to harm. 
7. I plan to make a point of learning from the mistakes of others. 
8. I plan to support trainees to learn from their own/ their team mistakes. 
9. I plan to support trainees to engage in quality improvement initiatives.   
 
 
 
4.00 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
5.00 
4.00 
5.00 
4.00 
5.00 
5.00 
 
 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
3.00-5.00 
 
4.00-5.00 
2.00-5.00 
4.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
4.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
 
4.00 
4.00 
 
4.00 
 
4.50 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
 
 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
 
3.00-5.00 
 
4.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
3.00-5.00 
4.00-5.00 
4.00-5.00 
4.00-5.00 
 
 
1.000 
1.000 
 
0.414 
 
1.000 
0.763 
0.480 
0.366 
1.000 
0.739 
* Rating scale: 1= very low/disagree strongly; 2= low/disagree; 3= average/neutral; 4= high/agree; 5= very high/strongly agree 
 
 
 
 
(iii) Internal consistency of the patient  safety  attitudes  scale  (Cronbach’s  Alpha) 
Domain Pre-course  
(Both cohorts) 
Post-course 
(Both cohorts) 
8 months post-course  
(First cohort only) 
 
Feelings about making error 0.771 0.852 0.662 
Personal attitudes to patient safety  0.643 0.785 0.732 
Personal influence over patient safety* 0.516 0.765 0.507 
* Excludes item 1 due to poor internal consistency 
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Appendix 15:  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  trainees’  pre-post intervention questionnaire  
 
As part of the evaluation of the Lessons Learnt project, all Foundation Trainees across the North Western Deanery are being asked 
to complete this questionnaire on knowledge, attitudes and skills in Patient Safety.  
 
Please complete ALL sections of this questionnaire independently and remember to include your details at the top of this page in 
order to enable a comparison of responses at baseline and year-end. Please note that when reported, all results will be presented 
in an anonymised, aggregate form. We are happy to provide personalised feedback on request at year-end (July / August 2011). 
 
PART 1: PATIENT SAFETY KNOWLEDGE 
 
A: Please circle one answer for each question below: 
 
1. Approximately what proportion of inpatients suffer a 
patient safety incident (PSI) during their care? 
a) 0.1% 
b) 1% 
c) 10% 
d) 30% 
e) 50% 
 
2. Which UK organisation was developed in 2001 to support 
reporting and learning from error? 
a) The Health Foundation  
b) The Care Quality Commission 
c) Monitor 
d) The National Patient Safety Agency 
e) The Centre for Patient Safety and Service Quality   
 
3. Which statement best describes a patient safety incident 
(PSI)?  
a) An incident that could have or did lead to patient 
harm 
b) An incident reported to a risk management system 
by a risk manager 
c) Clinician error which led to patient harm 
d) Systems error which led to patient harm 
e) An incident which enhanced patient safety  
 
4. The London protocol is based on what model? 
a) The System model 
b) The Process model 
c) The Surgical model 
d) The Person model 
e) The Outcome model 
 
5. Which of these is NOT a non-technical skill? 
a) Leadership 
b) Communication 
c) Teamwork 
d) Examining a patient  
e) Coping with pressure 
6. Initial estimates of the scale of inpatient PSIs were based 
on what methodology? 
a) Cohort studies 
b) Case record review 
c) Crossover trials 
d) Observational studies 
e) Randomised controlled trials 
 
7. Which of the following statements are true? 
a) Most PSIs are the result of staff carelessness 
b) Most PSIs are unavoidable 
c) Most PSIs are the result of system failures 
d) Most PSIs are voluntarily reported to relevant risk 
management systems 
e) All of the above 
 
8. What type of tool is the London Protocol? 
a) Interview protocol 
b) Root cause analysis tool 
c) Observational tool 
d) Failure modes and effects analysis tool 
e) Questionnaire tool 
 
9. Which one of the following documents by the UK 
Department of Health first established Patient Safety as a 
priority? 
a) To Err is Human 
b) Crossing the Quality chasm 
c) Lessons from High-risk Industry 
d) Seven steps to Patient Safety 
e) An Organisation with a Memory  
 
10. Which of the following is NOT a potential contributing 
factor to an adverse event?  
a) Staff inexperience 
b) Communication problems 
c) High-risk patient 
d) Hand-washing 
e) Lack of financial resources 
 
 
B: Please circle the number that best describes your level of knowledge for each item: 
What is your level of knowledge regarding: Low    High 
1. Different types of patient safety incident 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Factors contributing to patient safety incidents 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Factors influencing patient safety 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Ways of speaking up about patient safety incidents 1 2 3 4 5 
5. What should happen if a patient safety incident occurs 1 2 3 4 5 
6. How to report a patient safety incident 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
   
233  
 
PART 2: PATIENT SAFETY ATTITUDES & INTENTIONS 
 
A: For each statement please circle the number that best describes your feelings: 
      
1. Telling others about an error I made would be:  Difficult 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Easy 
5 
2. Telling others about an error I made would be: Worthless 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Worthwhile 
5 
3. Telling others about an error I made would be: Unacceptable 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Acceptable 
5 
4. Telling others about an error I made would be: Unhelpful 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Helpful 
5 
 
 
B: Thinking about your personal beliefs with regard to patient safety, please circle the number that best 
describes your own view for each statement: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
1. By concentrating on the causes of patient safety incidents (PSIs) I can 
contribute to patient safety.  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. If I keep learning from my mistakes, I can prevent PSIs. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Acknowledging and dealing with my errors is an important part of my job. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. It is appropriate to challenge well-established practices even if they 
compromise patient safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Being open and honest about the mistakes I make is acceptable at my 
place of work. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Admitting an error I had made would lead to just and fair treatment by 
management. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
C: Thinking about your own ability to influence patient safety, please circle the number that best describes 
your personal view for each statement: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
1. It is easier to find someone to blame rather than focus on the causes of 
error. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I am confident about speaking to someone who is showing a lack of 
concern  for  a  patient’s  safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I know how to talk to people who have made an error. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I am always able to ensure that patient safety is not compromised. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I believe that filling in reporting forms will help to improve patient safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am able to talk about my own errors. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
D: Thinking about your intentions regarding patient safety issues in the next 6 months, please circle the 
number that best describes your personal view for each statement: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
1. I will report any errors I make at my place of work. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I intend to challenge any complacency I notice with regard to patient 
safety issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I intend to clearly communicate my safety expectations to members of my 
healthcare team(s). 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I will support any members of my team who are involved in a PSI. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I plan to inform my colleagues about the errors they make. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I will intervene whenever I think a patient may be exposed to harm. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. I plan to make a point of learning from the mistakes of others. 1 2 3 4 5 
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PART 3: PATIENT SAFETY SKILLS & BEHAVIOURS 
A: Thinking about your ability & skills, please circle the number that best describes your view for each item: 
 
I am able to:  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
1. Identify a patient safety incident (PSI) 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Identify situations which could lead to a PSI 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Analyse a PSI to identify contributory factors 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Generate learning from a PSI 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Identify actions to be taken to prevent future incidents 1 2 3 4 5 
B: Please circle one answer for each question below:  
1. How many PSIs are you aware of that have occurred in the past 6 months? 0 1 2 3 4 5 or more 
2. How many PSIs have you reflected on in your portfolio in the past 6 months? 0 1 2 3 4 5 or more 
3. How many PSIs have you discussed with your colleagues in the past 6 months? 0 1 2 3 4 5 or more 
4. How many PSIs have you or your team disclosed to a patient in the past 6 months? 0 1 2 3 4 5 or more 
5. How many PSIs have you reported via Incident Reporting Systems in the past 6months? 0 1 2 3 4 5 or more 
 
 
PART 4: SATISFACTION WITH LESSONS LEARNT 
 
Please rate your satisfaction with the  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  programme 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
   Strongly 
agree 
Lessons Learnt promotes an  ‘open  and  learning’  safety  culture 1 2 3 4 5 
The frequency and timing of sessions was appropriate (i.e. monthly 1-hour sessions) 1 2 3 4 5 
Lessons Learnt should be continued at my Trust 1 2 3 4 5 
Lessons Learnt should form a regular part of Foundation teaching across all Trusts  1 2 3 4 5 
Overall, I am satisfied with Lessons Learnt  1 2 3 4 5 
 
What are the strengths of Lessons Learnt?  
 
 
 
 
 
How could Lessons Learnt be improved?  
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Appendix  16:  Guidance  for  ‘Lessons  Learnt’  data  collection   
 
Lessons Learnt Baseline Evaluation January 2011: Actions for FPAs & Trainee Leads 
 
The baseline evaluation will form part of the local launch in January 2011. It forms a key part of evaluating the Lessons Learnt 
project as a whole and aims to assess Foundation trainee knowledge, skills and attitudes in patient safety.  
 
The Lessons Learnt team will email the baseline evaluation to all FPAs by early January 2011. In order to ensure smooth running 
we rely on the support of both FPAs and Trainee Leads as detailed below. We thank you in advance for your cooperation. For any 
queries, please contact the team at lessonslearntnw@gmail.com  
 
 FPA Actions Lead Actions 
 
 
 
Please produce sufficient copies of the evaluation forms 
(comprises 3 pages)  - one set per Foundation trainee 
 
Please ensure that the evaluation is not forwarded to 
trainees ahead of the launch 
 
 
 
 
 
Create a ‘register’  of  trainees  to  help  you  to organise 
collection of the evaluation forms 
 
Name Present for launch  Baseline evaluation 
completed  
 Indicate if trainee was 
late or absent 
 
  
  No specific action. Please support the trainee Leads as 
required 
 
Distribute evaluation forms to trainees (one set per 
trainee) at the start of the launch session 
 
Remind trainees regarding the following: 
- Forms should be completed independently – without 
conferring or using references 
- Emphasise that all responses will be reported in an 
anonymised, aggregate form  
 
Collect completed forms before the introductory 
presentation 
 
  Please collect and store all completed evaluation forms for 
sending later (see below) 
 
Please submit all completed evaluation forms to your FPA 
 
Identify trainees who were late or absent and ask them to 
complete a baseline evaluation form and return to you 
ASAP and within 2 weeks of the launch (you can provide 
either an electronic or paper copy)  
 
Send a reminder to trainees  who  haven’t  returned the 
completed evaluation at one week following the launch 
 
  Please compile all completed evaluation forms (including 
those from trainees who were late or absent for the 
launch) 
 
Please photocopy all completed evaluation forms. 
Please store the photocopies until we confirm receipt of 
the originals at which point the copies can be discarded 
 
Please send the originals to the address below by 
standard delivery: 
 
Dr Maria Ahmed 
Clinical Research Fellow  
Room 504 Medical School Building  
Imperial College London 
Norfolk Place 
London 
W2 1PG 
 
 
Please write LATE at the top of any forms returned by late 
or absent trainees  
 
Please pass on any additional forms completed by the 2-
week deadline to your FPA  
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Appendix 17: ‘Lessons  Learnt’  trainees’  evaluation: additional results 
 
This Appendix contains a full breakdown of  (i)  Foundation  trainees’  patient  safety  attitudes  and behavioural 
intentions scores pre-post intervention and (ii) internal consistency of the patient safety attitudes and behavioural 
intentions scales. 
 
(i)  Trainees’  patient  safety  attitudes  and behavioural intentions pre-post intervention 
 
Domains 
Pre-intervention Post-intervention  
Mean SD Mean SD P-value 
Feelings about making errors      
1. Telling others about an error I made would be difficult (1) to easy (5) 3.22 0.99 3.42 0.90 <0.001 
2. Telling others about an error I made would be: worthless (1) to 
worthwhile (5) 
4.25 0.77 4.09 0.76 <0.001 
3. Telling others about an error I made would be: unacceptable (1) to 
acceptable (5) 
4.24 0.76 4.09 0.76 0.001 
4. Telling others about an error I made would be: unhelpful (1) to helpful (5) 4.28 0.76 4.12 0.80 0.001 
Average score 4.00 0.61 3.93 0.62 0.073 
Personal attitudes to patient safety      
1. By concentrating on the causes of patient safety incidents (PSIs) I can 
contribute to patient safety.  
4.13 0.62 4.02 0.68 0.003 
2. If I keep learning from my mistakes, I can prevent PSIs. 4.21 0.69 4.13 0.67 0.041 
3. Acknowledging and dealing with my errors is an important part of my 
job. 
4.43 0.64 4.25 0.65 <0.001 
4. It is appropriate to challenge well-established practices even if they 
compromise patient safety. 
3.90 0.95 4.04 0.75 0.004 
5. Being open and honest about the mistakes I make is acceptable at my 
place of work. 
3.96 0.76 3.85 0.69 0.011 
6. Admitting an error I had made would lead to just and fair treatment by 
management. 
3.47 0.88 3.58 0.82 0.024 
Average score 4.02 0.48 3.98 0.50 0.200 
Personal influence over patient safety      
1. It is easier to find someone to blame rather than focus on the causes of 
error. 
2.88 1.05 2.96 1.03 0.194 
2. I am confident about speaking to someone who is showing a lack of 
concern  for  a  patient’s  safety. 
3.15 0.89 3.35 0.82 <0.001 
3. I know how to talk to people who have made an error. 3.12 0.80 3.34 0.76 <0.001 
4. I am always able to ensure that patient safety is not compromised. 3.03 0.90 3.33 0.82 <0.001 
5. I believe that filling in reporting forms will help to improve patient safety. 3.32 0.93 3.42 0.91 0.067 
6. I am able to talk about my own errors. 3.86 0.68 3.81 0.66 0.205 
Average score 3.30 0.55 3.45 0.55 <0.001 
Intentions regarding patient safety in the next 6 months      
1. I will report any errors I make at my place of work. 3.93 0.70 3.95 0.63 0.565 
2. I intend to challenge any complacency I notice with regard to patient 
safety issues. 
3.81 0.66 3.88 0.64 0.067 
3. I intend to clearly communicate my safety expectations to members of 
my healthcare team(s). 
3.74 0.73 3.87 0.64 0.001 
4. I will support any members of my team who are involved in a PSI. 4.19 0.62 4.11 0.62 0.027 
5. I plan to inform my colleagues about the errors they make. 3.78 0.66 3.90 0.63 0.002 
6. I will intervene whenever I think a patient may be exposed to harm. 4.22 0.59 4.11 0.62 0.001 
7. I plan to make a point of learning from the mistakes of others. 4.29 0.62 4.15 0.64 <0.001 
Average score 3.99 0.47 4.00 0.50 0.951 
Rating scale: 1= very low/disagree strongly; 2= low/disagree; 3= average/neutral; 4= high/agree; 5= very high/strongly agree 
* Excludes item 1 due to poor internal consistency; Pre N=771-775, Post N=456-464 
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(ii) Internal consistency of the patient safety attitudes and behavioural intentions scales (Cronbach’s  Alpha) 
Domain Pre-intervention Post-intervention 
Feelings about making error  0.719 0.777 
Personal attitudes to patient safety  0.690 0.797 
Personal influence over patient safety* 0.660 0.735 
Intentions regarding patient safety in the next 6 months  0.843 0.905 
* Excludes item 1 due to poor internal consistency 
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Appendix 18: Interview schedule 
 
Topic Key Points/Phrases 
 
Introduction 
 
Trainees and Trainers 
-Establish ID  
-Introduce project – state  aim  of  interview  i.e.  ‘We  want  to  investigate  what  constitutes  an  effective  debrief  or  feedback  
to a trainee after they have performed a case (either in real theatre or in simulation). Debriefing is the process that 
occurs when you interact with others to reflect on the experience you have had, for example operating on a patient. In 
other words, it is feedback on your performance to allow you to understand how to improve and change your practice.’  
 
1. Purpose of 
debriefing and 
current practice 
 
Opening  statement  ‘First  of  all,  I’d  like  to  talk  about  debriefing,  or  feedback,  in  general’ 
 
‘What  is  your  view  on  the  purpose  of  debriefing? 
/  In  your  opinion,  what  are  the  main  goals  of  debriefing?’ 
 
Trainee 
‘Do  you  routinely  receive  feedback  or  debriefing  after  a  case?  If  so,  how  is  this  done?’ 
 
Trainer 
‘Do  you  routinely  give  feedback  or  debriefing  after  a  case?  If  so,  how  is  this  done?’ 
 
2. Examples of 
effective and 
ineffective 
feedback 
 
‘Ok  now  that  we’ve  talked  about  the  issue  in  general,  I’d  like  to  spend  some  time  focussing  on  your  experiences…’ 
 
Trainee 
‘Can  you  think  about  a  time  when  you  received  a  good  debrief  or  effective  feedback?  Why  did  you  find  it  effective?’ 
 
‘Can  you  recall  a  time  when  you  received  poor feedback or debriefing? Why was it not effective? Can you tell me about 
the  example?’ 
 
Trainer 
‘Can  you  recall  when  you  gave  a  trainee  a  good  debrief  or  effective  feedback?  What  was  it  that  made  it  effective?’ 
 
‘Can  you  think  about  a  time  when  you  gave  a  poor feedback or debrief? Why was it not effective? Can you tell me about 
the  example?’ 
 
3. Components 
of an effective 
debrief  
 
Trainee/Trainer 
‘What  do  you  think  are  the  core  components  of  an  effective  debrief?’   
‘How  do  you  think  it  could  be  structured?’ 
 
Prompts:  
1. How about other aspects such as communication, teamwork, leadership? 
2. If it would help, let’s  break  the  debriefing  into  what  you’d  like  at  the  start  of  the  debrief,  then  aspects  that  are  covered  
in more detail throughout the debrief, then how could it best be wrapped up at the end? 
 
4. Barriers to 
debriefing in 
practice  
 
 
Trainee 
‘What  do  you  see  as  the  barriers  to  receiving  effective  feedback  or  debriefing?  I.e. why do you not receive effective 
feedback all the time after a case? 
 
Trainer 
‘What  barriers  do  you  encounter  that  prevent  you  from  giving  effective  feedback  or  debriefing  i.e.  why  do  you  not  
always give effective feedback  or  debriefing  to  trainees  after  every  case?’ 
 
5. Strategies to 
improve 
debriefing 
 
‘How do you think that quality of debriefing/feedback can be improved to make it more educationally effective for the 
learner?’ 
 
Close 
 
Thank participant 
‘Is  there  anything  further  you  would  like  to  add…?’ 
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Appendix 19: Participants' perceptions vs. observed debriefing practice  
 
(Participants were surgical trainees and trainers at the surgical department of a large teaching hospital, London) 
 Participants’  perceptions  of debriefing practice 
(Phase 1: Interviews, n=20) 
Observed debriefing practice  
(Phase 2: Observations, n=35) 
General 
comparisons 
13 participants (65%) stated that debriefing is 
routinely provided/received in practice 
 
3 trainees (30%) stated that they routinely request 
debriefing from their trainer 
Debriefing was observed to be provided in only 
16 cases (46%) 
 
Trainees’  request  for  debriefing  was  observed  in  
only 2 cases (6%) 
Approach and 
timing of 
feedback  
Participants stated that debriefing or feedback 
should ideally be provided: 
 
During  the  case  to  ‘improve  performance  and  
patient  outcome’  and  after  the case  ‘to  
consolidate’  and  allow  a  more  comprehensive,  
structured feedback 
 
Verbally; written (minority)  
 
In a structured way 
 
In practice feedback was observed to be 
provided: 
 
During the case. Post-case feedback or 
debriefing was observed in only one case 
 
 
 
Verbally only 
 
In an unstructured way 
 
Corrective, didactic approach 
Content of 
debriefing 
Participants stated that debriefing should ideally 
comprise: 
 
Feedback on positive and negative aspects of 
performance  
 
 
Feedback on technical and non-technical skills 
(communication, teamwork etc.) 
 
Action plan to outline strategies for improvement 
In practice debriefing was observed to comprise: 
 
 
Feedback more often on negative than positive 
aspects of performance. Where positive 
feedback - non-specific 
 
Feedback on technical skills only 
 
 
Action plans for improvement rarely discussed 
 
Barriers to 
debriefing 
Participants’  perceived  barriers  to  debriefing  in  
practice were: 
 
Time  
 
 
 
Culture 
 
Competing clinical commitments 
 
Trainee-trainer rapport  
 
Observed barriers to debriefing in practice were: 
 
 
(Time questionable barrier as in many cases skin 
closure stage not used as opportunity for 
debrief)  
 
Culture 
 
Competing clinical commitments 
 
Competing educational commitments (if medical 
student also present in theatre, trainer reverts to 
didactic approach and neglects providing 
feedback to trainee) 
 
Case complexity (trainee has less opportunity to 
act as primary operator and therefore less 
opportunity for feedback on performance) 
 
(Ahmed et al. 2013)
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Appendix 20: Objective Structured Assessment of Debriefing Tool 
 (Arora et al. 2012b) 
DOMAIN 1 2 3 4 5 
1. APPROACH Confrontational, judgmental approach  Attempts to establish rapport with the learner(s) but is either over- 
critical or too informal in their approach 
 Establishes and maintains rapport throughout; uses a 
non- threatening but honest approach, creating a 
psychologically safe environment 
2.ENVIRONMENT Unclear expectations of the learner(s); no rules for 
learner(s) engagement 
 Explains purpose of the debriefing or learning session but does not 
clarify learner(s) expectations  
 Explains purpose of debrief and clarifies expectations 
and objectives from the learner(s) at the start  
3. ENGAGEMENT Purely didactic; facilitator doing all of the talking, and 
not involving passive learner(s) 
 Learner(s) participates in the discussion but mostly through closed 
questions; facilitator not actively inviting contributions from more 
passive learner(s) 
 Encourages participation of learner(s) through use of 
open-ended questions; invites learner(s) to actively 
contribute to discussion  
4. REACTION No  acknowledgment  of  learner(s)’s  reactions,  or  
emotional impact of the experience 
 Asks the learner(s) about their feelings but does not fully explore 
their reaction to the event  
 Fully  explores  learner(s)’s  reaction  to  the  event,  
dealing  appropriately  with  learner(s)’s  who  are  
unhappy 
5. REFLECTION No opportunity for self- reflection; learner(s) not 
asked to describe what actually happened in the 
scenario 
 Some description of events by facilitator, but with little self-reflection 
by learner(s) 
 Encourages learner(s) to self-reflect upon what 
happened using a step by step approach 
6. ANALYSIS Reasons and consequences of actions are not 
explored with the learner(s) 
 Some exploration of reasons and consequences of actions by 
facilitator (but not learner(s)), but no opportunity to relate to previous 
experience 
 Helps learner(s) to explore reasons and consequences 
of actions, identifying specific examples and relating to 
previous experience 
7. DIAGNOSIS No feedback on clinical or teamwork skills; does not 
identify performance gaps or provide positive 
reinforcement  
 Feedback provided only on clinical (technical) skills; focuses on 
errors and not purely on behaviours that can be changed.  
 Provides objective feedback on clinical (technical) and 
teamwork skills; identifies positive behaviours in 
addition to performance gaps, specifically targeting 
behaviours that can be changed 
 
8. APPLICATION No opportunity for learner(s) to identify strategies for 
future improvement or to consolidate key learning 
points 
 
 Some discussion of learning points and strategies for improvement 
but lack of application of this knowledge to future clinical practice 
 Reinforces key learning points identified by learner(s) 
and highlights how strategies for improvement could be 
applied to future clinical practice 
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Appendix 21:  Trainees’  assessment  of  debriefing  in  Surgery 
 
Date  
Senior surgeon initials  
Trainee initials  
Trainee gender  
Trainee grade  
 
BEFORE the case: Did you & your trainer clarify your expectations regarding what you would learn from this case?  
Yes / No  
AFTER the case: Did you receive feedback on your performance in this procedure (or the parts of it that you performed) either 
during or after the case?  Yes / No 
 
IF FEEDBACK RECEIVED: Please indicate how strongly you agree / disagree with the following statements  
(1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The feedback was delivered in a non-threatening but honest way      
I contributed to the discussion of my performance      
My reaction and views on my performance were acknowledged / discussed      
I was encouraged to reflect upon how I performed during the case      
The feedback helped me to understand the consequences of how I performed      
The feedback gave me a clear idea of what I did well      
The feedback gave me a clear idea of what I did not do well      
The feedback provided me with strategies to improve my future practice      
Overall, I am satisfied with the feedback on my technical skills      
Overall, I am satisfied with the feedback on my team-working skills      
 
  
 
 
 
